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ABSTRACT 
GOOGLE BOOKS AS INFRASTRUCTURE OF IN/JUSTICE: 
TOWARDS A SOCIOTECHNICAL ACCOUNT OF RAWLSIAN JUSTICE,  
INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
by 
 
Anna Lauren Hoffmann 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2014 
Under the Supervision of Dr. Michael Zimmer and Dr. Johannes Britz 
 
 
 
The Google Books project is germane for examining underappreciated dimensions of 
social justice and access to information from a Rawlsian perspective. To date, however, 
the standard account of Rawls as applied to information and technology has focused 
almost exclusively on rights to access and information as a primary good (Drahos 1996; 
van den Hoven and Rooksby 2008; Duff 2011). In this dissertation, the author develops 
an alternative to the standard account—the sociotechnical account—that draws on 
underappreciated resources available within discussions of Rawls’ work. Specifically, the 
author focuses on the importance of Rawls’ basic structure argument and the value of 
self-respect—two ideas that figure prominently in Rawls’ theory and have been discussed 
extensively by its critics. After developing this alternative account, the author undertakes 
a disclosive ethical analysis of Google Books from a social justice perspective. As a 
method, disclosive ethics is concerned with identifying morally opaque features of 
artifacts and systems. Following Brey (2000; 2010), the analysis proceeds along three 
levels: theoretical, disclosure, and application. At the theoretical level, extant Rawlsian 
applications are scrutinized and rearticulated in light of advanced informational and 
technological practices. At the disclosure level, morally opaque dimensions of Google 
 iii 
Books are disclosed as relevant to self-respect and social justice. In particular, the author 
focuses on three dimensions of the Books project that would go otherwise overlooked on 
the standard account of Rawls: quality of scans and metadata, visibility of indexes in 
Books’ preview mode, and Google’s conception of the value of information. At the 
application level, disclosed dimensions are examined according to both the standard and 
sociotechnical accounts. Ultimately, the author shows how, on a sociotechnical account, 
these three dimensions of Google Books raise otherwise overlooked questions regarding 
social justice, information, and technology today. 
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Chapter 1.0: Introduction 
Imagine sitting at your computer and, in less than a second, searching the full text 
of every book ever written. Imagine an historian being able to instantly find every 
book that mentions the Battle of Algiers. Imagine a high school student in 
Bangladesh discovering an out-of-print author held only in a library in Ann 
Arbor. Imagine one giant electronic card catalog that makes all the world's books 
discoverable with just a few keystrokes by anyone, anywhere, anytime.”  
 
–Eric Schmidt, “Books of Revelation,” The Wall Street Journal 
 
Google is so strange. It promises everything, but everything isn’t there. You type 
in the words for what you need, and what you need becomes superfluous in an 
instant, shadowed instantaneously by the things you really need, and none of them 
answerable by Google.  
 
–Ali Smith, There But For The 
 
 1.1 “It promises everything...” 
 This dissertation is about promises and what isn’t there.  
 It began with an interest in the promise of the Google Books project, Google’s 
massive and controversial book scanning initiative. Proponents have defended the project 
by pointing to its potential for promoting an “egalitarianism of information” and 
expanding social and economic opportunities, as when former Google CEO Eric Schmidt 
invited future users to “imagine the cultural impact of putting tens of millions of 
previously inaccessible volumes into one vast index, every word of which is searchable 
by anyone, rich and poor, urban and rural, First World and Third, en toute langue—and 
all, of course, entirely for free” [emphasis original] (Schmidt 2005, para. 9). The benefits 
of such an index proved central to the November 2013 decision in Authors Guild v. 
Google that ruled Google’s book scanning efforts protected by fair use. In the decision, 
presiding Judge Denny Chin listed as among the benefits of Google’s collection: 
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increased and efficient access to books; improved access for disabled persons through 
text-to-speech capabilities for digitized text; and the granting of new life to otherwise 
neglected and out-of-print works (Author’s Guild v. Google, 2013, p. 9-12). Overall, 
Judge Chin claimed that, “indeed, all society benefits” from the existence of Google’s 
massive digital library (Author’s Guild v. Google, 2013, p. 26). 
Critics have been hesitant to fully embrace Google Books, noting that the project 
might ultimately subvert the promises of equality and opportunity it claims to further. 
Vaidyanathan’s (2011) The Googlization of Everything carefully considers the 
consequences of surrendering control of the world’s knowledge—in the digital realm at 
least—to a private company. “Hanging over the promise of access to knowledge offered 
by Google Books,” Vaidyanathan (2011) writes, “is the specter of its opposite—
restrictions on open access to books, their contents, and the power that such access might 
help provide” (p. 156). Similarly, Waller (2009) warns that Google’s values of efficiency 
and technical rationality have come to supplant the liberal democratic values traditionally 
bestowed upon books by libraries. In narrower discussions, other critics argue Google’s 
privacy policies threaten to compromise intellectual freedom and expressive liberties 
(Grimmelmann, 2010; Zimmer, 2012). At the same time, challenges to existing copyright 
law posed by the Books project are indicative of the ongoing tension between intellectual 
property rights and control of information on the one hand and rights to access 
information on the other (Samuelson, 2009; Newman, 2011).  
These discussions invoke broad questions of liberty, equality, and social justice in 
the face of advanced information and communication technologies (ICTs). To date, 
however, few discussions about the project have thoroughly or explicitly engaged Google 
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Books across a wide range of liberal values, focusing instead on narrower issues of 
informational freedoms, control versus access, and social or economic opportunity. 
Initially, I was interested pushing beyond a single- or limited-issue focus to surface the 
broader themes and values latent these otherwise disparate discussions. I viewed the 
debates surrounding Google Books as fertile ground for attending to far-reaching 
questions of basic liberties, equality, and opportunity—all values relevant to liberal 
theories of social justice. 
To frame my thinking, I turned to the work of John Rawls—arguably the most 
important liberal political philosopher of the 20th century (Nagel, 1999). As G.A. Cohen 
(2008)—himself a sharp critic of Rawls—has put it, “at most two books in the history of 
Western political philosophy have a claim to be regarded as greater than [Rawls’] A 
Theory of Justice: Plato’s Republic and Hobbes’s Leviathan” (p. 11). For present 
purposes, Rawls’ work promised a comprehensive and systematic vision of social justice 
through which to assess the challenges presented by a large-scale information 
infrastructure like Google Books. Further, appealing to Rawls to address the moral and 
political challenges of informational and technological practices has scholarly 
precedent—notable efforts include Bell’s (1973) classic discussion of “post-industrial 
society,” Benkler’s (2006) liberal political economic analyses of networked production, 
van Dijk’s (2005) influential account of the “digital divide,” and Sclove’s (1992) work on 
democracy and technological design. Beyond these seminal works, Rawls has been 
employed extensively in conversations of morality, ethics, and ICTs (for example: Brey, 
2000a; van den Hoven & Rooksby, 2008; Raber, 2004). Inspired by previous efforts, I 
  
 
4 
sought to extend Rawlsian ideas to an assessment of the Google Books project and its 
capacities for both furthering and subverting social justice. 
As I sifted through various engagements with Rawls, however, I struggled with 
applications of his work. I failed to see in many of these discussions the parts of justice as 
fairness that had drawn me to Rawls in the first place—namely, his arguments regarding 
background justice and the social bases of self-respect. I also rarely saw information and 
technology scholars drawing on prominent feminist, leftist, and disabilities discussions of 
Rawlsian justice that had thoroughly informed my own understanding of his work. In 
addition, I saw many scholars explicitly rejecting Rawls work and abandoning his ideas 
for other approaches, in particular the “capabilities approach” advocated by economist 
Amartya Sen.  
Increasingly, my dissertation came to focus on sorting out and critically 
examining the picture of Rawls that has emerged in discussions of social justice, 
information, and technology today. I felt that if I wanted to address a project like Google 
Books using a Rawlsian frame, I needed to first attend to the frame itself. To that end, I 
have sought to identify shortcomings of extant applications and recover the promise of 
Rawls for attending to issues of social justice, information, and technology. 
1.2 Beyond Haves and Have-Nots: Identifying the Limits of Distributive Justice 
I began by pulling all the references to Rawls I could find from scholarly 
databases and journals where I knew explicit discussions of ethics, information, and 
technology lived. I read these works closely and inventoried their Rawlsian contents. 
Along the way, common themes emerged and I was able to uncover a clear picture of 
information and technology as important primary goods—that is, as vital instruments for 
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the pursuit and achievement of a wide range of human ends. Further, I found plentiful 
depictions of Rawls’ original position reasoning, his famous veil of ignorance, and his 
two principles of justice. It became clear that most applications of Rawls’ work were 
focused on the ways information and technology can be conceptualized as discrete and 
commodifiable goods and on prescriptions for how these goods should be distributed. 
Normatively speaking, these discussions were concerned with attending to the gap 
between information or technology “haves” and “have-nots.” 
Eventually, I came to understand these applications as the given or “standard” 
account of Rawls in discussions of social justice, information, and technology. Overall, 
the standard account is oriented towards problems related to the unequal distribution of 
informational and technological goods exacerbated by the rapid development and 
adoption of advanced ICTs (Lipinski & Britz, 2000; van den Hoven & Rooksby, 2008; 
Duff, 2008). Generally, work in this area is conducted under the assumption that, despite 
their empowering potential, new ICTs “may also maintain, and even exacerbate, existing 
inequalities as they are grafted onto preexisting socioeconomic structures” (van den 
Hoven & Rooksby, 2008, p. 377). The standard account’s focus on distributions is 
unsurprising, given Rawls’ own emphasis on distributive justice. However, I also found 
that much work on Rawls, information, and technology adopts Rawls’ distributive 
prescriptions without due consideration to the assumptions that underwrite his theory. 
Scholars in this area have failed to attend to the relevance of Rawls’ foundational 
assumptions for the sorts of complex networked relationships afforded by advanced ICTs 
today. Ultimately, I came to view this uncritical focus on distributions as a particular 
limitation of the standard account: by reducing issues of social justice, information, and 
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technology to purely distributive terms, all we are left to talk about are problems of 
distribution.  
But, as both critics and proponents of Rawls in other domains have pointed out, a 
focus on distributions tends to obscure or make invisible other dimensions that are 
equally important to the realization of social justice. Feminist critics of Rawls, for 
example, have long been aware of the unfair social burdens of reproductive labor that 
have historically fallen on women. Leftist critics underscore imbalances in economic 
decision-making power, arguing that distributions of goods cannot account for structural 
processes that allow such power to concentrate into relatively few hands. Disabilities 
critics have shown how normative standards of ability shape our world in ways that are 
biased, as when public buildings that lack access for wheelchairs impose a normative 
standard of mobility that excludes many otherwise capable persons. These critiques are 
attuned to the ways that the design of social, economic, and physical institutions assign 
roles and duties, structure decision making power, and impose normative standards in 
ways that are relevant to social justice but are not necessarily reducible to talk of 
distributions. Similarly, conceiving of information as a primary good cannot tell us much 
about the ways in which information is collected, framed, analyzed, presented, or 
packaged—only about the ways in which it is disseminated. By reducing informational 
and technological goods to just (or mere) things to be distributed according to certain 
principles, standard discussions of Rawls, information, and technology are unable to 
address the structures or processes that pattern distributions. Consequently, the structures 
and systems that allow for access to information—or the ways the these systems may 
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promote the distributions of some types of information while at the same time hindering 
others—go overlooked from the standpoint of Rawlsian justice. 
1.3 Framing the Argument 
1.3.1 Main ideas. In the face of advanced ICTs and large-scale information 
infrastructures like the Google Books project, discussions of social justice today must not 
only account for distributions of informational and technological goods, but also for the 
ways in which informational and technological systems fundamentally shape social, 
political, and economic relationships. We must be cognizant of the fact that technological 
devices and information systems exhibit their own values—and that those values exert 
their influence on the ideals of the societies within which they are embedded. Information 
and technology are not simply instrumental to, but intimately bound up with moral values 
like social justice, as they both mediate our perception of morally relevant aspects of 
particular situations and actively shape our responses to them (Verbeek, 2009).  
Against the focus on distributive justice, this dissertation advances an alternative 
to the standard account of Rawls in discussions of information and technology. It seeks to 
recover the importance of the basic structure argument and the social bases of self-respect 
within Rawls’ theory of justice—features of his work that have gone largely overlooked. 
It also draws regularly on insights from feminist, leftist, disabilities, and other critics of 
Rawls in order to arrive a more robust and inclusive picture of social justice than one 
concerned simply with information or technology “haves” and “have-nots.” By 
foregrounding these foundational elements and critical discussions, this alternative frame 
seeks to avoid a narrowly distributive focus in order to show how information and 
technology might be otherwise accounted for in a broadly Rawlsian manner. Ultimately, 
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the sociotechnical relations afforded by technological systems and information 
infrastructures are integral to the production and upkeep of Rawls’ basic structure and 
that technological artifacts and information systems are not merely instrumental to, but 
actively shape relations between institutions and individuals. In this way, sociotechnical 
relations can be viewed as integral to the promotion and preservation of what Rawls’ 
refers to as “background justice.” Accordingly, I will refer to this alternative approach as 
the sociotechnical account. As a normative project, the sociotechnical account seeks to 
identify the ways in which considerations of the design and implementation of 
information technology variously empowers some and disempowers others. 
1.3.2 Guiding questions. The questions that guide my inquiry in the following 
dissertation are: 
1. How has the work of John Rawls been applied in scholarly discussions of 
social justice, information, and technology? What dimensions of justice as 
fairness (and its attendant debates) have been marshaled for use? What 
dimensions have been overlooked? 
2. What alternative approaches for thinking about social justice, information, and 
technology can be recovered from these overlooked dimensions and discussions 
of Rawls’ work? 
3. How might both extant and alternative accounts of Rawls reveal different kinds 
of social justice issues raised by a large-scale, information infrastructure project 
like Google Books? 
1.3.3 Avoiding bad faith. Finally, this dissertation insists that it is not simply a 
matter of technological wonder that Google Books allows an imagined Bangladeshi high 
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schooler to access an out-of-print text in Michigan. Sociotechnical infrastructures like 
those that support the Books project are integral to discussions of the reach and 
requirements of social justice today, since “by mediating human experiences and 
practices...[our technologies] help to shape the quality of our lives and, more importantly, 
our moral actions and decisions" (Verbeek, 2009, p. 227). Accordingly, the site and scope 
of social justice must be formulated in ways that account for the global reach of today’s 
sociotechnical infrastructures. As political philosopher and Nobel Prize-winning 
economist Amartya Sen (2009) writes:  
The neighborhood that is constructed by our relations with distant people is 
something that has pervasive relevance to the understanding of justice in general, 
particularly so in the contemporary world. We are linked with each other through 
trade, commerce, literature, language, music, arts, entertainment, religion, 
medicine, healthcare, politics, news reports, media communication and other 
ties.... There are few non-neighbors left in the world today. (p. 172-173) 
Political philosopher Onora O’Neill (2000) expresses a similar sentiment when she notes 
that  
to deny the agency of others with whom we interact in...complex ways reeks of 
bad faith. Bad faith can be avoided only by counting as members of the plurality 
for whom principles of justice are to hold anybody with whom interaction is to be 
undertaken or held possible. (p. 157)  
Put another way, the normative demands of social justice obligate us to anybody with 
whom—to use Hume’s (1777/1975) phrase—“mutual connexions” are possible, as 
through the networks of information and knowledge exchange enabled by Google Books. 
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1.4 Disclosive Ethics and Google Books 
1.4.1 Google Books’ digital dominance. Beyond the ways in which Google 
Books invokes important liberal ideas of liberty, equality, and opportunity as mentioned 
above, analyses of the project take on additional importance in light of its dominance 
within the overall landscape of digital scanning initiatives. Given the massive size of the 
project, it has become difficult for other initiatives or organizations to justify the 
development of alternatives to Google’s collection. As Paul Duguid (2007) puts it, “with 
each scanned page, Google Books’ Library Project, by its quantity if not necessarily by 
its quality, makes the possibility of a better alternative unlikely. The Project may then 
become the library of the future, whatever its quality, by default” (para. 6). The inertia of 
the Books project is made particularly evident in the HathiTrust Digital Library, which 
consolidates collections from Google, OCA, Microsoft, and other initiatives for 
preservation and institutional access purposes (HathiTrust, 2014). Though HathiTrust 
aggregates content from various sources, more than 90 percent of the collection’s 10 
million book scans have been produced by Google (York, 2010; Conway, 2013). As a 
practical reality, then, Google Books has become the dominant digital library in the 
world—not only as a standalone collection, but by serving as the backbone for other 
digital library efforts as well. 
It is my aim to extend discussion of the relationship of Google Books and social 
justice by surfacing additional features of the project that might otherwise remain opaque 
from a moral point of view. Traditionally, applied ethical analyses of information and 
technology focus on morally salient problems—in the case of Google books, obvious 
issues surrounding privacy, control/access, and censorship have been thoroughly 
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discussed. However, there are additional dimensions of the Google Books project that are 
of moral import, though their relevance may be less immediately evident. In this 
dissertation, I identify and discuss three such dimensions: 1) quality of scans and 
metadata; 2) visibility (and invisibility) of information work patterned by the service’s 
snippet and preview mechanisms; and 3) the value of information as conceptualized in 
the context of Google search as opposed to a library setting. To surface the moral 
relevance of these features, I rely on the method of disclosive ethics as developed by 
Brey (2000a) and others (see, for example: Introna, 2005). As discussed in more detail 
below, disclosive ethics is concerned with moving past obvious moral issues raised by 
technology use to also address moral issues obscured by the development and design of 
information technologies. In particular, I am interested in bringing attention to 
dimensions of the development and design of the Google Books project relevant to a 
theory of social justice—dimensions that are not immediately apparent when looked at 
through the standard account’s focus on distributive issues. While moving along these 
three different dimensions, I hope to show how, under the sociotechnical account, certain 
features of sociotechnical systems move to the foreground while the distributive concerns 
that dominate the standard account recede into the background. In this way, Google 
Books can be viewed as potentially hindering the realization of social justice in ways that 
are not reducible to problems of distribution. 
1.4.2 Disclosive ethics. I adopt as a framework for the present analysis the 
method of “disclosive ethics” developed by Brey (2000a) Disclosive ethics was 
developed, in part, as a response to perceived shortcomings in standard approaches to 
computer ethics prevalent during the 1980s and 1990s. These standard approaches, as 
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with other areas of applied ethics, were largely concerned with developing ethical 
analyses and principles for guiding human action in practice. In the case of computer 
ethics, early scholars and professionals were concerned almost exclusively with 
normative evaluations of computer use. Towards the end of the 1990s, Brey and others 
began arguing that, while use should remain a central concern, information and computer 
ethics should also attend to the development, design, and management of computer 
technology. In particular, Brey (2000b) argued for a more broadly inclusive applied 
ethics—one that accounts for all practices that essentially involve computers, including 
(but not limited to) “the use, development, regulation, management, advocacy and 
advertisement of computer technology” (p. 125). Broadening the scope of applied ethics 
in technology requires researchers and ethicists to not only focus on actions, but to also 
attend to the products of actions—that is, to also pay further attention to “computer 
systems and software, manuals, advertisements, and law and policies regulating the use 
of computers” (Brey, 2000b, p. 125). These products  “deserve special mention because 
their moral properties may be analyzed independently from the actions that have lead to 
them” (Brey, 2000b, p. 125). In short, applied ethics for technology must take up both 
actions and the products of actions. 
In order to show how technological artifacts or systems might be analyzed 
independently of their use, Brey (2000a) proposed a method for exposing moral 
dimensions of technology that might not be immediately obvious in our interactions with 
technological devices and artifacts. While standard models of applied computer ethics 
focused on the most salient—or, “morally transparent”—actions involving technology, 
“like software theft, hacking, electronic monitoring, or Internet pornography” (Brey, 
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2000a, p. 10), the disclosive model recognizes that other moral dimensions of technology 
are less obvious. For instance, the methods of online tracking used by many private 
companies are invisible or unknown to average users (Brey, 2000a, p. 11). Similarly, 
certain technological practices may give the appearance of being morally neutral when 
they are, in fact, value-laden. The work of Introna and Nissenbaum (2000), for example, 
exposes how the search results produced by search engine algorithms—which, on the 
surface, appear to innocuously help users navigate the Web—are biased towards large 
sites or towards sites designed by particularly savvy computer professionals. As a result, 
smaller websites and the voices of the less computer literate are regularly discriminated 
against by routine practices of online search. The method of disclosive ethics seeks to 
surface these “morally opaque” features of technological artifacts and systems so that 
they may become the subject of ethical scrutiny. 
Other scholars have further developed the disclosive approach. According to 
Introna (2005), the method of disclosive ethics allows us to address a number of ethical 
and political problems raised by the increasing ubiquity of information technology in 
human activity. Introna (2005), argues that much of contemporary information 
technology “is mostly not evident, obvious, transparent or open to inspection by the 
ordinary everyday person affected by it. It is rather obscure, subsumed and black-boxed 
in ways that only makes its surface available for inspection” (p. 75). These “black-boxes” 
keep potentially meaningful questions of ethics and politics hidden from plain view, 
dismissed as innocuous matters of functionality and design. But, Introna (2007; see also: 
Brigham & Introna, 2007) argues that viewing problems of technological design as 
merely pragmatic questions leaves “technology as such…unproblematised” and 
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reinforces an “ontological separation between the technical world and the social world” 
that ignores the ways in which technology and society are co-constitutive (p. 11). Against 
this ontological distinction, Introna (2005) insists that “many seemingly pragmatic or 
technical decisions may have very important and profound consequences for those 
excluded” (p. 78). Applied ethics in technology, then, should seek “to trace all the moral 
implications…from what seems to be simple or pragmatic decisions…through to social 
practices, and ultimately, to the production of particular social orders, rather than others” 
(Introna, 2005, p. 78-79). As method, disclosive ethics is particularly well suited to the 
task of exposing the ways in which informational and technological systems “[exclude] 
some and not others—irrespective of whether this was intended by the designers or not” 
(Introna , 2005, p. 79). 
In the present analysis, I follow Brey’s (2000a; 2010) formulation of disclosive 
ethics as proceeding along three levels: disclosure, theory, and application. At the 
disclosure level, morally opaque features of a given technology are surfaced and 
disclosed as morally relevant. At the theoretical level, available moral theories and 
analytic frameworks are identified and scrutinized in light of the advanced informational 
and technological practices in question. At the application level, features surfaced at the 
disclosure level are subjected to analysis according to the moral frameworks introduced 
and scrutinized at the theoretical level. The application level, then, is ultimately where 
moral deliberations take place (Brey, 2010, p. 53). In following Brey’s multi-level 
analysis, I adopt a straightforwardly normative approach to disclosive ethics as opposed 
to the more descriptive approach advocated by Introna (2005). For Brey, relevant moral 
values are identified beforehand while, for Introna, the identification of relevant values is 
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to be the outcome of—and not the motivation for—undertaking a disclosive analysis (see: 
Introna, 2005; Brey, 2010, p. 54). For present purposes, Brey’s model is appropriate since 
I have already identified a concern for the moral value of social justice in discussions of 
information and technology. 
1.4.3 Levels of analysis. Overall, I am primarily concerned with critically 
examining the ways in which Rawls’ influential theory of social justice has been 
conceived of and applied to issues of information and technology. Consequently, much of 
this dissertation takes place at the theoretical level—it is primarily concerned with 
identifying and scrutinizing an applied moral framework. At this level, I introduce extant 
applications of Rawls to issues of social justice, information, and technology and identify 
their strengths and potential shortcomings. In response, I develop an alternative account 
that builds on underappreciated resources from Rawls’ work. Following Brey’s break 
from “standard” computer ethics, I will refer to extant applications as the standard 
account of Rawls in information and technology while the alternative account will be 
referred to as the sociotechnical account.  
In the final chapters, I move from the theoretical to the disclosive and application 
levels to demonstrate the different ways both the standard and sociotechnical accounts of 
Rawls address issues of social justice, information, and technology. To do so, I apply 
both the standard and sociotechnical accounts to Google Books. Given its massive size 
and the range of stakeholders invoked, Google’s massive book digitization project is 
germane for demonstrating the applicability of both the standard and sociotechnical 
accounts of Rawlsian social justice to informational and technological issues. As a 
project, its impact stretches from individual authors to multinational corporations to the 
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(potentially global) reading public. As a large-scale initiative, is a rich example of the 
complex sociotechnical relations informational and technological systems organizes 
between information, institutions, and individuals. As a practical reality, Google Books 
has become—and is likely to remain for some time—the dominant digital library in the 
world. In the present case, I use Google Books as illustrative of the idea that the 
development, design, and dissemination of certain technological artifacts, platforms, or 
systems have consequences that are of concern for a conception of social justice. 
The analysis of Google Books proceeds in two stages. First, I work to surface 
morally opaque features of Google Books (disclosive level) along three dimensions: 1) 
quality of scans and metadata; 2) visibility (and invisibility) of information work 
patterned by the service’s snippet and preview mechanisms; and 3) the value of 
information as conceptualized in the context of Google search as opposed to a library 
setting. Second, I examine each of these features according to both the standard and 
sociotechnical accounts of Rawls sketched earlier (application level). While moving 
along these three different dimensions, I hope to show how the sociotechnical account 
foregrounds non-distributive dimensions of social justice that go otherwise overlooked by 
the standard account’s focus on information rights and goods within a distributive 
framework.  
1.4.4 Definitions. It will be useful to lay out some more or less concise 
definitions of “information,” “technology,” and “sociotechnical”—terms I employ 
throughout the dissertation. I view “information” and “technology” here as separate, but 
related concepts. Though at times a simple reference to “ICTs” (information and 
communication technologies) might seem appropriate, I will continue to enforce a 
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separation between information and technology in order to keep in view the idea that 
moral issues raised by information are not wholly reducible to talk of technological 
artifacts and systems. For example, discussions of the moral value of informational 
privacy today are not wholly tied to any particular technological system, though 
contemporary ICTs might challenge our notions of privacy in many ways.  And, while I 
am primarily concerned with ICTs in my discussion—that is, technologies for the 
creation, storage, organization, and dissemination of information—I do not want to 
preclude the relevance of other types of technology for social justice, especially 
productive or industrial technologies. Similarly, I am also concerned with information 
systems—like standards and classification schemes—that might not be immediately 
thought of as “technology” in the same way that one thinks of computers or mobile 
phones as “technology.” In referring to “information and technology,” then, I seek to 
make room for a range of systems and infrastructures within my discussion. 
In enforcing this distinction, I do not at the same time mean to suggest that 
concepts of information and technology are wholly exclusive. Following Drahos (1996), 
there are times when information may fruitfully be considered an “abstract object,” 
separable from any given material expression, representative of certain “core structures” 
for determining “whether disparate physical objects are the same or similar, or resemble 
each other” (Drahos, 154). But, while an abstract conception of information might be 
useful in some contexts, here it is stressed that information is ultimately manifested and 
known through material systems and physical objects like technological artifacts or 
information infrastructures. Importantly, these systems and objects are not blank slates 
exclusively shaped by the information they distribute; rather, the relationship between 
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information as an abstract object and its physical manifestation is dialectical—
information both informs and is informed by the values and affordances of the physical 
objects through which it is expressed. 
The relationship between the individual persons, information, and technology 
with which I am concerned is best expressed through the idea of the “sociotechnical.” For 
present purposes, the sociotechnical can be defined in line with Kline's (1980/2003) 
“sociotechnical system of use," that is, "a system using combinations of hardware and 
people (and usually other elements) to accomplish tasks that humans cannot perform 
unaided by such systems—to extend human capacities" (p. 211). This definition accounts 
for technological artifacts themselves (hardware), limited systems of simple manufacture 
(the persons, procedures, and resources that go into the making of technological 
artifacts), as well as for the teleological conception of technology as a means or method 
for accomplishing this or that task (Kline, 1980/2003). Combined, these various 
conceptions of technology make up the broader sociotechnical systems of use with which 
I am concerned.  
In some sense, human societies have always been sociotechnical—we have 
always been, among other things, "tool making animals" (Gehlen, 1983/2003, p. 213). At 
the same time, human tools have long been concerned with the preservation, 
organization, and dissemination of information in a variety of formats, from cave 
paintings to clay tablets to the printing press. Today, the relationship between information 
and technology is further complicated by the widespread adoption of advanced networks 
and ICTs. These advances have allowed developed nations to transition from largely 
industrial to informational technological infrastructures marked, in part, by the increasing 
  
 
19 
importance of intellectual and intangible (i.e., informational) assets and information-
intensive services in our everyday lives (Floridi, 2010a). Increasingly, the industrial focus 
on technologies for producing physical goods is supplanted by an emphasis on those that 
produce informational goods. Meanwhile, mass production is usurped by mass 
communication and our social and economic lives revolve less around an industrial 
infrastructure designed to support the movement of material wealth, and instead become 
dominated by infrastructures designed to support flows of information. 
1.4.5 Limitations. Adopting any framework means adopting both its possibilities 
and its limitations. In appealing to Rawls, the sociotechnical account inherits a 
controversial view of individuals and agency. The reader will notice that I avoid use of 
the term “agent,” save for instances where cited authors and works have used the term. 
Instead, I opt for the term individual or, as is sometimes the case, persons. While agents 
may be more precise in some places, I want to set aside a debate over what constitutes 
agency itself. Instead, by talking about individuals (or persons), I mean simply to adopt 
an idea of human agents as neither wholly independent from nor overdetermined by 
social forces. I assume, from the start, that individuals are capable of undertaking actions 
to some extent (though the complexity of those actions may vary). As per liberalism 
generally, I adopt a commitment to the individual person as the ultimate unit of moral 
concern. Though there are, perhaps, certain moral issues better captured by talk of groups 
or communities (that is, that cannot be reduced to talk of individual members), I ascribe 
to the idea that the whole of morality or ethics cannot be adequately captured at the level 
of groups and that, to some extent, a focus on individuals is unavoidable.  
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 In addition, I follow Rawls in affirming the idea that social justice applies in the 
first to social institutions—though I aim to account for the relationship between 
institutions and individuals in sociotechnical terms. Or, put another way, I take the 
position that social justice is concerned with the impact of social, economic, political, and 
technological structures and systems on individuals’ life prospects. Despite this 
institutional focus, I want to resist the Rawlsian picture of individual agency within 
institutional structures as ideal and perfectly executable. Instead, I follow O’Neill (2000) 
in emphasizing individual agency as vulnerable and in need of support. A focus on 
vulnerability will help keep this work cognizant of the ways social justice issues can 
manifest themselves along complex, often intersecting racial, gender, sexual, educational, 
religious, socioeconomic, and other lines. In particular, the various feminist, leftist, 
capabilities, disabilities, and other critiques draw on this work are cited explicitly because 
of their emphasis on the vulnerabilities of individuals in a variety of contexts—from the 
home to the workplace to interactions with technology. To be sure, I do not claim to 
account for all dimensions or intersections relevant to an account of information, 
technology, and social justice—rather, I simply mean to keep their relevance visible 
along the way.  
1.5 Ideal versus Non-ideal Theory 
 Adopting a Rawlsian framework also means adopting—to some extent—a 
commitment to the value of ideal theory as opposed to non-ideal theory. Put briefly, the 
debate between ideal and non-ideal theory is a debate over the methodology used to 
arrive at normative prescriptions of justice (Valentini, 2012). Often times, the distinction 
between ideal and non-ideal theorizing is one between utopian and so-called “realist” 
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reasoning about justice. On the ideal—or utopian—account, principles of justice are 
taken to be independent of factual constraints or contextual considerations (Valentini, 
2012, p. 657). Non-ideal—or “realist”—accounts, on the other hand, consider utopian 
ideals of social justice imaginable, but not feasible (Valentini, 2012, p. 659). Instead, 
principles of justice should be heavily informed by practical, real-world, and context-
bound considerations. On other readings of the ideal/non-ideal distinction, the contrast is 
between end- or ideal-state and transitional theorizing. On the former, ideal theory is 
viewed as describing a long-term goal of perfect justice whereas the latter—exemplified, 
in particular, by the work of Amartya Sen (2009)—works to articulate the intermediate 
steps necessary in order to achieve ideals of justice.1 
 The relationship between Rawlsian theory and ideal/non-ideal theorizing is 
disputed. Some fully “utopian” theorists of justice take his work to be too beholden to 
considerations of feasibility, as represented by his assumptions of limited altruism and 
moderate scarcity. Heavily realist or transitional accounts, on the other hand, find Rawls’ 
theory too idealistic and unable to offer real, concrete prescriptions for achieving justice 
in the real world. For the purposes of this dissertation, I assume Rawls’ theory to be—in 
many ways—ideal, but I also view ideal theorizing as both useful and unavoidable. 
Accounts of justice that are not beholden to any feasibility constraints do, indeed, risk 
irrelevance. However, accounts of justice that are overly burdened by real-world 
considerations run the arguably more dangerous risk of biasing theorizing about social 
justice towards existing practices and institutions. In this sense, I view the abstracting 
away (to some degree) from actual circumstances as useful for helping articulate a vision 
                                                
1 For a more comprehensive review of various interpretations of the ideal/non-ideal distinction, see 
Valentini, 2012. 
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of justice beyond the status quo. Further, such abstractions are, as O’Neill (2000) has it, 
innocuous and unavoidable (p. 67). “We abstract whenever we make claims or decisions 
or follow policies or react to persons on a basis that brackets some predicates…. All 
normative principles and standards, including principles of justice, are always, inevitably 
and properly abstract” (O’Neill, 2000, p. 67). Idealizations, on the other hand, do not 
simply bracket certain predicates, rather, they “either [deny] those predicates…or [assert] 
that absent predicates obtain…. When this happens, reasoning may be based on false, 
idealized conceptions, of reason and action, of persons and situations” (p. 68). As 
opposed to a concern over the value of ideal versus non-ideal theorizing, the more 
immediately pressing issue for this dissertation concerns the soundness of the ideals and 
assumptions as to the relevance of information and technology for realizing social justice 
today. 
1.6 Connections to Other Research: Information, Infrastructure, and Values  
As a method, disclosive ethics has seen a range of applications, including online 
communities (Skog, 2011), social networking applications (Light & McGrath, 2010), 
facial recognition systems (Introna, 2005), and virtual reality technologies (Brey, 2008b). 
Of particular relevance to the present study is Beghtol’s (2005) disclosive analysis of 
ethical issues in the creation and maintenance of knowledge representations and 
organization systems. According to Beghtol (2005), insufficient attention has been paid 
to the ethical foundations of these systems and the means by which they spread 
information and knowledge “across cultural, social, national, spatial, temporal, linguistic, 
and domain boundaries” (p. 903). Brey’s version of the disclosive method is employed in 
order to surface morally opaque features of the ontologies, metadata schemes, and other 
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taxonomies that permit knowledge organization systems to function. Beghtol’s insights 
into the moral dimensions of these systems speaks directly to the Google Books project 
and its efforts to scan, index, and make searchable more than 30 million books from 
libraries around the world. Similarly, the works of Introna and Nissenbaum (2000) and 
Zimmer (2008a; 2008b; 2012) on the ethics of search engines will inform discussion of 
the moral dimensions of the search algorithms and practices by which Google makes its 
collection of books available. Indeed, search engines have firmly established themselves 
as “centers of gravity” for access to digital information, including (but not limited to) 
academic research, news, financial data, and commercial information (Zimmer, 2008b, p. 
82-83). But search engines are not innocuous information-delivery systems—as with 
information technology broadly, the design of search engines and their algorithms can 
have (intended or unintended) moral consequences.  
In addition to being a multi-level approach, Brey (2000b) argues that disclosive 
analyses should also be multi-disciplinary, drawing on a wide range of theoretical and 
practical considerations. In this spirit, I draw on literature from the Rawlsian political 
philosophical tradition, philosophy of technology, as well as broader discussions of 
Rawls in information and computer ethics literature from the last three decades. In 
addition, I often turn to ideas from feminist, leftist, disabilities, and queer theorists to 
keep the proposed sociotechnical account inclusive of a broader range of issues than the 
standard account and its binaristic focus on informational “haves” and “have-nots.” In 
doing so, I resist the view that social justice issues with regard to information and 
technology are wholly reducible matters of distributive justice.  
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Despite explicit adoption of the method of disclosive ethics, I also acknowledge 
affinities with the method of “infrastructural inversion” developed and employed by 
Bowker (1994; see also: Star & Ruhleder, 1996; Bowker & Star, 1999; Lee, Dourish, & 
Mark, 2006). Infrastructural inversion is “a methodological device, a figure/ground 
reversal that places infrastructure in the foreground and reveals its relational nature” (Lee 
et al, 2006, n.p.). “[It] is a struggle against the tendency of infrastructure to disappear 
(except when breaking down). It means learning to look closely at technologies and 
arrangements that, by design and by habit, tend to fade into the woodwork” (Bowker & 
Star, 1999, p. 34). Through the lens of infrastructural inversion, my analysis can be read 
as shifting the focus on Google Books from one that conceives of the service as a 
“what”—that is, as simply a tool for information access—and, instead, towards 
understanding the service as a “when,” occurring, following Star and Ruhleder (1996) 
“when local practices are afforded by a larger-scale technology, which can then be used 
in a natural, ready-to-hand fashion” (p. 6). Paying due methodological attention to the 
architecture and use of sociotechnical systems will serve to keep morally relevant 
features of the sociotechnical system in question—in this instance, the Google Books 
project—from “fading into the woodwork” during the course of the analysis (Bowker & 
Star, 1999, p. 33). 
Finally, I present this study as an attempt to parse out and reclaim the value of 
social justice in technological contexts from talk of values and technology broadly. Often 
times, and as Langdon Winner (1986) lamented more than 20 years ago, discussions of 
values “[act] like a lawn mower that cuts flat whole fields of meaning and leaves them 
characterless” (p. 158). While the situation Winner described in the late 1980s has 
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improved, there is still a tendency to talk in overly broad terms, lumping specific values 
like privacy, efficiency, justice, trust, security, and autonomy together with little regard to 
their specific intellectual and practical histories. But, as Flanagan, Howe, and 
Nissenbaum (2008) argue, a “sound grasp of value terms is one of the necessary links 
between values and specific design features” since “the choices designers make in 
shaping [technological design] will be guided by their understandings of [relevant] value 
concepts” (p. 326-327). 
1.7 Chapter Outline 
The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as follows: 
Chapter 2: This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of Rawls’ theory of 
justice, paying particular attention to the foundational assumptions and model-
conceptions that underwrite his work. 
Chapter 3: This chapter reviews applications of Rawls to moral and political 
issues relative to information and technology. The review is divided into two 
parts: 1) a broad overview of the ways in which Rawls has been applied and 2) a 
more detailed review of major Rawlsian proponents. Combined, these 
applications form what I refer to as the standard account of Rawls, information, 
and technology. 
Chapter 4: Against the standard account, this chapter develops an alternative 
approach—the sociotechnical account—to Rawls’ work that foregrounds 
problems of background justice and self respect for a theory of justice. The 
development of the sociotechnical account proceeds in two parts: 1) it begins with 
a discussion of the ways in which sociotechnical relations help produce and 
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maintain the background conditions that constitute Rawls’ basic structure and 2) it 
builds on this discussion of the productive role of sociotechnical relations to show 
how technological systems and information infrastructures can both support and 
undermine the development of self-respect. 
Chapter 5: This chapter advances an analysis of Google Books according to both 
the standard and sociotechnical accounts of Rawls, information, and technology. 
In particular, three features of the Books project are disclosed and assessed: 1) 
quality of scans and metadata; 2) visibility (and invisibility) of information work 
patterned by the service’s snippet and preview mechanisms; and 3) the value of 
information as conceptualized in the context of Google search as opposed to a 
library setting. 
Chapter 6: The final chapter presents a brief reflection on the preceding 
arguments and suggests some ways in which the sociotechnical account can be 
further developed for application beyond Google Books. 
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Chapter 2.0: John Rawls and Justice As Fairness 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a comprehensive overview of Rawls’ theory of social 
justice, paying particular attention to its foundational assumptions and methodological 
commitments. This overview is integral to the later development of the sociotechnical 
account, as it draws on underappreciated or overlooked resources yet available in Rawls’ 
work. The chapter begins by placing Rawls’ work in context, discussing its influences, 
and drawing connections connections to the liberal political philosophical tradition 
broadly. From there, Rawls’ methodological and theoretical commitments are introduced. 
After situating Rawls’ work, I sketch his theory of justice—justice as fairness—and some 
of its main ideas, focusing on 1) his argument from the basic structure and the idea of 
public reason and 2) his model-conceptions of “free and equal moral persons,” “well-
ordered society,” and the original position. At the end of the chapter is an overview of 
capabilities, communitarian, leftist, feminist, and disabilities debates surrounding Rawls’ 
work that further clarify (and problematize) justice as fairness. Ultimately, the overview 
presented in this chapter will provide a baseline against which applications of Rawls in 
information and technology can be reviewed. 
2.1.1 Situating Rawls. Committed to the idea that there can be a reasonable, 
public basis for argument on moral issues, Rawls’ life work sets out to develop such a 
basis for reasoning about social justice in contemporary liberal democratic societies.   
This commitment is made explicit in his early writing:  
...does there exist a reasonable method for validating and invalidating given or 
proposed moral rules and those decisions made on the basis of them? For to say of 
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scientific knowledge that it is objective is to say that the propositions expressed 
therein may be evidenced to be true by a reasonable and reliable method, that is, 
by the rules and procedures of what we may call ‘inductive logic’; and, similarly, 
to establish the objectivity of moral rules, and the decisions based upon them, we 
must exhibit the decision procedure, which can be shown to be both reasonable 
and reliable, at least in some cases, for deciding between moral rules and lines of 
conduct consequent to them (Rawls, 1951/1999a, p. 1). 
Initially, Rawls had hoped that such a procedure might be useful for constructing a wide 
range ethical principles, but as his career progressed he refined and restricted the scope of 
its applicability, eventually limiting it to the construction of principles of justice (see, 
generally: Rawls, 1980/1999d; Rawls, 1993; O’Neill, 2003). Perhaps his most notable 
achievement was the development of the “original position”—a constructive procedure 
for modeling rational decision-making under conditions that are fair (hence the name of 
his theory, justice as fairness). As I discuss below, this procedure allowed Rawls to 
revive and further the idea of a social contract as found in the work of Hobbes, Locke, 
and—in different ways—Kant and Rousseau. 
 2.1.2 Historical context.2 In Rawls (1971b) own words, the aim of his theory “is 
to generalize and carry to a higher order of abstraction the traditional theory of the social 
contract as represented by Locke, Rousseau, and Kant” (p. xviii). He also views the role 
of a social contract much as Kant did—not as an actual agreement but, instead, as a 
hypothetical construct. For Rawls (and for Kant) it is not important for citizens to have 
ever actually agreed to a social contract for mutual advantage, but that a theory of justice 
                                                
2 I am indebted to the work of Samuel Freeman (2007) for informing much of my understanding of Rawls 
in both historical and theoretical context. 
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could be hypothetically agreed to by ideal citizens under conditions that are fair. His 
Kantian affinities are further evident in his assertions as to the intrinsic worth and dignity 
of all pesons. Rawls (1971b) makes this idea explicit at the start of Theory: “Each person 
possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole 
cannot override” (p. 3). His commitment to human dignity is further evident in extended 
discussions of the role of self-respect (Rawls, 1971b, p. 386-391) and in his assertions 
that individuals should not have to debase themselves to earn a living (Rawls, 2001, p. 
177).  
Though Rawls is situated in the liberal tradition, his work differs in important 
ways from other strands of liberalism, such as the classical liberal economic thought 
descended from the work of Adam Smith. Unlike with classical liberalism, Rawls’ work 
does not view liberalism as a fundamentally or narrowly economic doctrine tied to the 
rise of capitalism and market economic thought. Rather, Rawls (2007a) locates the roots 
of liberalism in the 16th and 17th century Wars of Religion and the Reformation, which 
he views as “ending with the, at first, reluctant acceptance of the principle of toleration 
and liberty of conscience” (p. 11). For Rawls, then, liberalism is fundamentally 
concerned with ideals of toleration and the promotion of  basic freedoms of conscience, 
expression, and association. Rawls also describes liberalism as an incomplete and 
ongoing project. He approvingly cites the idea of political theory as outlined by R.G. 
Collingwood: “The history of political theory is not the history of different answers to 
one and the same question, but the history of a problem more or less changing, whose 
solution was changing with it” (Collingwood as cited in Rawls, 2007b, p. 103).3  
                                                
3It is important to note that Rawls does not profess to be a historian—let alone a historian of liberalism —
and I do not mean to implicate him as such. Rather, I simply present this sketch to better understand the 
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Liberalism, then, is not to be viewed as an answer to some singular question (or limited 
set of questions), but, rather, as a rough set of core commitments evolving alongside new 
or emergent problems—put another way, it is a solution that changes along with its 
problems. 
By locating the foundations of liberalism in religious toleration and the 
Reformation, liberalism expresses a certain modern character. This is not to say, 
however, that various elements of liberalism were not espoused or advocated for by 
societies or philosophers prior to the Reformation (to assert as much would be plainly 
untrue). As Ryan (2007) points out, “[much] of what liberals value is not distinctively 
modern because is what is valued by almost anyone” (p. 5). Rather, it is liberalism’s 
worldview—the reasons why liberals value what they do—that makes it distinctly 
modern. Ryan (2007) describes the unique confluence of historical events that imbues 
liberalism with its essential modern character in the following: 
The Protestant contribution is the claim that as individuals every one of us is 
under an obligation to consider our place in the world, and our relationship to 
God, and to be ready at every moment to give an account of ourselves and our 
deed to the Creator. Because we are obliged to render an honest account, we must 
think for ourselves and say plainly what we think; this yields...the right of private 
judgement and therefore a genuine moral individualism. The other aspect is the 
destruction of the teleological conception of the universe [that] was to undermine 
the naturalness of rank and order. No longer could a hereditary and hierarchical 
                                                                                                                                            
historical roots of liberalism as Rawls himself seemed understand them. In Rawls (2007a) words, “This is a 
philosopher’s schematic version of speculative history, and to be recognized as such” (footnote 9, p. 11). 
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system of ranks gain validity by claiming to be inscribed in the natural order. (p. 
6) 
 Jeremy Waldron (1987), in his important paper on the theoretical foundations of 
liberalism, emphasizes the connection between liberalism and the Enlightenment broadly, 
which lent liberalism its “confidence in the human ability to make sense of the world, to 
grasp its regularities and fundamental principles, to predict its future, and to manipulate 
its powers for the benefit of mankind” (p. 134). In the Enlightenment, he further claims, 
one finds the source of a set of specifically liberal normative attitudes regarding the 
justification of social and political institutions (Waldron, 1987, p. 134). It is the demand 
for “intelligible justifications in social and political life” that Waldron (1987) puts at the 
foundation of liberalism (p. 135). Importantly, such justifications “must be available in 
principle for everyone, for society is to be understood by the individual mind, not by 
tradition or sense of a community” (Waldron, 1987, p. 135).  
Galston (1995) also describes the different commitments of liberalism as 
emanating from both Enlightenment and Reformation traditions. The Enlightenment 
tradition of liberalism emphasizes reason as ultimate authority—institutions must be 
justified by appeal to individual reason, rather than tradition or divine authority (Galston, 
1995, p. 525-526). Rawls (2007a), too, affirms the Enlightenment tradition of legitimacy 
as foundational when he defines a legitimate regime as one where  
political and social institutions are justifiable to all citizens—to each and every 
one—by addressing their reason, theoretical and practical. Again: a justification 
of the institutions of the social world must be, in principle, available to everyone, 
and so justifiable to all who live under them (p. 13).  
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In contrast, the Reformation tradition is foremost concerned with religious diversity and 
toleration (Galston, 1995, p. 525-526). Both the Enlightenment and Reformation 
traditions inform Rawls’ particular view of liberalism. 
Outside of social contract liberals, Rawls was also influenced proponents of 
utilitarianism. Though he ultimately argues against principles of justice rooted in 
utilitarian thought, he relies at different points on ideas developed by Hume, Sidgwick, 
and Mill in particular. From Hume, Rawls inherits a focus on institutions and practices as 
the subject of justice, as well as a vision of the circumstances of justice (that is, 
circumstances marked by the need for social cooperation in the face of moderate 
scarcity). The influence of Hume is particularly evident in his early work on different 
conceptions of rules—for Rawls (as for Hume), there is an important distinction to be 
made between justifying a practice and justifying an action that falls under a particular 
practice (see, generally: Rawls, 1955/1999b). Theories of justice, Rawls thinks, properly 
apply to the former and not the latter—as moral and political doctrines, they apply not to 
particular actions that fall underneath moral or political practices but, rather, they serve to 
justify moral or political practices themselves. In other words, theories of justice should 
work to regulate institutional and social practices and not individual behavior. This 
distinction is important for understanding Rawls’ assertion that his principles of justice 
apply to the “basic structure of society” and not to individual action. From Sidgwick, 
Rawls inherits the systematic comparison of ethical positions that underpins his argument 
for his principles of justice against utilitarian (and other) principles in the original 
position. Finally, Rawls finds in Mill a powerful defense of basic liberties like freedoms 
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of conscience and expression—liberties that Rawls’ grants lexical priority throughout his 
work. 
2.1.3 Theoretical context. Methodologically, Rawls’ work represents a type of 
moral constructivism. Early in his writing, Rawls’ constructivism is explicitly Kantian, 
though he later attempts to articulate a form of constructivism that is purely political and 
justifiable apart from its earlier Kantian formulation. While contemporary proponents of 
Kantian-influenced moral constructivism differ (sometimes markedly), they all share a 
commitment to the idea that moral principles do not require metaphysical vindication.4 
Instead, Rawls’ brand of constructivism “holds that moral objectivity is to be understood 
in terms of a suitably constructed social point of view that all can accept. Apart from the 
procedure of constructing the principles of justice, there are no moral facts” (Rawls, 
1980/1999d, p. 307). This approach categorically differs from justifications rooted in 
moral realism, which holds that moral concepts refer to independent moral facts that, 
once apprehended, become self-evident.5 For realists, articulating moral principles is a 
matter of developing methods for arriving at these independently-given facts. 
Constructivism, on the other hand, does not commit itself to the existence of an order of 
independently-given moral facts. Instead, moral principles are adopted not because they 
are true, but because they issue “from social procedures that are, in some sense, suitable” 
(Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, 1992, p. 139). Put another way: for moral realism the 
justification of moral principles is best characterized as an epistemological problem, 
while for constructivists it is a practical one. The practical task before the constructivist, 
                                                
4 One point on which Kantian constructivists regularly disagree is on the types of moral principles that may 
be constructed. For example, Rawls (1993) held that only principles of justice could be constructed while 
Thomas Scanlon (1998) extends the concept of construction to a range of moral issues. 
5 For a detailed account of the differences between constructivism and moral realism, see Korsgaard, 2008. 
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then, is to identify “what social procedures [are] suitable” and “what procedures count as 
yielding reasonable principles” (Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, 1992, p. 139). It is this 
task that Rawls sees before him in developing an account of justice. 
2.1.4 Summary. The details of Rawls’ influences and method are important for 
understanding the motivations and assumptions that underwrite the development of 
justice as fairness. For example, recognizing Rawls’ Kantian affinities helps to highlight 
his rooting of individual liberty and autonomy in ideas of dignity and moral 
independence (as opposed to, for example, notions of self-ownership as typified by the 
Lockean tradition). Also, understanding Rawlsian liberalism as founded on an ideal of 
toleration and freedoms of conscience and expression (as opposed to the economic 
liberties emphasized by classic and neo-liberals) makes clearer his reasons for prioritizing 
the protection of personal and expressive liberties over socioeconomic ones. In addition, 
emphasizing Rawls’ Humean influences reinforces the importance of his distinction 
between the application of moral principles to institutional and individual circumstances. 
Finally, keeping in view his constructivist method demonstrates the relevance of the 
original position—Rawls’ does not take principles of justice to be self-evident or 
independent of the procedures that construct them. 
2.2 Theory 
2.2.1 Argument from the basic structure. Rawls views the moral justification of 
the basic structure of contemporary liberal democratic societies as the primary problem of 
a theory of justice (Rawls, 1971b, p. 4). As he puts it 
one main feature of justice as fairness is that it takes the basic structure as [its] 
primary subject.... It does so in part because the effects of the basic structure on 
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citizens’ aims, aspirations and character, as well as on their opportunities and their 
ability to take advantage of them, are pervasive and present from the beginning of 
life. (Rawls, 2001, p. 10) 
As a consequence, Rawls’ focus is on principles of justice for governing the basic 
structure of society—that is, how its basic institutions fit together to distribute, among 
other things, rights, responsibilities, and wealth—and not the individual decisions and 
actions of persons within society. He views institutional arrangements and individual 
decisions as markedly different subjects to be regulated by different types of principles 
(recall his indebtedness to Hume). So, while the primary unit of moral concern for Rawls 
is (as with liberal theory generally) the individual, it is notable that Rawls’ theory is not 
aimed at providing principles for the regulation of individual behavior. 
Rawls gives two kinds of reasons for taking the basic structure as his primary 
subject. Under the first kind of reason, he argues that principles of justice are necessary 
for the regulation and preservation of just background conditions against which 
individuals live out their lives—what Rawls refers to as “background justice.” Rawls’ 
(1993) concern with background justice is rooted in a belief that injustice arises not 
because individuals in society are necessarily deceitful or disingenuous but because there 
is a “…tendency…for background justice to be eroded even when individuals act fairly” 
(Rawls, 1993, p. 269). This assumption is built, in part, on what Rawls views as the 
limited foresight of individuals and associations in any given society. “Individuals and 
associations,” Rawls (1993) thinks, “cannot comprehend the ramifications of their 
particular actions viewed collectively, nor can they be expected to foresee future 
circumstances that shape and transform present tendencies” (p. 268). For Rawls, “the 
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overall result of separate and independent transactions is away from and not toward 
background justice” (p. 267). He assumes that “if transactions between individuals are to 
be fair” then “certain background conditions are necessary” (Rawls, 1993, p. 269). Given 
these conditions, he argues for “an institutional division of labor between the basic 
structure and the rules applying directly to individuals and associations and to be 
followed by them in particular transactions” (Rawls, 1993, p. 268-269). This 
“institutional division of labor” frees individuals and associations up to pursue their 
chosen ends, confident that somewhere else in the basic structure “the necessary 
corrections to preserve background justice are being made” (Rawls, 1993, p. 269). Once 
this division of labor is established, the need for certain special institutions for the 
preservation of background justice becomes clear. Further, since these institutions are 
conceived of as distinct from individual actions or local exchanges, these special 
institutions require special principles—principles of social justice.  
Under the second kind of reason, Rawls (2001) centers on the basic structure for 
its “profound and pervasive” influence on the life chances of citizens (p. 55-56).  
We assess our prospects in life according to our place in society and we form our 
ends and purposes in the light of the means and opportunities we can realistically 
expect. So whether we are hopeful and optimistic about our future, or resigned 
and apathetic, depends both on the inequalities associated with our social position 
and on the public principles of justice that society not merely professes but more 
or less effectively uses to regulate the institutions of background justice. (Rawls, 
2001, p. 56) 
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In this way, the basic structure can be seen as integral to the structuring of political, 
social, and economic possibilities both now and in the future. “This it does,” Rawls 
(2001) notes, “by the expectations and ambitions it encourages in the present, and indeed 
over a complete life” (p. 56). Combined, these two kinds of reasons make up Rawls’ 
justification for taking the basic structure as his primary subject. 
Within the basic structure, Rawls intends his principles of justice to apply to 
institutions that he believes are essential to establishing and maintaining productive social 
cooperation, including (but not limited to): a constitution and the system of government it 
defines; systems of property for regulating the use of goods; and economic markets for 
distributing productive resources. Rawls refers to these institutions as “basic institutions” 
and his two principles of justice are intended to address their design. At the same time, 
these principles are not intended to apply directly to individual behavior or the inner-
workings of other types of associations in society—in particular, private associations, 
religious institutions, and the family. However, the relationship between principles of 
justice and these other associations—associations that are sometimes (but not 
consistently) characterized as “non-basic institutions”—has not always been clear in 
Rawls’ work. His characterization of the institution of the family, in particular, has drawn 
a great deal of criticism.6 In order to gain a better picture of Rawls’ understanding of 
these different types of institutions, however, it is necessary to address Rawls’ idea of 
public reason. 
2.2.2 The idea of public reason. Rawls’ description of the idea of public reason 
is complex and a full account of the idea is beyond the scope of this section, but two 
features of this debate are important for the present discussion: 1) the idea of public 
                                                
6 I attend to the institution of the family later in this section. 
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reason as distinguished from nonpublic reason and 2) clarification on the concept of basic 
institutions regulable by principles of justice. Here, I focus on the first feature and only 
briefly touch on the second feature (though it will be addressed in more detail later in the 
dissertation). In particular, the first feature is important to understanding the rules of 
deliberation Rawls later imposes on parties in the original position.  
In the following passage, Rawls (2001) illustrates the idea of public reason by 
contrasting it with nonpublic reason: 
All ways of reasoning—whether individual, associational, or political—must 
accept certain common elements: principles of inference and rules of evidence; 
they must incorporate fundamental concepts of judgment, inference and evidence, 
and include standards of correctness and criteria of truth. Otherwise they would 
not be ways of reasoning but something else: mere rhetoric or artifices of 
persuasion…. Nevertheless, different procedures and methods are appropriate in 
view of the different conceptions of themselves held by individuals and corporate 
bodies, and given the different conditions under which their reasoning is carried 
out as well as the different constraints to which their reasoning is properly 
subject.” (p. 92-93) 
In other words, different sorts of institutions and associations (and their attendant 
practices) are governed by different sorts of reasoning. For example, the methods of 
reasoning and rules of evidence appropriate for a church need to be justifiable to its 
members—but not necessarily to non-members. Further, the types of reasons and rules 
relevant to religious institutions may differ considerably from those considered 
authoritative in scientific circles and different yet still from forms of reasoning employed 
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by firms and labor unions, to use some of Rawls’ own examples (see: Rawls, 2001, p. 92-
93). In a just society, these ways of reasoning are authoritative within their specified 
contexts and individuals may freely accept the authority of different institutions in 
accordance with personal beliefs. At the same time, an individual is also permitted to 
reject the authority of other types of non-basic institutions without jeopardizing their 
standing as a citizen. For example, leaving a particular religious sect may carry certain 
social or other consequences, but it does not jeopardize one’s standing as a citizen in a 
liberal democracy. As Rawls (2001) explains: “In the case of ecclesiastical authority, 
since apostasy and heresy are not legal offenses, those who are no longer able to 
recognize a church’s authority may cease being members without running afoul of state 
power” (p. 93). The idea is a familiar one, as it underwrites our most basic views on the 
freedoms of conscience, speech, association, and movement. The ability of individuals to 
effectively exercise these freedoms serves to justify the authority of different nonpublic 
reasons within their appropriate context. 
Public reasons must also be justifiable to those to whom they apply—in this case, 
citizens of a liberal democracy. However, public reasons could only be freely accepted in 
the same way as nonpublic reasons if it were as easy or feasible to reject state authority 
and leave the society within which one was raised as it is to freely reject different 
theological, philosophical, or other associations. But, as Rawls (2001) argues, this is not 
similarly feasible, since it  
involves leaving the society and culture in which we have been raised, the society 
and culture whose language we use in speech and thought to express and 
understand ourselves, our aims, goals and values; the society and culture whose 
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history, customs, and conventions we depend on to find our place in our social 
world…. The state’s authority cannot, then, be freely accepted in the sense that 
the bonds of society and culture, of history and social place of origin, begin so 
early to shape our life and are normally so strong that the right of emigration 
(suitably qualified) does not suffice to make accepting its authority free, 
politically speaking. (p. 93-94)  
As a consequence, public reasons must be justifiable to all (recall the liberal notion of 
legitimacy). Further, for Rawls, this “all” is understood as containing a wide range of 
competing and perhaps irreconcilable worldviews. Rawls refers to these competing 
worldviews as “comprehensive doctrines” consisting of items such as persons’ 
philosophical, moral, or religious beliefs, their sentiments and loyalties, as well as their 
fundamental values and projects, among other things. The concept of comprehensive 
doctrines is used to demonstrate 1) the diversity of backgrounds, motivations, and reasons 
individuals appeal to when setting and pursuing various ends and 2) that one person’s 
doctrine may, at times, be irreconcilable with that of another. Further, individual 
members of society might—at any given moment—possess only a partially fleshed out 
(and perhaps incoherent) comprehensive doctrine. Even so, however, it is presumed that 
individuals will, at any given time, possess some more or less complete set of religious, 
philosophical, or moral ideals that shape their conception of the good and inform their 
aims and aspirations.  Unlike nonpublic reasons for associations that might be oriented 
towards a single religious, philosophical, or other doctrine, public reasons for a political 
society must account for a plurality of competing comprehensive doctrines.7 
                                                
7 It is important to point out, however, that Rawls does not think society has to accommodate every 
possible comprehensive doctrine. To delineate between those doctrines with which society must be 
  
 
41 
Consequently, standards for public reasoning are more stringent than for forms of 
nonpublic reasoning.  
Understanding the distinction between public and nonpublic reasoning makes 
clearer Rawls’ distinction between basic institutions and other types of associations. It 
also serves to further justify his focus on principles of justice for basic institutions: 
Rawls’ principles are designed to meet the stringent standards of public reasoning 
required to justify authority of basic institutions in a liberal democracy. As such, they are 
not intended to apply directly to the inner-workings of other types of associations that fall 
within the basic structure. But, while Rawls’ principles of justice are not applicable to the 
internal workings of non-basic institutions, his principles of justice do impose certain 
constraints on their overall operations. To use Rawls’ own example, liberal principles of 
justice do not require governance within religious institutions to be democratic. However, 
they do protect the rights and liberties of the members of religious institutions—as a 
result, churches cannot “practice effective intolerance, since, as the principles of justice 
require, public law does not recognize heresy and apostasy as crimes, and members of 
churches are always at liberty to leave their faith” (Rawls, 1997/1999f, p. 597).  
Though this distinction appears somewhat straightforward here, there are points in 
Rawls’ theory where the idea of basic institutions (immediately governed by principles of 
justice) and other associations (merely constrained by principles of justice) comes under 
strain. This tension becomes particularly evident in Rawls’ discussion of the family. 
Early on, feminist critics challenged Rawls’ conception of family structures and familial 
relations as being unjustly patriarchical. Their sharp and sustained criticisms later forced 
                                                                                                                                            
concerned from those that it does not need to recognize, he outlines a criterion of reasonableness, which is 
defined in relation to the rational. The distinction between the reasonable and the rational is discussed later. 
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Rawls to re-evaluate and clarify the role of the family as an institution in society. 
Ultimately, he admits the family as among his list of basic institutions given its role in 
“the orderly production and reproduction of society and its culture from one generation to 
the next” (Rawls, 1997/1999f, p. 595). Unlike other basic institutions (such as systems of 
property or economic markets), however, Rawls does not think the family should be 
regulated immediately by principles of justice. Instead, he views the application of his 
principles to the family much in the same way as they are applied to non-basic 
institutions: 
To put the case another way, we distinguish between the point of view of people 
as citizens and their point of view as members of families and of other 
associations. As citizens we have reasons to impose the constraints specified by 
the political principles of justice on associations; while as members of 
associations we have reasons for limiting those constraints so that they leave room 
for a free and flourishing internal life appropriate to the association in question. 
Here again we see the need for the division of labor between different kinds of 
principles. We wouldn’t want political principles of justice—including principles 
of distributive justice—to apply directly to the internal life of the family. (Rawls, 
1997/1999f, p. 598) 
Just as principles of justice protect the rights of members of religious organizations as 
citizens, so too do principles of justice apply to members of the family as citizens.  
Though there are lingering problems with Rawls description of the family overall, 
I discuss it here only to further draw out the relationship between principles of justice 
designed to regulate institutions essential to the basic structure of society and principles 
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for regulating the inner workings of groups and associations that fall within—but are not 
viewed on Rawls’ account as essential to—the basic structure. That being said, Rawls 
(2001) also admits that his characterization of the basic structure is deliberately loose and 
open to further interpretation (p. 12). Finally, though this discussion may not appear to 
have immediate implications for problems of social justice, information, and technology, 
its relevance will be made clearer in later chapters. For now, this discussion of Rawls’ 
focus on the basic structure helps us better understand that he does not intend his 
principles to apply to individual behavior or to the inner-workings of non-basic 
institutions or the family. Rather, they apply to the basic structure of society, that is, a 
loosely defined set of basic institutions essential to the development and reproduction of 
social cooperation over time. In addition, they put certain constraints on the operations of 
other types of associations and groups. Ultimately, then, Rawls is concerned with 
articulating just background conditions against which individuals set and pursue valued 
ends in line with a range of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. 
2.2.3 Model-conceptions. As previously discussed, Rawls is committed to the 
idea that there are no moral truths prior to or independent of our practical reasoning about 
them. Instead, moral truths (in Rawls’ case, principles of justice) are the outcome of 
suitable procedures that incorporate relevant features of practical reason. Rawls puts 
forward his famous “original position” as one such suitable procedure. Understanding the 
role of this procedure, however, can sometimes make it easy to overstate its importance 
for arriving at his two principles of justice. Much of the “heavy lifting” of Rawls theory 
is done while setting up the parameters of the procedure, well before Rawls arrives at the 
original position—ultimately, the device is simply intended to operationalize the relevant 
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features of practical reason that Rawls lays out in advance. The following section 
foregrounds the foundational assumptions that underwrite the original position.  
To start, I introduce two of Rawls’ three ideal moral conceptions—referred to as 
“model-conceptions” —of persons and society (the first two model-conceptions) that set 
conditions for the design of the original position (the third model-conception). 
Importantly, these model-conceptions are not the outcomes of constructive procedures as 
are his principles of justice. Instead, they are simply laid out as per the requirements of 
constructivism generally. After introducing Rawls’ first two model-conceptions of 
persons and society, I lay out the ways in which these two model-conceptions are 
operationalized in the original position—Rawls’ third ideal model-conception—and 
describe briefly the deliberations that take place within the device. Finally, I outline the 
two principles of justice that Rawls believes parties in the original position would arrive 
at as suitable for regulating the basic structure of liberal democratic societies. 
2.2.3.1 Well-ordered society and moral persons. Rawls’ model-conceptions are 
clearly articulated in Rawls’ (1980/1999d) description of the driving idea of justice as 
fairness:  
justice as fairness begins from the idea that the most appropriate conception of 
justice for the basic structure of a [well-ordered] democratic society is one that its 
citizens would adopt in a situation that is fair between them and in which they are 
represented solely as free and equal moral persons. (p. 310)  
Here, we find reference to the ideal moral conceptions of persons, a well-ordered society, 
and the original position that lie at the base of Rawls’ constructivism. Again, this is not to 
say that these models justify the use of a constructive procedure itself, as that justification 
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is given by the method of constructivism broadly. Rather, they serve to justify the design 
of the procedure (that is, its content and parameters). In particular, the model-conceptions 
of the well-ordered society and the moral person isolate aspects of practical reason 
essential to constructing suitable principles of justice.8  
The first relevant model-conception is that of the “well-ordered society.” Rawls 
(1980/1999d) identifies such a society as one in which everyone accepts (and knows 
others also accept) the same principles of justice (p. 309). Further, its basic structure—
that is, the arrangement of its main institutions into one scheme—is believed by all to 
satisfy the principles of justice (Rawls, 1980/1999d, p. 309). Finally, the principles of 
justice are public and founded on reasonable beliefs as determined by generally accepted 
methods of inquiry (Rawls, 1980/1999d, p. 309). This model-conception plays in 
important role in arguing for the selection of certain principles of justice, as parties in the 
original position are charged with choosing principles (from a range of options) that line 
up or square with the idea of a well-ordered society.9 Or, put another way: if the 
principles proposed in the original position do not square with the idea of a well-ordered 
society then that counts as an argument against them. 
The second relevant model-conception is that of the “moral person.” Moral 
persons in society, Rawls claims, importantly view themselves, in their political and 
social relations, as free and equal. This idea of moral persons contains three components 
that must be defined: free, equal, and moral.   
                                                
8 It is important to note, however, that Rawls thinks societies and persons are more than these models. 
However, “if certain principles of justice would indeed be agreed to,” a constructivist account of justice 
must connect definite principles with particular conceptions of the person and society (Rawls, 1980/1999d, 
p. 308). Put another way, other conceptions of persons might be appropriate for reasoning about other 
moral principles but, insofar as we are concerned with principles of justice, we are, Rawls thinks, 
concerned with the model-conceptions he advances. 
9 As Rawls (2001) puts it: “The suitability of a conception of justice for a well-ordered society provides an 
important criterion for comparing political conceptions of justice” (p. 9). 
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1. Persons as moral are a) said to possess the two moral powers, that is, they 
have an effective sense of justice (a capacity to recognize and act from justice’s 
demands) and b) they also possess a conception of the good (that is, they have 
some more or less complete set of valued ends and are capable of adopting 
effective means to those ends).  
2. Persons are equal insofar as they recognize that everyone has an equal 
right to determine and evaluate the principles of justice that are to govern the 
basic structure of society.  
3. Finally, persons are free if a) they think they are entitled to make claims 
on common institutions in order to fulfill their goals and higher-order interests 
and b) they believe that they can revise or change their conception of the good at 
any given time. 
It is important to note the ways in which Rawls understands the concepts of equality and 
freedom in these model-conceptions. First, Rawls does not consider people equal in all 
respects—he is aware that there will be natural inequalities in the distribution of certain 
talents and abilities. What is important from the standpoint of justice, however, is that 
people are equal “…in that they are all regarded as having to the essential minimal degree 
the moral powers necessary to engage in social cooperation over a complete life and to 
take part in society as equal citizens” (Rawls, 2001, p. 20). Though Rawls’ definitions of 
“essential minimal degree” and “a complete life” are distinct points of contention for 
some critics, what is important here is that persons are defined as equal insofar as they 
are conceived of as a) equally capable of exercising the two moral powers and b) having 
an equal claim on the political process.  
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Second, Rawls does not assume that people are free or autonomous in the sense of 
free from natural or social contingencies and influences. In this sense, Rawls’ theory is 
not (against the claims of some critics) ahistorical or unduly atomistic since it does not 
view persons as ultimately detached or removed from their cultural or historical 
circumstances. Rather, Rawls views people as free so long as they view themselves a) as 
able to revise their aims and ambitions as they see fit (that is, they do not view 
themselves as permanently bound to any single conception of the good) and b) as 
responsible for their ends and can make claims on behalf of those ends. By conceiving of 
equality and freedom in these limited ways, Rawls seeks to avoid metaphysical questions 
regarding free will and determinism that he views as irrelevant to the articulation of 
principles of justice (see, generally: Rawls, 1985/1999e).  
For Rawls, free and equal moral persons are also said to be both reasonable and 
rational, though he defines this idea in a specific way. Recalling that the method of 
Kantian constructivism requires moral principles to be arrived at through suitable 
procedures, Rawls’ theory must incorporate dimensions of persons’ capacities for reason 
that can be justified as relevant to social justice.10 Insofar as we are concerned with 
principles of justice, Rawls thinks, we are concerned with people’s capacities to be both 
reasonable and rational. Understanding these concepts, then, is integral to understanding 
the reasons Rawls has for adopting the model-conceptions outlined above. 
In crude terms, Rawls thinks a person has the capacity to be reasonable if they are 
prepared to advance standards, principles, or reasons for action believed to be justifiable 
to (reasonable) others. 
                                                
10 Rawls distinction here echoes the Kantian distinction between pure practical reason and empirical 
practical reason (see: Rawls, 1993, footnote 1, p. 48). 
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Persons are reasonable in one basic aspect when, among equals say, they are 
ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide 
by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so. Those 
norms they view as reasonable for everyone to accept and therefore as justifiable 
to them; and they are ready to discuss the fair terms that others propose. (Rawls, 
1993, p. 49) 
 On this account, reasonableness falls somewhere between pure altruism (acting solely on 
behalf of the common good) and mutual advantage (cooperating with others to advance 
one’s own ends). Reasonable persons, Rawls (1993) thinks, “are not moved by the 
general good as such but desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and 
equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept” (p. 50).  
By contrast, persons are rational when they exercise “powers of judgment and 
deliberation in seeking ends and interests peculiarly [their] own” (Rawls, 1993, p. 50). 
Rawls’ notion of rationality accounts for the rationally self-interested person familiar to 
economic theory and classical liberalism, though it is constrained by his idea of 
reasonableness. In addition, Rawls’ (1993) vision of rationality goes beyond mere self-
interest:  
rational agents as such [are not] solely self-interested: that is, their interests are 
not always interests in benefits to themselves. Every interest is an interest of a self 
(agent), but not every interest is in benefits to the self that has it. Indeed, rational 
agents may have all kinds of affections for persons and attachments to 
communities and places, including love of country and of nature; and they may 
select and order their ends in various ways. (p. 51) 
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What distinguishes the rational from the reasonable is “the desire to engage in fair 
cooperation as such” (Rawls, 1993, p. 51). Together 
neither the reasonable nor the rational can stand without the other. Merely 
reasonable agents would have no ends of their own they wanted to advance by fair 
cooperation; merely rational agents lack a sense of justice and fail to recognize 
the independent validity of claims of others. (Rawls, 1993, p. 52) 
Importantly, these complementary ideas bring together concepts of equality and freedom 
that are often viewed by both critics and proponents of liberalism as in tension with one 
another. The reasonable gives expression to equality insofar as it recognizes that all 
persons have an equal claim on matters of justice; the rational expresses the idea of the 
freedom of individuals to set, pursue, and revise individual ends.11 Further, the reasonable 
and the rational work together to produce a fuller picture of persons acting in the real 
world: it does not make unreasonable assumptions about persons’ abilities to exercise 
pure altruism (for example, in conditions of moderate scarcity or in the face of familial, 
religious, or other social commitments) nor does it reduce individuals to exclusively self-
interested, rational calculators (as is typical of certain strands of economic or libertarian 
theory). 
Finally, the ideas of the reasonable and the rational are embedded in Rawls’ 
articulation of the idea of the two moral powers. The notion of the reasonable is 
articulated in the first moral power: the ability of individuals to exercise an effective 
                                                
11 Another way of viewing the concepts of the reasonable and the rational are as an attempt to reconcile two 
otherwise distinct approaches to justice found in the social contract tradition. On the one hand, rationality 
here represents the Lockean (and, to some extent, Hobbesian) tradition of agreement for mutual advantage. 
Reasonableness, on the other hand, expresses the ideas of democracy and the general will found in the work 
of Rousseau. In this way, Rawls is able to weave together two established traditions in order to further 
develop the idea of a social contract generally. 
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sense of justice, that is, a capacity to recognize and act from justice’s demands. The 
rational is represented by the second moral power: the capacity of individuals to possess 
and pursue a conception of the good, that is, to adopt some more or less complete set of 
valued ends and take up effective means to those ends. On an earlier account, Rawls 
(1971b) presented the moral powers in a controversial Kantian manner, claiming that 
they are constitutive of our nature as free and equal persons (p. 226). In his later work, 
Rawls distances his theory from its Kantian underpinnings, but the ideas of the 
reasonable and the rational are retained through his development of political (as opposed 
to Kantian) constructivism. As a matter of political constructivism, he came to defend the 
two moral powers as simply features of persons that are necessary for social cooperation 
(Rawls, 1993). Regardless, the challenge for Rawls in constructing principles of justice is 
to develop a decision procedure that incorporates these important ideas that, as Rawls 
argues, appropriately represent different dimensions of persons and their capacities for 
practical reasoning.  
2.2.3.2 The original position. Rawls’ two model-conceptions—of a well-ordered 
society and free and equal moral persons—help set conditions for the design of his third 
model-conception: the original position.  
First, [the original position] models what we regard…as fair conditions under 
which the representatives of citizens, viewed solely as free and equal persons, are 
to agree to the fair terms of social cooperation (as expressed by principles of 
justice) whereby the basic structure is to be regulated. 
Second, it models what we regard—here and now—as acceptable restrictions on 
the reasons on the basis of which the parties (as citizens’ representatives), situated 
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in those fair conditions, may properly put forward certain principles of justice and 
reject others. (Rawls, 2001, p. 80) 
Further, Rawls (1980/1999d) describes the original position as incorporating “pure 
procedural justice at the highest level” (p. 310). That is,  
the fairness of the circumstances under which agreement is reached transfers to 
the principles of justice agreed to; since the original position situates free and 
equal moral persons fairly with respect to one another, any conception of justice 
they adopt is likewise fair. (Rawls, 1980/1999d, p. 310)  
Hence the name of Rawls’ theory, justice as fairness.  
Beyond the ideals of free and equal moral persons capable of exercising both 
reasonableness and rationality, Rawls also imposes additional constraints that inform 
deliberation in the original position. One set of conditions are what Rawls (2001) refers 
to as (following Hume) “the circumstances of justice” (p. 84). The circumstances of 
justice are intended to reflect (generally) our current historical circumstances, since if the 
principles selected in the original position are to be useful they must in designed, in part, 
to be applicable to our actual conditions in the actual world (Rawls, 2001, p. 84). He 
divides the circumstances of justice into two parts, objective and subjective. Among the 
objective circumstances of justice are conditions of moderate scarcity and the necessity of 
social cooperation.12 In light of this moderate scarcity, then, social cooperation is 
necessary to ensure that a decent standard of living for all is arrived at and maintained. 
The subjective circumstances of justice include the fact of reasonable pluralism. 
Recalling foundational liberal ideals of toleration and religious diversity, Rawls believes 
                                                
12 Here, Rawls admits his theory as not applicable in cases of extreme scarcity (i.e, famine) or unlimited 
abundance; instead, it is designed to apply to societies where there are enough resources to achieve a decent 
standard of living for all, but not so many that distributive justice is no longer a concern. 
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a liberal democratic society will inevitably contain a wide array of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines that will be different, often competing, and sometimes 
irreconcilable with one another. The fact of reasonable pluralism must be accepted as a 
permanent part of the circumstances of justice, Rawls (2001) argues, because “[there] is 
no politically practicable way to eliminate this diversity except by the oppressive use of 
state power to establish a particular comprehensive doctrine and to silence dissent” (p. 
84). Such oppressive force clearly runs counter the aims of a liberal conception of justice. 
Finally, Rawls also stipulates that the reasoning parties employ in the original position 
must be public, that is, they must make use of public reasons (as previously defined).  
At this point, parties (as free and equal moral persons) have been introduced to 
the original position, constrained by the circumstances of justice, and committed to the 
employment of public reasons in their deliberations about principles of justice (for a well-
ordered society). Below, I address the ways Rawls further models rationality and 
reasonableness through 1) the introduction of primary goods (modeling the rational) and 
2) the veil of ignorance (modeling the reasonable). 
Primary goods: modeling the rational. In order to model the idea of rationality, 
Rawls charges parties in the original position with securing sufficient means for the 
exercise of their two moral powers.  In order to give content to this idea, Rawls 
introduces the concept of primary goods to the original position. “These goods,” Rawls 
(2001) argues, “are things citizens need as free and equal [moral] persons” and they are 
not merely “things it is simply rational to want or desire, or to prefer or even to crave” (p. 
58). Primary goods are Rawls’ way of making explicit the rational autonomy of 
individuals as described in the model-conception of free and equal moral persons. 
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The original version of Rawls’ (1971a) A Theory of Justice was unclear about the 
justification for primary goods as the object of distribution within Rawls’ framework. As 
Joshua Cohen (2003) points out, Rawls initially “presented the interest in [primary 
goods] in terms of what it is rational for individuals to want to pursue their ends without 
an idea of the person in the background” (p. 108). But, the presentation of primary goods 
changed in the revised version of A Theory of Justice:  
In the revised version, the presentation of primary goods generally—and of the 
liberties in particular—is modified. Thus the account of primary goods generally, 
and of the liberties in particular is now said to ‘depend on a moral conception of 
the person that embodies a certain ideal…. Primary goods are now characterized 
as what persons need in their status as free and equal citizens, and as moral and 
fully cooperating members of society over a complete life. (Cohen, 2003, p. 108) 
The move, then, is from an understanding of primary goods as “advancing human 
interests under all conditions” to “advancing the goods of citizens understood as free and 
equal persons” (Cohen, 2003, p. 108). Cohen’s discussion helps to further emphasize the 
fundamental importance of Rawls’ conception of the person to the development of justice 
as fairness. In the original position, these moral persons are moved by their interest in 
exercising the two moral powers—primary goods are then introduced as a way to make 
this interest concrete.  
Rawls’ index of primary goods is derived by ascertaining which things are 
generally necessary as both social conditions and all-purpose means not for advancing 
persons’ interests generally under particular historical circumstances, but for enabling 
persons to exercise their moral powers specifically (Rawls, 1993, p. 314). “These goods,” 
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Rawls (2001) states, “are things citizens need as free and equal [moral] persons” and they 
are not merely “things it is simply rational to want or desire, or to prefer or even to crave” 
(p. 58). In other words, primary goods are an expression of the interests of moral persons 
and not the consequence of an empirical or historical inquiry. 
The list of primary goods that Rawls adopts includes: basic rights and liberties; 
freedom of movement and free choice of occupation; powers and prerogatives of offices 
and positions of responsibility in political and economic institutions; income and wealth; 
and the social bases of self-respect. Rawls further specifies the basic rights and liberties 
by way of a list. Just as the index of primary goods was derived from certain features of 
persons (that is, their interest in effectively exercising their two moral powers), so is the 
list of basic liberties—Rawls (2001) seeks out “what liberties provide the political and 
social conditions essential for the adequate development and full exercise of the two 
moral powers” (p. 45). Recall that the first moral power is an effective sense of justice. 
To promote the exercise of this power, Rawls (2001) points to equal political liberties and 
freedom of thought as enabling persons “to develop and to exercise these powers in 
judging the justice of the basic structure of society and its social policies” (p. 45). The 
second moral power—the capacity to adopt and pursue a conception of the good—is 
promoted through liberty of conscience and freedom of association (Rawls, 2001, p. 45). 
In fact, Rawls (1993) views liberty of conscience and the freedom of association as both 
exceptionally important and fundamentally intertwined, “for unless we are at liberty to 
associate with other like-minded citizens, the exercise of liberty of conscience is denied” 
(p. 310-315). Rawls (1971b) also affords special consideration to the primary good of 
self-respect, calling it “perhaps the most important primary good” (p. 386). Self-respect, 
  
 
55 
according to Rawls (1971b), is defined as both “a persons’ sense of his own value, his 
secure conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life is worth carrying out” 
and a “confidence in one’s ability, so far as it is within one’s power to fulfill one’s 
intentions” (p. 386). Taken together, committing parties in the original position to the 
task of securing a fair share of primary goods operationalizes Rawls’ ideal of rationality. 
The veil of ignorance: modeling the reasonable. Reasonableness is modeled in the 
original position by situating parties in symmetrical relations with one another. Parties 
are said to be symmetrically situated when: 1) they are described in the same way (as free 
and equal moral persons); 2) they are similarly constrained by the use of public reasons in 
their deliberations; and 3) when they are exposed to the same informational constraints, 
such as the circumstances of justice and the veil of ignorance. With regard to (1), I have 
already described the idea of free and equal moral persons. I have also already briefly 
addressed (2), that is, the idea that parties in the original position must employ public (as 
opposed to non-public) reasons in their deliberations. Recall that in order to satisfy the 
liberal criteria of legitimacy public reasons must be justifiable to everyone in the society 
to which they apply. Given the fact of reasonable pluralism (the subjective circumstances 
of justice), this society is assumed to contain a wide range of competing and perhaps 
irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines. In order to accommodate the diversity of 
comprehensive doctrines, public reasons must be reasons that are not oriented towards 
any single comprehensive view. Instead, parties in the original position seek what Rawls 
(1993) calls an “overlapping consensus” (p. 133-172).13 
                                                
13 For Rawls (1993), a single comprehensive doctrine “cannot secure the basis of social unity, nor can it 
provide the content of public reason on fundamental political questions” (p. 134). In order to be unified and 
stable, members of a society “must affirm the same political conception of justice,” though they do not 
need to do so “for all the same reasons, all the way down” (Rawls, 2001, p. 32). Instead, a political 
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Regarding (3), Rawls places certain informational constraints on deliberations in 
order to fully ensure that parties are situated symmetrically. First, he presents the 
objective and subjective circumstances of justice in order to reflect the historical 
circumstances that make the problem of justice relevant—all parties are equally subject to 
the problem of moderate scarcity and the fact of reasonable pluralism. Second, Rawls 
(1980/1999d) employs the “veil of ignorance,” which deprives parties of information 
regarding “their place in society, their class position, or social status” as well as “their 
fortune in the distribution of natural talents and abilities” and of “their own distinctive 
psychological dispositions and propensities…” (p. 310). Parties are also denied particular 
knowledge of their held beliefs and desired ends—in other words, parties know they have 
comprehensive doctrines but do not know their doctrines’ specific contents. In the 
absence of this knowledge, parties are to rely on the notion of primary goods to give 
substance to their deliberations.14 Such restrictions, Rawls (1980/1999d) argues, are 
“required if no one is to be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural contingencies or 
social chance in the adoption of principles.” (p. 310). Overall, these informational 
parameters serve to situate individuals as rationally autonomous and mutually 
disinterested, ensuring that deliberation between the parties is fair insofar as they are not 
constrained by previous conceptions of justice or other commitments but, instead, are 
                                                                                                                                            
conception (as Rawls intends justice as fairness to be) should aspire to be justifiable to a wide range of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. 
14 Other information that is permitted behind the veil of ignorance includes: general principles of science 
and common sense; the fact of reasonable pluralism, that is, that there exists a diversity of reasonable 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines; and it is assumed that there are (at least to some degree) 
sufficient resources to realize the principles agreed to—that is, citizens will not be living in conditions of 
extreme scarcity (the objective circumstances of justice). 
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interested only in advancing their desired (but unknown and indeterminate) ends as 
specified by the index of primary goods.15 
2.2.3.3 Selecting principles of justice. Once inside the original position, parties 
are to deliberate and select principles of justice for regulating the basic structure of a 
well-ordered society. Loosely following the method of ethics developed by Sidgwick, 
Rawls puts before the parties different sets of principles of justice rooted in different 
philosophical schools of thought (including his own two principles). In this way, the 
original position acts as a device for selection—that is, principles of justice are not 
deduced from Rawls’ ideal moral conceptions but, rather, they are selected from a given 
list (Rawls, 2001, p. 83).16 Finally, Rawls (2001) recognizes that this approach cannot 
establish the best conception of justice out of all possible systems—but doing so is not 
necessary for practical purposes. We are, Rawls argues, not looking for the best 
conception. Instead, we seek a suitable conception that can provide a moral basis for the 
justification of the basic structure of a democratic society.   
Once the conditions for deliberations in the original position have been set up, 
Rawls aims to show why parties in the original position would adopt his principles over 
principles from other philosophical traditions, most notably utilitarian principles. While I 
do not address these other principles here, it is worth noting that the original position is 
designed in such a way so that the deliberating parties would most reasonably select his 
                                                
15 “That the parties are symmetrically situated is required if they are to be seen as representatives of free 
and equal citizens who are to reach an agreement under conditions that are fair... To model this conviction 
in the original position, the parties are not allowed to know the social position of those they represent, or 
the particular comprehensive doctrine of the person each represents. The same idea is extended to 
information about people’s race and ethnic group, sex and gender, and their various native endowments 
such as strength and intelligence…” (Rawls, 1993, p. 24-25). 
16 Selection from a list is preferable, Rawls (2001) thinks, as trying to determine what alternatives parties 
in the original position might think up themselves would be “a complicated business” and distract from the 
practical aims of the endeavor (p. 83). 
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two principles over others. In other words, Rawls stacks the deck in his favor. This is not, 
however, a defect of Rawls’ (1971b) theory—rather, it is a feature: 
there are…many possible interpretations of the initial situation. This conception 
varies depending upon how the contracting parties are conceived, upon what their 
beliefs and interests are said to be, upon which alternatives are available to them, 
and so on. In this sense, there are many different contract theories. Justice as 
fairness is but one of these. But the question of justification is settled, as far as it 
can be, by showing that there is one interpretation of the initial situation which 
best expresses the conditions that are widely thought reasonable to impose on the 
choice of principles yet which, at the same time, leads to a conception that 
characterizes our considered judgments…. We may conjecture that for each 
traditional conception of justice there exists an interpretation of the initial 
situation in which its principles are the preferred solution. (p. 105) 
This extended passage reinforces the importance of the assumptions Rawls builds into the 
model-conceptions that set constraints on the design of the original position. These 
assumptions, as we have seen, are the ones Rawls thinks it is reasonable to make when 
working out an appropriate procedure for the selection of principles of justice. If one is 
critical of the principles Rawls’ parties adopt, it is not necessarily their reasoning inside 
the original position that should be criticized but, rather, the assumptions and constraints 
that Rawls builds into his model-conceptions in first place. 
2.2.3.4 Rawls’ two principles of justice. Built on the preceding ideas, Rawls proposes 
two principles of justice: 
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1. Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of 
equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of 
liberties for all; and 
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to 
be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-
advantaged members of society (the difference principle)17 
Rawls intends these principles to specify a fair distribution of primary goods in society to 
effectively promote persons’ ability to exercise their two moral powers. The first 
principle guarantees individuals equal basic civil and political liberties—including (but 
not limited to) freedom of speech and expression, religion, association, choice of 
occupation, right to vote, and the right to hold office, as well as the fair value of the 
political liberties (that is, similarly able and motivated people should have the same 
prospects for political participation).  
The second principle provides for the effective actualization of the first: it ensures 
fair equality of social, professional, and economic opportunity, and permits social, 
professional, and economic inequality only if they work to the benefit of the least-
advantaged (the difference principle). To put it another way, inequalities are only 
permitted on the basis that, were they to be eliminated, the position of the worst- off 
would be made even worse. Further, Rawls two principles are lexically ordered: the first 
principle is necessarily prior to the first, while the first part of the second principle (fair 
equality of opportunity) is necessarily prior to the second part (the difference principle). 
                                                
17 Here I have quoted Rawls (2001) formulation of the principles as they appear in Justice As Fairness: A 
Restatement (p. 42-43). 
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For Rawls (2001), this arrangement “means that in applying a principle…we assume the 
prior principles are fully satisfied” (p. 43). As a consequence, the distribution of basic 
liberties in the first principle cannot be compromised to improve conditions according to 
the second principle (for example, one cannot trade the right to vote for a greater share of 
economic benefits). The basic civil and political liberties, then, have special priority for 
Rawls. Overall, these two principles are designed to maximize the distribution of primary 
goods, recognized earlier as “things that every rational man is presumed to want” and 
“normally have a use whatever a person’s rational plan of life” (Rawls, 1971b, p. 54). 
 2.2.4 Summary.  
 Rawls’ development of justice as fairness is complicated. Following the 
requirements of constructivism, he has to begin by clearly laying out features of persons’ 
practical reason and justify their relevance for constructing principles of justice. He goes 
to great lengths to articulate a vision of moral persons as free and equal, reasonable and 
rational, and prepared to deliberate about principles of justice. Further, he seeks out ways 
to effectively operationalize these features of persons within the original position. By 
putting forward an index of primary goods and charging parties in the original position 
with securing their fair share of such goods, Rawls is able to give expression to individual 
rationality. By excluding from consideration information regarding persons’ specific 
place in society, Rawls is able to give expression to the notion of reasonableness. Once 
inside the original position, Rawls further endeavors to construct conditions under which 
reasoning about principles of justice can be construed as fair. To this end, he employs 
various informational restrictions—including the ideas of public reason and the veil of 
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ignorance—in order to prevent deliberations from being biased towards any one 
particular view (or comprehensive doctrine). 
As is evident in the preceding overview, much of the theoretical “heavy lifting” of 
Rawls’ theory is done well before parties begin to select principles of justice within the 
original position. Further, their selection of Rawls’ two principles of justice is a foregone 
conclusion: Rawls’ constructs the original position in such a way as to make the selection 
of his principles inevitable. To reiterate, however, this is not a defect in Rawls’ theory—it 
is a feature. Understanding it as a feature of justice as fairness, however, serves to 
reinforce the importance of attending to the foundational assumptions that underwrite the 
construction of the original position. Simply adopting or advocating for Rawls’ principles 
without also attending to the foundational ideas that serve to justify them means 
accepting uncritically Rawls’ assumptions about persons and society. 
2.3 Debates 
 Many prominent debates surrounding Rawls work center on the model-
conceptions of the person and society that set conditions for the design of the original 
position. These debates are particularly important as they not only challenge Rawls’ 
resultant two principles, but his starting points—the very foundations upon which his 
theory is built. If these starting points are called into question—if they are shown to not 
accurately capture aspects of persons and society relevant to justice—then the entire 
framework of justice as fairness is undermined. Rawls’ own constant revision of the 
foundations of his theory (often in response to effective critiques) demonstrates the 
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difficulty of setting appropriate starting points for reasoning about justice.18 This does not 
mean, of course, that reasoning about justice is impossible. It is, however, difficult.  
In the following, I briefly outline the challenges leveled against Rawls’ 
conceptions of persons, society, and the original position by capabilities, communitarian, 
leftist, disabilities, and feminist perspectives. Though these critiques are by no means 
exhaustive of the range of debate surrounding Rawls’ work, they are particularly relevant 
for a discussion of his conceptions of person and society. Finally, it should be noted the 
full force of each of these critiques often goes well beyond a mere challenge to Rawls’ 
model-conceptions. However, for the time being, I will limit my discussion to those 
aspects. 
2.3.1 Capabilities debates. Developed by economist Amartya Sen, and advanced 
in important ways by Martha Nussbaum, the capabilities approach represents one of the 
most pressing challenges to justice as fairness available today. Sen’s (2009) account of 
justice calls into question the importance of Rawlsian model-conceptions broadly, 
arguing instead for an approach centered on “ways of judging how to reduce injustice and 
advance justice, rather than aiming only at the characterization of perfectly just 
societies—an exercise that is such a dominant feature of many theories of justice in 
political philosophy today” (p. xi). Sen (2009) argues that an over-reliance on abstract 
models, especially those of institutions in a well-ordered society, ultimately overlooks the 
“inescapable relevance” of human behavior (p. 67). Further, Sen (1990) thinks the 
uniform model-conception of the person cannot account for “interpersonal comparisons 
that must form a crucial part of the…basis of justice” (p. 112). Nussbaum’s account, on 
                                                
18 For a more detailed inventory of the revisions Rawls made to his starting points over the course of his 
career, see O’Neill, 2000, p. 72-73. 
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the other hand, is less disparaging of Rawls’ model-conceptions—instead of abandoning 
them altogether, she proposes replacing Rawls’ Kantian conception of the person with 
one that is Aristotelean/Marxist in nature (see, generally: Nussbaum, 2004).19 
2.3.2 Communitarian debates. Communitarian critics—notably Alasdair 
MacIntyre (1981), Michael Walzer (1984), Charles Taylor (1989), and Michael Sandel 
(1998)—take issue with Rawls’ conception of the person, as well as the way the original 
position models relations between persons in society. They argue that Rawls’ conception 
of persons defined as distinct and prior to their valued ends (or, in Rawls’ terms, their 
conceptions of the good) represents an incoherent picture of personhood (Mulhall and 
Swift, 2003, p. 464-465). For communitarians, the radical detachment of persons from 
their substantive commitments (which they take to be constitutive—rather than 
subsequent to—the self) is “psychologically impossible…[and] would anyway deprive 
the participants of the resources they needed to reason about social justice” (Mulhall and 
Swift, 2003, p. 465). As a further consequence of this problem, these theorists claim that 
Rawls’ design of the original position (and the mutually-disinterested deliberation that 
takes place within it) fails to properly account for the “necessarily social or communal 
origin of any individual’s ways of thinking” (Mulhall and Swift, 2003, p. 467). Last, as 
argued by Walzer (1984), given the social contingencies of human life (that is, human 
dependence on particular social or communal arrangements), Rawls’ theory cannot have 
the universal applicability to which it aspires.20 
2.3.3 Leftist debates. Various leftist and Marxist thinkers have leveled criticisms 
against Rawls’ entire system of justice—from its model-conceptions and justificatory 
                                                
19 For a review of the capabilities approach and some of its limitations, see Cohen, 1995 and Pogge, 2010. 
20 For a summary of the communitarian position and the responses made by Rawls and his defenders, see 
Mulhall and Swift, 2003. 
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foundations to its resultant two principles. G.A. Cohen (2008), who has argued forcefully 
against both Rawls and constructivism, challenges the idea that the basic structure of a 
well-ordered society represents the singularly appropriate subject of justice. Borrowing a 
phrase familiar from feminist theory, he argues that “the personal is political,” and that 
“principles of distributive justice, principles, that is, about the just distribution of benefits 
and burdens in society, apply, wherever else they do, to people’s legally unconstrained 
choices” (Cohen, 2008, p. 116). His point is not that the basic structure is an 
inappropriate subject of justice, but that it cannot be the only appropriate subject—justice 
also bears on the individual decisions of persons in society. 
 Gerald Doppelt (1981) has argued that justice as fairness is ideological, 
incorporating as it does certain positive bourgeois-democratic achievements (such as the 
assumption that all individuals possess equal dignity and equal liberty in some respect) 
while accepting uncritically certain negative “structural features of capitalist democracy 
which…prevent it from acknowledging other human claims” (p. 281-282).  For example, 
Doppelt (1981) believes that Rawls’ (inherently Kantian) model-conception of the moral 
person rationalizes a detachment of dignity from economic position, since it prioritizes 
persons as citizens and not as workers. As a result, Rawls’ envisaged well-ordered 
society—structurally speaking—“cannot be systematically organized to affirm the dignity 
of its laborers…” (p. 282). Julius Sensat (2007) has suggested that Rawls’ justification 
for the original position is also vulnerable to accusations that it incorporates (or is, at 
least, unnecessarily tolerant of) estrangement, as conceived by Marx. First, parties 
deliberating in the original position only compare his two principles against utilitarian 
principles, and ignore any principles grounded in the socialist tradition “that would 
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accord the highest priority to extensions of the rights of democratic political participation 
to encompass collective determination of the most important sectors of the economy…” 
(Sensat, 2007, p. 50). Second, Rawls model-conception of the moral person as free and 
equal is atomistic, and commits persons, foremost, to their respective individual (and 
differing) conceptions of the good (Sensat, 2007, p. 51). The first issue leaves Rawls 
vulnerable to economic estrangement, as his two principles are not tested against 
principles that would be more sensitive to such issues as they might arise in capitalist 
democracies; the second issue exposes justice as fairness to the problem of political or 
moral estrangement, as the parties, in acting independently of (and not necessarily in 
concert with) one another, might generate macrosocial effects that work to undermine the 
system of justice within which the parties undertake (and make sense of) individual 
actions.  
2.3.4 Disabilities debates. Disabilities critics of Rawls take aim at his model-
conceptions of both persons and society, as well as justice as fairness’ reliance on 
primary goods as an appropriate metric for justice generally (see: Nussbaum, 2006; Terzi, 
2010). Since, for Rawls (2001), persons are conceptualized “as having to the essential 
minimal degree the moral powers necessary to engage in social cooperation over a 
complete life and to take part in society as equal citizens” (p. 20) his theory is forced to 
set aside questions of justice for persons with various cognitive or physical disabilities. In 
fact, Rawls (1993) makes this exclusion explicit: “I put aside for the time 
being…temporary disabilities and also permanent disabilities or mental disorders so 
severe as to prevent people from being cooperating members of society in the usual 
sense” (p. 20). Instead, Rawls’ theory postpones addressing issues of disabilities until a 
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conception of justice for so-called “normal cases” can be worked out. Part of this 
problem stems from the limited account of diversity Rawls builds into the foundation of 
the original position—he accounts for a plurality of comprehensive doctrines (or 
conceptions of the good) but he sets aside the heterogeneity of human abilities. As a 
result, Rawls’ two principles of justice seem to exclude considerations that would be 
sensitive to diverse abilities, in particular differences in the abilities of individuals to 
make use of primary goods (Terzi, 2010). 
2.3.5 Feminist debates. Like communitarian critics, feminist critics—notably 
Alison Jaggar (1983) and Susan Moller Okin (1989)—challenge Rawls’ conception of 
the person and the supposedly symmetrical relations established between them by the 
design of the original position. A model of persons as mutually disinterested, seeking 
only to advance their own interests (as represented by Rawls’ commitment to primary 
goods), they claim, places an undue premium on rationality and does not appropriately 
consider the possibilities of human capacities for altruism, care, or love when reasoning 
about moral issues (including justice). In this way, and despite Rawls’ own claims to the 
contrary, they view his theory as egoistic. Other critics—inspired by Habermasian ideals 
of social dialogue and the public sphere—bemoan the lack of diversity of voices in the 
original position. By limiting persons to a single, uniform conception and subjecting them 
to a singular veil of ignorance, “the parties are imagined as basically all alike, and as 
reasoning on their own, rather than exchanging claims and counterclaims in a dialogue in 
which different perspectives can be presented and investigated” (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 
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494-495). In this way, the original position is unduly monological and limits the 
possibilities for Rawls’ theory to deal with issues of justice between genders.21 
 Feminist critics also commonly reject the Rawls’ idea that the subject of justice 
should be confined to the regulation of the basic structure of society. As previously 
discussed, Rawls’ early work was unclear as to whether or not the family was to be 
admitted as part of the basic structure regulated by principles of justice. Okin (1989), in 
particular, aimed much of her criticism at this ambiguity (p. 89-109). According to Okin 
(1989), Rawls offers “strikingly little indication…that the modern liberal society to which 
the principles of justice are to be applied is deeply and pervasively gender-structured” (p. 
89). In response, Rawls (1997/1999f) eventually admitted the family as part of the basic 
structure of society, but concedes that his two principles of justice do not apply directly to 
its internal workings. As a consequence, his theory appears to overlook the ways in which 
unjust power relations may persist in institutions or arrangements not directly regulated 
by his principles of justice, such as within the family.  
2.4 Summary 
Given its overall prominence, it is not surprising that Rawls’ work has been cited 
extensively in discussions of social justice, information, and technology. As the 
preceding overview makes clear, Rawls’ theory is deeply complex—it draws on and 
furthers powerful insights from a range of moral and political philosophical thought. It 
presents a systematic way to think about and arrive at “moral rules and lines of conduct 
consequent to them” (Rawls, 1951/1999a, p. 1). Moreover, since the publication A 
Theory of Justice in 1971, Rawls’ ideas have generated a great deal of discussion and 
debate between its defenders and critics. These discussions have helped clarify and 
                                                
21 For a summary of feminist criticisms and some responses available to Rawlsians, see Nussbaum, 2003. 
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deepen our understandings of basic liberal values such as freedom and equality and 
helped open up new lines of moral inquiry into issues of social justice for various 
marginalized or exploited groups. Resistance to Rawls’ institutional focus and lexical 
principles has helped fuel the development of alternative metrics for justice, most notably 
the capabilities approach advocated for by Sen and Nussbaum.  
Stressing the value of attending to the ideas developed in debates over Rawls for 
thinking about moral issues in information and technology, Karsten Weber (2010) has 
called for a return to Rawlsian theory by scholars interested in issues of ethics, 
information, and technology. Though there has been much handwringing over whether or 
not new and novel frameworks are needed to address issues of morality in the face of 
advanced ICTs, Weber argues that the wealth of resources yet available in the liberal 
tradition alone suggests that inventing entirely new theories is not entirely necessary. In 
the following, I echo this sentiment. However, it demands that we gain a better 
understanding of just which Rawlsian resources have been marshaled for use in 
informational and technological contexts and which have gone overlooked. 
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Chapter 3.0: Applications of Rawls to Information and Technology 
3.1 Introduction 
The primary aim of this chapter is to show how researchers and scholars 
interested in social justice, information, and technology have commonly employed 
Rawls’ work and its attendant debates. The discussion is divided into two parts. In the 
first part, I present a broad overview of engagements with Rawls in informational and 
technological contexts based on more than 150 scholarly articles from databases and 
journals dedicated to considerations of information and technology ethics, 
information/technology studies, philosophy of information, philosophy of technology, 
technology and human values, or some combination thereof.22 Of course, Rawls’ 
influence extends beyond these domains. However, my aim is not to present a critical 
review of Rawls specifically but, rather, of the way in which Rawls’ work has been 
discussed at the intersections of social justice, information, and technology—my choice 
of publications and databases reflects this focus. In addition to these sources, I consulted 
outside articles referencing Rawls that were frequently cited in works culled from the 
primary search—though, admittedly, the number of outside articles is small, as most of 
these citations were accounted for already. 
In the second part, I focus on scholars whose bodies of work demonstrate a 
significant commitment to the development of Rawlsian theory with regard to 
information and technology. During the primary literature review, five scholars in 
                                                
22 Consulted databases include Library, Information Science, & Technology Abstracts (LISTA) and the 
digital library of the Association of Computing and Machinery (ACM), both of which contain a wide range 
of publications relevant to ethics, information, and technology. Consulted journals include Ethics and 
Information Technology; Journal of Information Ethics (JIE); International Review of Information Ethics 
(IRIE); Philosophy and Technology; Information, Communication, and Ethics (ICE); Science, Technology, 
and Human Values: Journal of the Society for Social Studies of Science (ST&HV); Journal of the 
American Society for Information Science and Technology (JASIST); and First Monday. 
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particular stood out as major proponents of Rawls: Drahos (1996), van den Hoven (1995; 
1997), Brey (2000a; 2007), Britz (2004; 2008), and Duff (2011; 2012). Drahos, van den 
Hoven, and Brey represent the most systematic and comprehensive attempts to articulate 
concerns from the areas of information and technology studies within a Rawlsian 
framework—each author pays close attention to the mechanics of Rawls theory and how 
information and technology might best be accounted for within it. In contrast, Britz and 
Duff follow the spirit and ideals of Rawls’ work but do not attempt to account for 
information or technology within the framework of justice as fairness itself. Instead, they 
extract Rawls’ basic ideas and attempt to further develop them in applied contexts. Britz, 
for example, is concerned with articulating practical principles for attending to social 
justice in the flow of information from the affluent global north to the relatively 
disadvantaged global south. Duff, on the other hand, attempts to develop concrete 
prescriptions for how certain types of information should be distributed within affluent 
liberal democratic societies.  
Drahos, van den Hoven, and Brey are more strict and systematic in their use of 
Rawls, while Britz and Duff are more generous in their interpretations. Nonetheless, each 
author shares a set of core conceptions and commitments: they are all committed to the 
idea that access to information should be a basic liberty; they each argue that information 
is vital to the pursuit of individual and collective ends; and they focus on the concept of 
information as a resource in the abstract, in particular by conceiving of information as a 
primary good. Combined with the most common uses of Rawls revealed by the broader 
review, these central concerns come together to form what I will refer to as the “standard 
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account” of Rawls in informational and technological contexts. At the end of the chapter, 
I sketch the main ideas of the standard account and articulate some of its shortcomings. 
3.2 Survey of Engagements 
As previously noted, references to Rawls in the areas of ethics, information, and 
technology are common. They are not, however, scattershot—references to Rawls’ work 
tend to fall into one of four categories: 1) as a figurehead or representative of 
contemporary Western philosophy, in particular social contract theory; 2) as an 
oppositional figure, that is, as representative of an argument or position to be resisted; 3) 
as an authority for a particular normative concept, such as the idea of procedural justice 
or the priority or liberty; and 4) methodologically, that is, as a method for reasoning 
about and arriving at moral rules or principles (here, original position reasoning and the 
veil of ignorance are particularly prominent). I discuss each of these four areas in detail 
below. After doing so, I briefly identify some gaps in uses of Rawls that emerge from the 
review. 
3.2.1 Rawls as figurehead. Rawls is commonly cited as a figurehead for Western 
or liberal philosophy generally or social contract doctrines specifically. This type of 
reference often stands alone and serves to situate an author’s work in relation to a 
Western philosophical tradition generally without explicitly engaging Rawls’ work 
(Laudon, 1995; Kling, 1996; Carbo & Smith, 2008; Hongladorem, 2008; Chang, 2011; 
Brabham, 2012). Garg and Camp (2012), for example, invoke Rawls as representative of 
“Western philosophies” generally (p. 10), while Hildebrandt (2011) and Duff (2005) cite 
him as a contemporary example of deontological ethical reasoning. Clarke and Roache 
(2012) mention Rawls’ work as typical of contemporary liberal political philosophy and 
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Levy (2012) situates Rawls as an authority on the historical roots of liberalism. Similarly, 
Reed and Sanders (2008), Litscha and Karamasin (2012), and Heeney (2012) recognize 
Rawls’ place in a liberal social contract tradition alongside Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau 
(p. 1136). Hamlett (2003), Hands (2005), and Brabham (2012) admit his work as 
representative of certain debates concerning deliberative and participatory democracy.23  
In a similar vein, Rawls is often invoked as a figure worth appealing to in future 
discussions. In these instances, a work describes an ethical or political dilemma in 
relation to information technology and cites Rawlsian justice as a possible solution. In 
Wheeler’s (2003) critical discussion of the ACM Code of Ethics, for example, Rawls’ 
political liberalism is cited as one possible way of systematically thinking through 
complex moral and political issues. Jain and Boehm (2005) suggest Rawls’ framework as 
potentially useful for attending to human values in software engineering contexts. 
Finally, Kahn, Gill, Reichert, Kanda, Ishiguro, and Ruckert (2010) cite uses of Rawls by 
developmental psychologists as a future direction for philosophically-grounded research 
in the field of human-robot interaction. None of these works, however, explicitly attempt 
to apply Rawls to their stated informational or technological problems. 
3.2.2 Rawls as oppositional figure. The inverse of figurehead approaches, 
oppositional uses reject Rawls’ framework as inappropriate for addressing issues of 
morality and social justice. Within oppositional approaches, two general paths can be 
identified. On the first path, Rawls work is contrasted against an already existing critique 
in order to better illustrate the alternative position. This is most common in articles that 
                                                
23 Occasionally, this sort of fleeting reference serves to obscure or misconstrue important features of 
Rawls’ work, For instance, Bardy and Rubens (2009) align Rawls with a Benthamite conception of 
utilitarianism, overlooking the fact that Rawls’ work was driven (at least in part) by a critique of utilitarian 
reasoning. 
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appeal to the capabilities approach (unsurprising, given that the capabilities approach is 
built, in part, on a critique of Rawls). Examples of this approach include: capabilities 
analyses of morality and robots as caretakers (Borenstein & Pearson, 2010; Vallor, 2011); 
Coeckelbergh’s (2011) articulation of the capabilities approach as a suitable foundation 
for a comprehensive “ethical-anthropological framework;” and Johnstone’s (2007) 
application of the capabilities approach for normative analyses of technology generally. 
Outside of capabilities discussions, Rawls is also cited as incompatible with a feminist 
ethics of care (Froelich, 2004; Capurro, 2008). In a particularly clear example, Allen 
(2013) rehearses both capabilities and feminist critiques of Rawls’ institutional focus in 
her discussion of frameworks for assessing disaster response efforts by NGOs. In these 
cases, Rawls’ work is only indirectly criticized—it is simply presented to reinforce or 
justify the choice of an alternative framework.  
On the second path, Rawls’ work is not only used to punctuate or illustrate an 
alternative approach, but is directly challenged as well. Hands (2005), for example, 
criticizes Rawls’ model of public reasoning as an “idolatry of the state” that 
mischaracterizes civil society as residing solely in the relationships between citizens and 
state institutions, and not also between citizens themselves (n.p.). Similarly, Noveck 
(2005) challenges Rawls’ “idealization” of group deliberation behind the veil of 
ignorance (n.p.). More broadly, Brothers (1999) finds the liberal approach typified by 
Rawls as wholly inadequate for addressing issues of social justice in a Global 
Information Society. In a pointed example, Atikinson (2001) cites Rawls’ use of the veil 
of ignorance as emblematic of a “neutral” liberal ideology that limits our thinking about 
library services:  
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One of liberalism’s central concerns is to ensure fairness or justice, and the library 
is, therefore, intent upon providing a “just” service. As defined by John Rawls, 
the ideal person to engage in such a just interchange would be someone who is 
entirely without bias or predilection—someone who views the world through a 
“veil of ignorance” with respect to his or her own needs, preferences or place in 
society…. Only, we imagine, by totally ignoring our own personal histories can 
we avoid prejudicing the user’s search: we want always to connect the user 
directly to the information without getting in the way ourselves….” (Atkinson, 
2001, p. 4) 
Here, Rawls’ veil of ignorance is interpreted independent from Rawls’ model-
conceptions of persons, society, and the original position. As shown in the previous 
chapter, however, the veil of ignorance is introduced specifically to ensure fair 
deliberations between parties in the original position. Contrary to Atkinson’s claims, the 
veil is not neutral with respect to needs, preferences, or place in society; instead, it 
articulates “morally arbitrary” features of persons, that is, features that are irrelevant to 
the provision of primary goods or the application of moral and political principles.  
Atkinson’s interpretation fails to appreciate the role of the basic structure: Rawls’ 
work is not designed to apply to persons’ individual behavior within social and political 
institutions like a library but, rather, it stipulates conditions of fairness in the provision of 
goods and the application of justice by social institutions that make up the basic structure. 
As argued earlier, the original position (including the veil of ignorance) and its resultant 
two principles of justice apply not to individual actions or decisions, but to institutional 
and social structures. Atkinson could hardly deny that, from an institutional perspective, 
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persons’ ability to use the library should not be contingent upon morally arbitrary factors 
like race, gender, or religious affiliation. 
Similarly muddled interpretations have been prevalent in discussions of 
intercultural information ethics, where Rawls’ Western liberal commitments are taken as 
a signal of his ultimate incompatibility with intercultural ethical frameworks. Ess (2007), 
for example, argues that Rawls expects people to “[bracket their] diverse metaphysical 
beliefs” so that they might engage “with [their] fellow citizens simply on the basis of 
what is politically expedient” (p. 21). While this is not an uncommon interpretation, it 
misconstrues the role of persons’ comprehensive doctrines (which contain, among other 
things, persons’ metaphysical beliefs) in Rawls’ system of justice. Given the demands of 
public reasoning, Rawls does indeed argue that certain types of reasoning ought to be 
bracketed (for that matter, so does Ess); however, Rawls makes this argument from the 
perspective of institutions, not individuals. In fact, Rawls explicitly acknowledges that 
persons cannot wholly set aside their various commitments—they need to find 
justifications for political arrangements within their own comprehensive doctrines in 
order to support them as anything other than a “politically expedient” modus vivendi 
(Rawls, 2001, p. 192-195). Like Atkinson (2001), Ess’s argument mistakenly exchanges 
persons for institutions as the primary target of Rawls’ theory. As a result, Rawls is 
presented in such a way so as to be incompatible with an intercultural information ethic 
when other interpretations might suggest otherwise.24  
In a similar fashion, Wong’s (2012) discussion of ICTs and the good life depends 
heavily on criticisms of Rawlsian liberalism made by Michael Walzer (1984)—namely, 
that Rawls’ framework is not attentive to the social and cultural embeddedness of 
                                                
24 See Hausmanninger (2004) for a defense of Rawls in the context of global information ethics. 
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individuals. However, these criticisms overlook the ways in which Rawls’ argument from 
the basic structure is designed to respond directly to the justice of the social and cultural 
“background conditions” against which individuals live their lives. In this way, Rawls’ 
theory is not removed from but, rather, designed specifically to respond to certain 
carefully bracketed contextual considerations.25 
3.2.3 Normative applications. Outside of figurehead or oppositional uses, 
Rawls’ work is frequently cited for its clear articulation of certain normative concepts. 
Sometimes, scholars of information and technology simply endorse Rawls’ normative 
system wholesale. For example, Johnson and Miller (2002)—in an editorial exploring the 
issues of morality and diversity in computing contexts—invoke Rawls’s two principles of 
justice as support for promoting equal opportunity in professional computing. They 
appeal to Rawlsian justice to argue that “jobs in computing should be open to all” 
(Johnson & Miller, 2002, p. 10). Most examples, however, are not so broad. Instead, 
specific dimensions of Rawls’ theory are discussed and endorsed as authoritative or 
normatively appropriate, namely: his articulation of procedural justice; his formulation of 
the difference principle; his discussions of basic liberties and the priority of liberty; and 
the idea of an overlapping consensus. 
3.2.3.1 Procedural justice. Computer scientists interested in developing 
computational models of legal reasoning have turned to Rawls definition of procedural 
justice as a model (Lodder & Herezog, 1995; Leenes, 2001; Zeleznikow, Bellucci, 
Schild, & Mackenzie, 2007; Roth, Riveret, Rotolo, & Governatori, 2007; Gordon, 1993). 
According to this work, procedural justice “is concerned with making and implementing 
                                                
25 Most notably, proponents of the “practice-dependent” interpretation of Rawls have shown how justice as 
fairness can be read as methodologically dependent on a notion of social embeddedness (Ronzoni, 2009; 
James, 2005). I return to the idea of practice-dependence in the next chapter. 
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decisions according to a fair process” (Zeleznikow, et al, 2007, p. 238). Put another way, 
just outcomes are the result of fair processes and are not assessed independently of the 
procedures from which they issue. A representative example is Lodder and Herczog’s 
(1995) “DiaLaw,” which builds on a definition of law as “purely procedural” (in the 
Rawlsian sense) to create a dialogical approach to modeling legal reasoning in computing 
environments.  
3.2.3.2 Difference principle. Computer scientists have also relied on Rawls’ work 
in attempting to justify particular distributions of computing resources within a network. 
In these instances, the difference principle—alternatively referred to as the “maximin” 
principle (i.e., maximizing the minimum)—is used to argue for egalitarian distributions 
without appealing to utilitarian principles (Ephrati, Zlotkin, & Rosenschein, 1994; 
Crowcroft & Oechslin, 1998; Dramitinos, Stamoulis, & Courcoubetis, 2004; Radunović 
& Boudec, 2007). The Rawlsian idea that fair distributions are distributions arranged to 
improve the position of the worst-off has offered computer scientists a potent alternative 
notion of fairness for discussing allocations of resources in computer networks that does 
not rely on simply trying to maximize overall utility. 
In a different manner, scholars working in the areas of information or digital 
divides often appeal to the difference principle to show how certain inequalities with 
regard to access to information or technology are unjust (Britz & Ponelis, 2005; Duff, 
2006; Hodel-Widmer, 2006; Bose, 2012). Wolf and Grodzinsky (2006) and Misra (2012) 
also cite the difference principle in this way, arguing that software engineers ought to 
take into account the special considerations of the least-advantaged. In a unique 
application, Ottinger (2013) cites the difference principle as a potential alternative model 
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for assessing the environmental risks of technological development. Rather than relying 
exclusively on political and economic arguments, Ottinger (2013) argues that the 
difference principle can be used to make a moral assessment as to whether or not a given 
community or area would be made worse off by proposed facilities or developments. 
3.2.3.3 Basic liberties and the priority of liberty. Rawls’ account of basic liberties 
(as enshrined in his first principle of justice) and their priority has featured prominently in 
different works (Primeaux, 1998; Taebi, 2011). For example, Laird (1993) cites Rawls’ 
assertion that, in democratic societies, certain basic political liberties cannot be traded off 
for other goods (for example, trading voting rights for money). Similarly, Franke (2012) 
invokes the lexical ordering of Rawls’ two principles to argue against justifications of 
censorship that appeal to second-principle considerations (such as economic efficiency or 
property rights). Vaccaro and Madsen (2009) draw on van den Hoven and Rooksby’s 
(2008) interpretation of Rawls to articulate an “informational liberty” (alternatively 
described as a “right to know”) to be enshrined alongside other Rawlsian basic liberties. 
In a different vein, Mattlage (2007) discusses Rawlsian basic liberties in the context of 
intellectual property rights and Margaret Jane Radin’s (1993) “contested commodities.” 
In particular, the author notes that Rawls’ “treatment of basic liberties recognizes the 
incommensurability of certain primary (usually material) goods and the basic liberties of 
individuals” (Mattlage, 2007, p. 21). 
3.2.3.4 Overlapping Consensus. The idea of an overlapping consensus—
developed most prominently in Political Liberalism—has also figured into discussions of 
ethics, information, and technology. For example, van de Poel and Zwart (2010) suggest 
that an overlapping consensus could be a valuable approach to reaching agreement on 
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moral issues in research and development (R&D) contexts. In a different vein, both 
Hausmanninger (2004) and Søraker (2006) draw on Rawls’ concept of an overlapping 
consensus in their normative discussions of the Internet, though in different ways. 
Hausmanninger (2004) argues against normative visions of the Internet that rely on 
pragmatic arguments and instead advocates a return to universal principles for global 
ethics debates. For Hasumanninger (2004), the idea of an overlapping consensus 
represents a promising framework for developing an ethics of the Internet that is 
simultaneously global and pluralistic (p. 7). Inversely, Søraker (2006) argues that 
pragmatic arguments actually present the best foundation for the development of a global 
overlapping consensus on ethical issues with regard to the Internet. 
3.2.3.5 Additional considerations. Though the above features represent the most 
commonly consulted dimensions of Rawls’ work, other features have been invoked as 
well. Bärwolff (2009), Bose (2012), and Collste (2008), for example, cite Rawls’ 
conception of justice as generally preferable from a normative perspective. Fallis and 
Whitcomb (2008) briefly cite Rawls in the context of rationality and advancing particular 
ends. Mathiesen (2013) has appealed to Rawls’ definition of a right as something that can 
be owed to a rights-holder as a matter of justice. Dell and Venkatesh (2012) rely on 
Rawls’ distinction between the reasonable and rational to show that the exercise of 
reasonableness should be emphasized in social design settings. Finally, in a discussion of 
reconciling conflicting human values within Values Sensitive Design (VSD) and related 
design methodologies, Burmeister, Weckert, and Williamson (2011) cite Rawls’ 
discussion of the tension between the values of equality and efficiency. 
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3.2.4 Methodological applications. Similar to the above are what might best be 
referred to as methodological uses of Rawls. In these instances, an author (or authors) 
adopts a method or procedure from Rawls’ body of work and employs it in applied 
contexts. For example, in their article “How Good is Good Enough: An Ethical Analysis 
of Software Construction and Use,” Collins, Miller, Spielman, and Wherry (1994) 
declare: “We use the reasoning that Rawls applied to general societal ethics in the 
specific context of software fairness, modifying his ideas as needed to apply to 
computing" (p. 85).26 Similarly general approaches are taken by Lockhart (2001), 
Johnson and Miller (2002), and Murphy (2012). In a different vein, Powers (2003) uses 
Rawls’ distinction between two concepts of rules to systematically identify norms and 
standards at play in a particular online community (see also: Tavani, Grodzinsky, & 
Spinello, 2003). Most methodological uses of Rawls, however, are not so broad and tend 
to appeal specifically to Rawls’ method of wide reflective equilibrium (discussed below) 
or the original position (and, more often, its veil of ignorance). 
3.2.4.1 Wide reflective equilibrium. Rawls (2001) articulates the idea of “wide 
reflective equilibrium” to address conflicts when “the implications of the judgments we 
render on one question [are] inconsistent or incongruent with those we render on other 
questions” (p. 30). In a state of wide reflective equilibrium, a person 
has carefully considered alternative conceptions of justice and the force of various 
arguments for them. More exactly, this person has considered the leading 
conceptions of political justice found in our philosophical tradition (including 
views critical of the concept of justice itself…), and has weighed the force of the 
                                                
26 The recognition of the value of Rawls for thinking through problems in technological contexts by 
Collins, et al has been reaffirmed elsewhere (see: Siponen and Vartiainen, 2007). 
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different philosophical and other reasons for them. In this case, we suppose this 
person’s general convictions, first principles, and particular judgments are in line; 
…the reflective equilibrium is wide, given the wide-ranging reflection and 
possibly many changes of view that have preceded it. (Rawls, 2001, p. 31) 
In short: a person is said to have reached a state of wide reflective equilibrium when they 
have brought their general moral and ethical principles more or less “in line” with their 
considered judgments about particular cases or situations. Further, Rawls argues that the 
method of wide reflective equilibrium demonstrates why people would choose his 
principles of justice over utilitarian principles, lending justificatory force to his theory. 
  Various works have recognized the value of wide reflective equilibrium for 
reasoning about not only justice, but a wide range of ethical issues. van den Hoven 
(1997) has argued that wide reflective equilibrium represents an appropriate 
methodological approach for computer ethics, and others have followed him in this 
assertion (Tavani, 2001; Bynum, 2000; Himma, 2008). Elia (2009), in his discussion of 
ICTs and transparency, describes the method as particularly valuable for “testing broad 
moral principles against empirical data, situation difference, and intuitions or judgments 
regarding specific cases in an ongoing and potentially revisionary way” (p. 147). van de 
Poel and Zwart (2010) and Doorn (2012) explicitly deploy the method in their attempts to 
morally assess particular research and development (R&D) practices. Tidwell (1999) uses 
the method to discuss how the World Wide Web can support ethical debates between 
professional communities. Additionally, Clarke and Roache (2012) cite wide reflective 
equilibrium as a useful way of thinking through moral dimensions of human 
enhancement technologies. 
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3.2.4.2 Original position and the veil of ignorance. The most common 
methodological engagement with Rawls is through the device of the original position. In 
many cases, the idea or “spirit” of the original position as a thought experiment is applied 
to a particular ethical issue raised by information or technology. Culnan and Regan 
(1995) rely on Rawls’ characterization of “mutually disinterested” persons in the original 
position to stress the importance of preserving individual privacy in the face of massive 
political campaign mailing lists in the United States. Similarly, Introna (2000) and Olivier 
(2002) invoke the original position as a way to ask what information privacy policies 
persons might choose under ideal conditions. Vartiainen and Siponen (2010) recommend 
the veil of ignorance as a useful tool for helping students think about moral dimensions of 
pirating software. Johansson (2011) relies heavily on Brandt’s (1972) modification of the 
veil of ignorance to discuss the morality of unmanned armed vehicles (UAVs). Kaddu 
(2007) employs a modified original position and veil of ignorance to advocate for a free 
flow of information in society. LePoire (2005) suggests a version of the veil for resolving 
tensions between development, risk, and uncertainty when developing technological 
solutions to social problems. Finally, Cooke (2005) cites the original position as perhaps 
valuable for generating an ethical defense of GLBT-specific library and professional 
organizations. 
The above uses of the original position tend to be less detailed, though they all 
explicitly or implicitly endorse impartiality as integral to the development and 
justification of moral principles. In contrast, Chopra and Dexter (2009) develop a 
particularly robust application of original position reasoning while generating their 
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defense of “Freedom Zero” of the Free Software Definition. Their discussion is worth 
citing at length for the clarity and detail of their application:  
suppose [a software development] community were assembled behind a veil of 
ignorance: none of the group knows in advance which position in the community 
they will hold. Individuals would not know their social and political positions, or 
others’ reasons for being interested in the project. Some will be users of the 
software, some will be core developers and maintainers, while others will write 
code and documentation. In order to determine a just allocation of rights and 
responsibilities, the group is asked, still behind the veil, to determine which rights 
should be granted to whom. Most plausibly, the community would choose to grant 
Freedom Zero to all. If a particular subgroup in the community could unilaterally 
decide for what purposes a program could be used, each member would be 
justified in fearing that such a subgroup could prevent his legitimate use of the 
software. Alternatively, the group as a whole could try to arrive at a set of 
restrictions by consensus, but such a process could be intractable if no-one knows 
their eventual position in the community. (Chopra & Dexter, 2009, p. 294) 
Within the reviewed literature, Chopra and Dexter’s application represents the most 
developed use of original position reasoning to a specifically informational or 
technological issue. 
Another prominent use of Rawls is available in Jim Moor’s (1999) framework of 
“just consequentialism,” which relies on the impartiality of original position reasoning. 
Dissatisfied with traditional tensions between deontological and consequentialist 
frameworks , Moor (1999) sets out to articulate a unified theory that might aid applied 
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computer ethics that he sees as “immersed in ad hoc analyses” and “searching for 
practical guidance” (p. 65). Noting that actions involving computers can sometimes have 
harmful consequences, he insists that policy makers and computer ethicists cannot 
abandon consequentialist reasoning altogether. However, he also recognizes that 
consequentialist reasoning can often be insensitive to principles of justice and human 
rights. In order to account for this shortcoming of consequentialism, Moor (1999) 
develops a framework of “just consequentialism” that he thinks allows policy makers and 
ethicists “to take into account the consequences of policies while at the same time making 
sure that these policies are constrained by principles of justice” (p. 66). 
To begin, Moor (1999) insists that all persons are interested in a certain set of core 
goods, namely life, happiness, and autonomy (inversely, he believes that humans also 
generally have an interest in avoiding certain core evils including—unsurprisingly—
death, unhappiness and lack of autonomy). For Moor (1999), happiness is defined 
vaguely as “pleasure and the absence of pain” (p. 66). Autonomy, on the other hand, is 
articulated by reference to another set of goods which he refers to as “the goods of 
autonomy.” The goods of autonomy include (but are not necessarily limited to): ability, 
security, knowledge, freedom, opportunity, and resources to accomplish projects (Moor, 
1999, p. 66). Much like how Rawls’ primary goods are an expression of the two moral 
powers (the first of which includes rational autonomy), Moor’s set of goods express the 
value of autonomy that just consequentialism is designed to promote. “Of course,” Moor 
(1999) continues, “humans are not necessarily concerned about the lives, happiness, and 
autonomy of others, but they are concerned about their own” (p. 66). Ethics intervenes, 
then, to prevent people from inflicting unjustified harm on one another. 
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Another way to make this point is to regard the core goods as marking 
fundamental human rights—at least as negative human rights. Humans ought to 
have their lives, happiness, and autonomy protected. And this principle of 
justice—the protection of fundamental human rights—should guide us in sharing 
ethical policies for using computer technology. (Moor, 1999 p. 66)  
To preserve this principle of justice, Moor develops a minimal impartiality test grounded 
in Gert’s (1998) “blindfold of justice,” itself a modification of Rawls’ veil of ignorance. 
The test is a two-part procedure: first, one abstract morally relevant features of a given 
action; second, one considers whether or not the abstracted action could be publicly 
allowed (that is, one asks what the world would be like if everyone performed the same 
or similar actions). Like Rawls’ veil of ignorance, this process of abstraction allows one 
to consider morally relevant features of a given situation without reference to benefits or 
harms to particular persons. In this way, Moor thinks, we can—at a minimum—arrive at 
some universal agreements on matters relevant to computer ethics. At the very least there 
will be some policies or actions “every rational, impartial person would regard as unjust” 
(Moor, 1999, p. 67). These policies and actions can be explicitly barred. After this 
minimum has been met, however, we can use consequentialist reasoning to assess the 
benefits and harms of other, permissible policies and actions.27 
Outside of these detailed applications, other scholars have simply emphasized the 
original position’s value as a framework for addressing ethical issues generally. Floridi 
(1999), for example, admits the original position as a rare example of a patient-oriented 
                                                
27 Moor’s “just consequentialism” has been applied to a range of computing and informational contexts, 
including privacy-enhancing technologies (Tavani & Moor, 2001), values in design (Flanagan et al 2008), 
video games (Gotterbarn & Moor, 2009), and software engineering (Gotterbarn & Miller, 2009). 
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approach to moral reasoning in the typically agent-centered Western philosophical 
tradition. The original position, Floridi (1999) notes,  
must be acknowledged to stress the crucial importance of the impartial nature of 
moral concern, thanks to the hypothetical scenario in which rational agents are 
asked to determine the nature of society in a complete state of ignorance of what 
their positions would be in it, thus transforming the agent into the potential patient 
of the action…. (p. 42)  
Floridi repeatedly affirms the relevance of the original position for thinking about a 
patient-centered information ethics (see: Floridi, 2006; Floridi 2010b). In a different vein, 
Visala (1996) uses the original position to defend a “universalizable” moral discourse and 
subsequently attempts to unite a Habermasian model of communicative rationality with a 
Rawlsian model of rational decision-making behind a veil of ignorance. Wallace (1999) 
holds up the veil of ignorance as reinforcing the value of anonymity for helping people 
make ethical decisions. In a detailed discussion of moral dimensions of data mining 
practices in health care and insurance industries, Lercher (2008) endorses the original 
position for the way in which it limits the role of risk-taking in the selection of principles 
of justice. “If none of the contracting parties [in an original position],” Lercher (2008) 
writes, “knows whether he or she has any condition resulting in higher than average 
health risks, it seems that they would not agree to rules governing insurance that 
permitted insurance to be denied to those with higher than average risks” (p. 38). 
3.2.5 Gaps. Though this overview demonstrates a number of common 
engagements with Rawlsian theory, it also exposes gaps in the application of his work. 
For example, the ideas of background justice and fair background conditions integral to 
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Rawls argument from the basic structure do not figure heavily into discussions of social 
justice, information, and technology. Although the notion of primary goods is present, not 
all of Rawls primary goods receive the same degree of consideration—the social bases of 
self-respect, for instance, have gone overlooked. Similarly, Rawls’ model-conceptions of 
free and equal moral persons and a well-ordered society that underwrite the normative 
authority of the original position are not discussed. Without due attention to its 
foundations, most deployments of original position-style reasoning lack the rigor of 
Rawls’ articulation. In many places, the appeal to Rawlsian concepts has been quite 
limited in scope, often failing to also draw on well-developed discussions in other 
domains. Weber (2010), as mentioned earlier, has identified a similar shortcoming, 
pointing out that scholars interested in intercultural information ethics have ignored 
important developments and clarifications in the area of group and minority rights 
generated by debates over Rawls’ work (i.e., Kymlicka, 1989). Further, while the review 
turned up references to capabilities and communitarian debates, it also showed that 
disabilities, leftist, and feminist perspectives have rarely been consulted. Finally, in spite 
of van den Hoven’s (2010) acknowledgement that Rawls’ focus on the basic structure 
equips us with powerful tools for thinking about ethics in the context of design, scholars 
have overlooked the relevance of the argument from the basic structure.28 
3.3 Major Proponents 
Beyond limited or passing engagements with Rawls’ work, five scholars have 
emerged as major proponents of Rawlsian thought in informational and technological 
contexts. In the mid-1990s, Peter Drahos began appealing to Rawlsian thought in 
                                                
28 Palm (2009) is one exception. In this study, the author attempts to describe fair background conditions 
for workplace surveillance practices. 
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discussions of information justice. In particular, Drahos relied on Rawls’ two principles 
to develop a systematic account of intellectual property rights and just distributions of 
informational goods. Not long after, Jeroen van den Hoven also began advocating for the 
value of Rawls’ work, though his concerns revolved less around intellectual property 
specifically and instead centered on access to information generally. His discussion with 
Emma Rooksby (see: van den Hoven & Rooksby, 2008) is, to date, the most 
comprehensive account of information as a primary good in the Rawlsian sense. In 
addition to van den Hoven, Philip Brey has appealed to Rawls for thinking through moral 
dimensions of information and technology. As already discussed, Brey’s disclosive 
method of computer ethics calls for the subjecting of opaque moral features of 
technology to analysis according to existing moral, ethical, or political frameworks—
justice as fairness is frequently cited as one such existing framework (see, for example: 
Brey, 2000a).  Together, Drahos, van den Hoven, and Brey have done a great deal of 
work to articulate the role of information as a primary good within the framework of 
Rawls’ theory of justice. 
In a less systematic manner, Johannes Britz (along with frequent co-authors Shana 
Ponelis and Peter Lor) has, on various occasions, relied on Rawls’ two principles of 
justice as a model for thinking through just distributions of information goods on a global 
scale. Britz’s work focuses on the implications of a Rawlsian approach to justice for 
applied informational and technological issues, especially as they relate to the flow of 
informational and technological goods between affluent Western countries and less-
advantaged African nations. Similarly, Alistair Duff has also promoted the use of Rawls 
for studying issues of social justice in a global information society (or, as he often has it, 
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a “post-industrial” society). Duff’s major work—A Normative Theory of the Information 
Society (2012)—represents perhaps the most robust interpretation of Rawls to applied 
issues of information distribution. In the book and elsewhere (see: Duff, 2011), he 
proposes concrete prescriptions for distributing the types of information he views as 
relevant to justice today.  
While all of these authors vary in their attention to the details of Rawls’ theory 
(Drahos, van den Hoven, and Brey are stricter and more systematic, while Britz and Duff 
are looser and more generous in their interpretations), each account revolves around a 
similar set of conceptions and concerns. In the following section, I review their work in 
more detail, explicitly addressing their uses and interpretations of Rawls. After doing so, 
I bring together their common features and—combined with the uses of Rawls reviewed 
in the previous section—develop what I refer to as the standard account of Rawls in 
available discussions of social justice, information, and technology. 
3.3.1 Drahos. In A Philosophy of Intellectual Property, Drahos (1996) addresses 
problems of information, intellectual property rights, and social justice through a 
Rawlsian lens. Overall, he is concerned with showing what sorts of intellectual property 
rights arrangements might be justifiable according to a robust theory of justice such as 
justice as fairness. He argues that Rawls’ theory is an appropriate one to adopt for a few 
reasons. First, he sees Rawls’ work as less metaphysically problematic than an account 
rooted in natural rights. Second, Rawls’ “impeccable liberal pedigree” means his theory 
will not be inherently hostile to the concept of property rights altogether. And, finally, 
Rawls’ two principles set a clear benchmark against which the justice of any given 
intellectual property rights scheme can be assessed. Drahos (1996) is also aware of the 
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challenges that have been put to Rawls’ work—he recognizes that adopting a Rawlsian 
frame means simultaneously acquiring established opposition to that frame (p. 172). 
Nonetheless, he is not interested in responding to critics of Rawls directly and, instead, 
seeks to articulate its value for addressing issues of intellectual property rights. 
Drahos begins his analysis by outlining the importance of information for 
knowledge construction, development of the economy, and the exercise of power. He 
defines information as an “abstract object” in a legalistic sense—that is, as an object that 
can be conceived of in abstract terms despite ultimately being known through physical 
objects. Information in the abstract is a sort of highly useful fiction—it represents certain 
“core structures” used by various actors in deciding “whether disparate physical objects 
are the same or similar, or resemble each other” (Drahos, 1996, p. 154). Given 
information’s status as an abstract object, Drahos is also quick to note two other 
properties of information that are important in the context of justice. First, information, 
unlike physical goods, is non-rivalrous: its use by one person does not preclude or 
diminish its ability to be used simultaneously by another person. Second, information has 
a tendency to spread. “Humans are information gatherers and exchangers,” Drahos 
(1996) argues, and “in a world full of digital technology…the capacity of humans to 
spread information is greatly enhanced” (p. 172). Though information about a given 
subject or topic may be scarce at times (that is, people may be ignorant or restricted from 
having access), information is not scarce once it exists, since the “supply of information 
to one person does not diminish the amount available for supply to another person” 
(Drahos, 1996, p. 171). Consequently, information challenges ideas of scarcity that 
underwrite most discussions of distributive justice. 
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In order to account for information within a scheme of distributive justice, Drahos 
argues that information should be considered a primary good in the Rawlsian sense. 
Drahos (1996) asserts that rational persons would want more and not less information 
since—as with rights, liberties, opportunities, and resources (Rawls’ other primary 
goods)—information is indispensable to pursuing one’s valued ends or life projects:  
One reason for thinking that information is a primary good is its crucial role in 
human planning…. After all, the act of planning requires information. Plans take 
their shape according to the information available to the planners. The more 
information they have about the world to which their desires, purposes and goals 
relate, the more specific their plans can be. The less information individuals have, 
the more general their plans have to be. In a world where the amount of 
information available for planning was ever diminishing, a point would be 
reached where planning could not take place. (p. 174) 
For Drahos (1996), persons need more than equal rights and liberties in order to develop 
and pursue plans and make decisions—they also need information (p. 175). 
Drahos goes on to account for information as a Rawlsian primary good at two 
different levels: domestic and international. At the domestic level, Drahos (1996) 
suggests a “freedom of information” to sit alongside other basic liberties, like freedom of 
expression (p. 176). Here, the equal relevance and import of information for individuals 
finds explicit protection through Rawls’ lexically-prior first principle. At the same time, 
Drahos emphasizes the economic value of information. He cites positive economics and 
Rawls’ difference principle as providing some justification for certain productive 
inequalities in the distribution of information: inequalities in the distribution of 
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information may be justified so long as they provide incentives to produce more 
information or goods that, ultimately, improve the well-being of the least-advantaged. 
One can imagine cases where the unequal distribution of some socially useful 
information through, say, the patents mechanism would satisfy the difference 
principle and be therefore a permissible inequality. If it were really true, for 
example, that certain kinds of beneficial drug inventions would only have taken 
place because of the patent system then the temporary inequalities that the patent 
system creates in terms of access to information could be accommodated under 
the difference principle. (Drahos, 1996, p. 177) 
However, Drahos (1996) is also quick to emphasize that certain inequalities in the 
distribution of information could never be justified since, under a Rawlsian scheme, 
second-principle considerations cannot take priority over first-principle ones (p. 177-
178). For example, basic and political liberties cannot be compromised in order to gain 
economic or positional advantages with regard to information resources. Instead, property 
rights in information should be viewed “as a tool to preserve political liberties and 
maximize access to, and the distribution of, primary goods such as information” (Drahos, 
1996, p. 178).  
To work this way, Drahos (1996) believes that parties in the original position 
would adopt a scheme of property rights in information that severely limited monopoly 
rights (p. 179). Since monopoly rights in information limit the degree to which 
information diffuses throughout the population, they have the potential to generate unjust 
inequalities between information haves and have-nots by undermining the ability of the 
latter group to effectively exercise their first principle rights and liberties. For this reason, 
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parties in the original position, Drahos argues, would likely adopt a minimal (as opposed 
to maximal) scheme of intellectual property rights. 
At the international level, Drahos adjusts his view of informational justice to 
accommodate the differences between Rawls domestic and global theories of justice. He 
believes parties at the global level would also adopt a severely limited scheme of 
intellectual property rights, though their reasons for doing so would be different. At the 
global level, Rawls abandons his domestic original position and develops an alternative 
procedure where the representative parties are “peoples”—not individual rational persons 
(Rawls, 1999g). On Rawls’ account, since there is no such thing as a global basic 
structure (i.e., a world government) comparable to those found at the domestic level, it 
does not make sense to design an original position for arriving at principles of justice to 
govern a global basic structure in the same way that his domestic theory is designed to 
govern the basic structure of domestic institutions. Instead, parties in a global original 
position come together to deliberate about terms for governing relations between states, 
so the appropriate representatives in the original position will be “peoples” and not 
individuals. These peoples, Rawls argues, would be most interested in developing some 
basic rules and procedures for governing cooperation between states, as well as 
establishing some minimal institutions and agencies responsible for enforcing these basic 
rules.  
In discussing global intellectual property agreements, Drahos emphasizes Rawls’ 
argument that peoples in a global original position would likely adopt a position of non-
interference, that is, that states should not interfere in the inner-workings of other states’ 
domestic structures (so long as those structures meet certain minimal standards of 
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decency). This condition of non-intervention, Drahos argues, would severely restrict the 
possible global intellectual property agreements that could be justified. In particular, 
robust protectionist schemes of intellectual property rights would be barred since they 
would unduly interfere in domestic property structures and undermine the autonomy of 
individual states (Drahos, 1996, p. 190).29 
Drahos’ argument against maximal and protectionist intellectual property schemes 
is compelling and reflects the spirit of the difference principle as articulated by Rawls. 
However, because Drahos limits his focus to the ways in which intellectual property 
rights impact the distribution of information, so is the application of his argument to 
information and technological issues limited. Though he is clear that information in the 
abstract is ultimately known through physical objects, his discussion does not address 
potential injustices that may arise from the design of physical objects through which 
information is ultimately known. Structurally speaking, physical objects like 
technological artifacts or information infrastructures are not blank or neutral vessels 
exclusively shaped by the information they distribute; rather, the relationship between 
information as an abstract object and its physical manifestation is dialectical—
information both informs and is informed by the values and affordances of the physical 
objects through which it is expressed. So, while Drahos’ use of Rawls has profound 
implications for policy and ethical discussions of intellectual property regimes and their 
distributive effects, it cannot account for non-distributive issues of values embedded in 
the design of informational systems or technological objects. 
                                                
29 Drahos (1996) defines a scheme of intellectual property rights as protectionist if “(1) it favors longer 
periods of protection rather than shorter; (2) it properties more areas of information rather than fewer; (3) it 
imposes substantive standards of intellectual property protection uniformly on all states; (4) it has few or no 
discretionary mechanisms that allow nation states to adjust substantive standards and the levels of 
protection to suit their level of economic development” (p. 189) 
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3.3.2 van den Hoven. Jeroen van den Hoven has engaged Rawlsian theory, 
information, and technology on multiple fronts. Broadly, he believes Rawls’ systematic 
construction of principles of justice for well-ordered, democratic societies helped pave 
the way for considering issues of design in ethics: “Thinking about social justice can, in 
the context of Rawls’ theory, be described as formulating and justifying the principles of 
justice in accordance with which we should design the basic institutions in society” (van 
den Hoven, 2010, p. 76). For van den Hoven (2010), “the design turn” goes beyond 
offering simple applied ethical analyses to also address  
the economic conditions, institutional and legal frameworks and incentive 
structures that need to be realized if our applied analyses are to stand a chance in 
their implementation and thus contribute to bringing about real and desirable 
moral changes in the real world. (p. 76)  
While work in this vein is largely focused on institutional design, he believes it 
simultaneously raises issues relevant to the design of sociotechnical systems and 
technological artifacts (van den Hoven, 2008, p. 59; van den Hoven, 2010, p. 76). 
Additionally, van den Hoven (1997) has argued that Rawls’ method of wide reflective 
equilibrium (described earlier) is the most appropriate methodology for considering 
ethical issues in the context of computers and other advanced ICTs (see also: van den 
Hoven, 2008, p. 56-57). 
van den Hoven’s most thorough and pointed engagements with Rawls position 
information as a primary good within justice as fairness (1995; see also: van den Hoven 
& Rooksby, 2008). As with Drahos earlier, van den Hoven argues that information 
qualifies as a primary good in the Rawlsian sense via its role in persons’ life planning.  
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The idea of forming, revising, and pursuing a rational plan subject to the 
conditions that confront one hardly makes sense without assuming that 
information relevant to the task is relatively easy to come by. New information 
about the world is the first thing you need if you want to make, evaluate, and 
revise rational plans about your life. (van den Hoven & Rooksby, 2008, p. 382).  
Since, on Rawls’ account, 1) primary goods are assumed to have value regardless of the 
details of one’s plan of life and 2) it is rational for persons to prefer a greater (and not 
lesser) share of primary goods, the indispensability of information to pursuing one’s ends 
seems to make it an excellent candidate as a primary good.30 
Unlike Drahos, van den Hoven goes beyond simply showing the (obvious) 
instrumental value of information to also differentiate between different types of 
Rawlsian primary goods and further justify the claim that information should be added to 
the index. Recall that Rawls distinguishes between different types of primary goods: 
basic liberties, opportunities, and income and wealth (all-purpose means). Citing Rawls’ 
assertion that the basic liberties are necessary background institutions for the exercise of 
the second moral power, van den Hoven and Rooksby (2008) argue that access to 
information should be protected alongside established basic liberties like free speech or 
freedom of movement. Such an informational basic liberty would be violated, for 
example, in a situation “in which…a national information infrastructure…reaches urban 
citizens but not rural citizens, thereby preventing rural citizens from accessing relevant 
information stored only online” (van den Hoven & Rooksby, 2008, p. 385). This sort of 
                                                
30 van den Hoven & Rooksby (2008) summarize a conception of information as a primary good as: “(PG 1) 
the freedom to acquire information relevant to rational life planning qualifies as a BASIC LIBERTY under 
the first principle of justice. (PG 2) Opportunities to acquire information are, like opportunities for 
education or health care, afforded under the opportunity principle” (p. 386; for an earlier formulation, see 
van den Hoven, 1995). 
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situation would unjustly impose inequalities in information liberties on rural citizens (van 
den Hoven & Rooksby, 2008, p. 385). Given the lexical priority Rawls affords to 
protection of these basic liberties, van den Hoven is able to find and defend a basis within 
Rawls’ theory for information policies that promote equitable access.  
While access to information is amenable to Rawls’ index of basic liberties, 
information and ICTs also represent opportunities and resources that can be, van den 
Hoven thinks, further accommodated under Rawls’ second principle of justice. In this 
way, the formal right to access information already outlined is given substantive 
expression: 
Now if, in a society, a substantial proportion of information relevant to citizens’ 
life planning is only accessible via information media, then, in that society, a 
guarantee of equal liberty to seek information will not be sufficient in itself to 
ensure that all citizens have access to all relevant information. In such a society, 
access to (often expensive and complex) information media will also be necessary 
for citizens to access much of the information relevant to their rational life 
planning. To put the point in general terms, ensuring a just distribution of 
information requires not only a just distribution of information liberties for all 
citizens, but also mechanisms to ensure that people’s opportunities to exercise 
their information liberties are roughly equal. (van den Hoven & Rooksby, 2008, p. 
385) 
In describing access to information in opportunistic terms, van den Hoven is able to 
further accommodate information under the equal opportunities protections afforded by 
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Rawls’ second principle of justice (unlike Drahos, who uses the problem of intellectual 
property rights to account for information under the difference principle). 
van den Hoven’s work also attends to a number of critiques that have been leveled 
against Rawls work. In particular, the work of Amartya Sen and Thomas Pogge, as well 
as (though in a different way) communitarian Michael Walzer have figured heavily into 
his thoughts on information, technology, and justice. Thomas Pogge’s (2002) prominent 
socioeconomic critique has informed van den Hoven’s efforts to define information as a 
primary good, and he readily admits the challenge of supplying people with effective 
means to the realization of basic liberties (including a right to access information). Pogge 
challenges the lexical priority of Rawls first principle, arguing that without a sufficient 
share of material means and all-purpose goods (considerations relegated to Rawls’ 
second principle) citizens will be unable to effectively exercise their first-principle 
liberties (see, generally: Pogge, 1989). If some and not others have the means to exercise 
their basic liberties, the overall worth of liberty remains unequal regardless of formal 
protections. van den Hoven and Rooksby (2008) recognize this challenge, noting that “in 
high-technology information societies, people [need to be] educated in the use of 
information technologies, and afforded access to information media sufficient for them to 
be able to participate in their society’s common life” (p. 389). Following Pogge’s 
solution that Rawls’ first principle require basic socioeconomic needs to be satisfied at 
the same time that basic liberties are articulated and protected, van den Hoven and 
Rooksby argue that appropriate basic needs of access to—and education in the use of—
ICTs be included as well. 
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More recently, van den Hoven has helped develop the use of Sen’s capabilities 
approach in the context of technological design (Oosterlaken & van den Hoven, 2011). 
Similar to socioeconomic considerations in the effective exercise of information liberties, 
capabilities debates help demonstrate the shortcomings of a primary goods approach, 
since people are “not equally endowed with the natural talents so important for making 
use of information goods, namely, cognitive abilities” (van den Hoven & Rooksby, 2008, 
p. 391). In the context of privacy, van den Hoven has turned to Michael Walzer’s (1984) 
work on “spheres of justice” to make sense of challenges to privacy and autonomy in the 
face of advanced ICTs. In particular, van den Hoven appeals to Walzer’s critique of 
Rawlsian “simple equality” to demonstrate the ways in which people not only distribute 
goods, but also distribute the meanings assigned to goods—including information (van 
den Hoven & Vermaas, 2007). Rawls’ simple equality of primary goods cannot account 
for these complex local meanings assigned to goods. Echoing Helen Nissenbaum’s 
(2010) theory of contextual integrity (also indebted to Walzer), van den Hoven and co-
auther Peiter Vermaas  (2007) have argued that the “meaning and value of information is 
local, and allocation schemes and local practices that distribute access to information 
should accommodate local meaning and should therefore be associated with specific 
spheres” (p. 287). When information from one sphere is distributed according to the 
norms and logic of another sphere, information injustice results—at least on a Walzerian 
account. Finally, van den Hoven has also, at different points, cited criticisms of Rawls by 
Dworkin (choice-sensitivity) and Garfinkel (positionality) and suggested their 
implications for information and information technology. Despite this wide range of 
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critiques, however, van den Hoven has not pursued leftist, feminist, or disabilities 
critiques of Rawls’ work. 
While van den Hoven recognizes the urgency of certain critiques and 
acknowledges that they must be addressed if Rawlsian justice is to remain relevant in an 
information society, he does not himself take on that task. Additionally, in his early work 
he criticizes Rawlsian theorists for overlooking the fundamental role technological 
artifacts and information infrastructures play in shaping human possibilities:  
technology has become a paramount feature of the objects of their studies in 
healthcare, education, science, business, government, and politics. Information 
Technology has become part and parcel of the tools which society uses to regulate 
and steer itself and its component parts. (van den Hoven, 1995, p. 2)  
However, though he has written extensively about the ways in which values and biases 
may be embedded in technology, he does not evoke Rawls in these discussions. Further, 
Mathiesen (2004) has argued that van den Hoven’s distributive focus on information as a 
primary good cannot account for situations where a lack of information may be morally 
desirable (n.p.). Indeed, the primary goods approach advocated by van den Hoven 
provides few tools for identifying and assessing the justness of non-distributive features 
of technological artifacts or information systems. Like other Rawlsian theorists before 
him, van den Hoven appears to consider social justice in information and technology in 
narrowly distributive terms as there remains a gap between his work on values embedded 
in design and his discussions of Rawlsian justice.  
3.3.3 Brey. Across his varied projects, Brey is largely concerned with clarifying 
and synthesizing analyses of information and technology issues across disparate 
  
 
101 
disciplines or contexts. He has, for example, proposed broader normative analyses of the 
Internet and new media, seeking to develop an axiology of technology—that is, a theory 
of values in technology—that might help researchers, ethicists, and designers 
systematically consider issues of power and value for both existing and emergent 
technologies. He is also interested in developing methods and heuristics for uniting 
otherwise disconnected debates and issuing normative judgments in a systematic and 
coherent manner. As already discussed, this interest led him to develop a method of 
disclosive computer ethics that aims to systematize analyses of morally opaque features 
of technological systems (Brey, 2000a; 2012). One of the strengths of this method is that 
it offers researchers and ethicists a clear path for surfacing otherwise obscure or 
overlooked features of technology that may have moral import. Once these features have 
been surfaced they become available for analyses according to established moral or 
political frameworks. “For example,” Brey (2000a) writes, “to start off a disclosive 
analysis a feature of a computer system may initially be identified as (potentially) unjust 
when it systematically favors the interests of some user groups over those of others” (p. 
13). Once surfaced, morally problematic features can be subject to a theoretical analysis 
according to established theoretical framworks—he often cites Rawls’ theory of justice as 
a relevant example. A disclosive analysis that appeals to Rawls might, he thinks, help one 
assess the justness of a technological artifact or system through appeal to the ways it 
generates “an unequal distribution of primary social goods according to Rawls’s theory of 
justice” (Brey, 2000a, p. 13).   
Unlike Drahos or van den Hoven, Brey does not attempt to thoroughly or 
systematically account for information within a Rawlsian framework. Instead, he is 
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concerned with describing or accounting for informational and technological phenomena 
in ways that are congenial to Rawls system. For example, he often speaks of information 
or access to technology as relevant additions to Rawls’ index of primary goods—but he is 
careful to justify how this might be according to Rawls’ own criteria (and not by 
critiquing the construction of Rawls’ index). Primary goods also feature prominently in 
his conception of empowerment. In “The Technological Construction of Social Power,” 
Brey (2008a) advances a theory of technology and power that is intended to serve as a 
foundation for the development of a more robust critical theory of technology. Though a 
full discussion of this paper is outside the scope of this overview, it is necessary to 
understand Brey’s definition of empowerment in relation to his ideas about power in 
general in order to see the work that Rawlsian primary goods does within the framework. 
Brey briefly presents an overview of competing conceptions of social power advanced by 
Lukes (1974), Dowding (1996), and Weber (1948) before outlining two formulations of 
the social power, one broad and one narrow. In a broad sense, Brey (2008a) defines social 
power as “the power to determine social outcomes, which are changes of any kind in the 
makeup of society” (p. 5). In the narrow sense (which he relies on for the rest of the 
paper), he defines social power more simply as “the power to influence the behavior of 
others” (Brey, 2008a, p. 5).  
Within this landscape of social power, individual agents are socially empowered 
on Brey’s (2008a) account if they are “free to determine [their] own goals and choose 
[their] own actions, and…can exercise social power in relation to others to help attain 
these goals” (p. 6). Later, Brey (2008a) relies on Rawlsian primary goods to further 
concretize this notion of empowerment:  
  
 
103 
Empowerment…can be understood as (1) having the power to use one’s primary 
goods to one’s own ends (freedom from restraint by others and from other 
restraints) and (2) the successful acquisition of a relevant share of primary social 
goods to more effectively further one’s ends. (p. 16)  
Consequently, Brey asserts that justice demands the adoption of design methods and 
regulations that promote the empowerment of individuals in the sense just described. 
Though he does not explicitly reference Rawls, it is clear that it is Rawlsian justice that 
he has in mind, as he relies on language familiar to the difference principle in noting that 
technology design should promote the interests of the least-advantaged (Brey, 2008a, p. 
21). 
In addition, Brey (2006; 2007) has also adopted the Rawlsian idea of 
comprehensive doctrines to describe the value-systems or ideologies held by individuals, 
groups, or institutions when they make claims as to the goodness or badness of 
information and technology. In his axiology of new media, Brey relies on Rawls’ concept 
of comprehensive doctrines to make sense of the lenses through which different 
individuals, groups, or institutions make value judgments about new media content and 
practices. For Brey (2007), as for Rawls, comprehensive doctrines contain a thick 
conception of the good—detailed systems that define what one finds both intrinsically 
and instrumentally valuable—and some more or less comprehensive set of accompanying 
beliefs and norms of conduct (p. 7). A normative axiology of new media, then, “utilizes a 
certain value system or thick conception of the good to critique particular value 
implications of technology or culture” (p. 9). Examples of explicit comprehensive 
doctrines that may be adopted in order to critique the value implications of new media 
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include comprehensive religious doctrines (for example, Christianity, Judaism, or Islam), 
secularized consumer-oriented doctrines (i.e., conceptions of the good promoted by 
marketers, advertising agencies, and other similar institutions), or political doctrines (for 
example, liberalism, socialism, or communitarianism). Brey (2006) similarly relies on the 
concept of comprehensive doctrines in exploring the social and cultural implications of 
the Internet in particular—he argues that making explicit the content and commitments of 
one’s comprehensive doctrine is integral to understanding a given appraisal of the 
Internet or new media. 
Messerly (2007) has criticized Brey’s use of Rawls as uncritical.  It is misleading 
of Brey, Messerly (2007) thinks, to blindly advocate or promote the use of a political 
theory like Rawls’ without reference to its attendant controversies. However, Messerly 
appears to overstate Brey's overall reliance on Rawls. Compared to the work of Drahos or 
van den Hoven, Brey’s use of Rawls is quite limited—he only suggests justice as fairness 
as one example of an existing moral theory one might appeal to in the course of a 
disclosive ethical analysis. Brey also makes numerous references to competing political 
ideologies—such as libertarianism and communitarianism—recognizing, in a roundabout 
way at least, the controversial playing field of political theory. Brey does not, however, 
challenge or interrogate the foundational model-conceptions of Rawls’ theory when 
employing specific concepts (like primary goods or comprehensive doctrines). In this 
sense, Brey is not critical of Rawls. So, Messerly is correct to criticize Brey’s relatively 
uncritical adherence to a Rawlsian system, but he is misguided in his choice of 
illustration. 
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3.3.4 Britz. Britz (2004; 2008) is largely concerned with developing normative 
prescriptions for addressing the moral dimensions of a global information society. “It is a 
moral imperative,” he writes, “that the continuous construction of the growing 
information society be regulated by a set of universal principles based on social justice” 
(Britz, 2004, p. 193). Though Britz (2008) views our global information society as 
continuous with—and not wholly distinct from—preceding industrial relations, he argues 
that contemporary developments in ICTs “have changed the very nature of these 
relationships and impacted our socioeconomic and political activities” (p. 1172). Along 
with these changes come new challenges for defining and promoting social justice today. 
Early articulations (Lipinski & Britz, 2000) of this idea are rooted in interpretations of 
information and Rawlsian justice offered by Drahos (1996) and van den Hoven (1995), 
though Britz later moves away from these interpretations of Rawls’ principles (Britz, 
2008). 
Throughout his work, Britz attends to a tension he sees between the control of 
information and access to information. On the control side, Britz and various co-authors 
identify individual creators, publishers, and other intellectual property holders, as well as 
government agencies and affluent or “information-rich” states; on the access side are 
users of information—citizens, students, other creators, and developing or “information-
poor” states. In the context of scholarly information, Britz and Ponelis (2005) describe 
the tension as between publishers’ “need to control distribution of information in order to 
protect their interests” and access to information that is ”needed for education and 
development” (p. 234). In the context of global economic relations, this conflict plays out 
between “the right to own and control” information asserted by affluent countries and 
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transnational corporations and “the right of access to information” claimed by developing 
nations often disadvantaged or further marginalized by global information policies (Britz, 
Lor, & Bothma, 2006). 
This tension between control and access parallels the tension between liberty and 
equality found in Rawls’ work. Control, on Britz’s account, is concerned with the 
freedom of information creators and intellectual property holders to dictate the flow of 
their property while issues of access raise important questions about equality and the 
claims of users can make against the ownership and control rights of creators. For Britz, 
as for Rawls, this tension can be resolved through the application of principles of social 
justice. Indeed, “anytime a society…must settle a dispute involving information 
controllers and users, it involves a potential question of social justice” (Lipinski & Britz, 
2000, p. 50). To this end, Britz and various co-authors put forward principles tailored 
specifically for addressing social justice and information. Though the number and type of 
principles vary in different publications, they all share certain common features: 
1. A fundamental right of access to information should be enshrined alongside 
other basic liberties. Britz variously roots this claim in Article 19 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Ponelis & Britz, 2008), the World Summit on the 
Information Society’s Statement on the Right to Communicate (Britz, 2008), or to 
the role of information in promoting human well-being and developing rational 
plans of life (Lipinski & Britz, 2000 p. 63; Lor & Britz, 2007). 
2. All people should have access to the same scheme of rights, which scheme 
includes rights to communicate and to access information. This assertion reflects 
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the equal consideration given to all individuals by Rawls’ first principle of justice 
(Britz et al, 2006; Lor & Britz, 2007; Lor & Britz, 2012). 
3. The protection of individual rights to control information (for example, 
intellectual property rights) should be justified by appeal to social utility or the 
common good. Here, “creators and distributors of information goods” can claim 
control rights so long as they do not thwart creativity generally, exacerbate the 
gap between information-rich and information-poor, or demand unfair 
compensation (Lipinski & Britz, 2000; Britz & Ponelis, 2005; Britz et al, 2006; 
Lor & Britz, 2007). 
4. Inequalities in the distribution of information—or in the distribution of benefits 
and burdens in an informational society—must be justified according to agreed 
upon norms or rules, for example Rawls’ difference principle (Britz, 2004, p. 202; 
Britz, 2008). 
Unlike other authors reviewed in this section, Britz recognizes the importance of 
achieving social justice outside of distributive arrangements. He extends his concerns 
beyond distributive justice to also address important ideas of recognition, contribution, 
and participation in an information society. For example, he argues that appropriately 
recognizing the equal worth and dignity of all people (justice as recognition) should 
constrain any contemporary principles of justice (Britz, 2008, p. 1175). In line with Sen 
(1993), facilitating opportunities for people to meaningfully participate in economic or 
political activities (justice as participation) also serves to further reinforce persons’ 
dignity and well-being (Britz, 2008, p. 1178). He also invokes Young’s (1990) discussion 
of the generative role principles of justice can play in fostering a sense of justice among a 
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population (Britz, 2008). Additionally, Britz (2008) is keen to the ways in which 
important issues of social justice might be obscured by existing structures and 
institutions. “These preset conditions make it difficult,” he writes, “to change or alter 
society according to the moral imperatives set by justice” (Britz, 2008, p. 1174). Britz 
(2008) argues—following Lötter (2000)—that in-depth analyses are needed to examine 
injustices obscured by embedded structures. 
It is unclear, however, if some of the principles Britz proposes sufficiently 
recognize and reflect this concern with hidden injustices—at least at a conceptual level. 
For example, the demand that inequalities between the information-rich and the 
information-poor are only permissible if they meet certain criteria set by widely 
understood and accepted norms and rules betrays a conservative bias, privileging existing 
norms over the development of new ones. Adapting Rawls’ difference principle, Britz 
(2008) holds that “inequalities must…not be to the disadvantage of the information poor 
and the marginalized” (p. 1175). Of course, Britz might not be referring to actually 
existing norms and rules, as many currently operating norms and rules regulating the 
distribution of goods—informational, technological, or otherwise—are no doubt unjust. 
Though it is not clear in his work, Britz could be referring to norms and rules that 
could—hypothetically—be widely understood and accepted. This interpretation is 
plausible, given the Kantian roots of the theories of justice that undergird both Rawls’ 
theory and Britz’s work. Here, Britz might appeal to norms and rules justified by 
something like Kant’s categorical imperative—that is, inequalities are only permissible if 
they meet criteria set by norms and rules that everyone involved could hypothetically 
agree upon. 
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Britz also, at times, emphasizes ideas of desert that Rawls tends to de-emphasize. 
Britz’s (2008) emphasis is clear in his definition of social justice: “to give a person or a 
group—in this case, all those who are part of the global Information Society—what they 
deserve” (p. 1174). He explicitly codifies the notion of desert in his work, arguing that 
“everyone should get what they deserve—be it good or bad” (Britz, 2008, p. 1175). For 
Britz, desert seems to be a general concept—he never defines it beyond the broad idea of 
receiving one’s due. Rawls (2001), on the other hand, is careful to distinguish between 
three different kinds of desert and specify those that are relevant for social justice and 
which are not: 
First, the idea of moral desert in the strict sense, that is, the moral worth of a 
person’s character as a whole (and of a person’s several virtues) as given by a 
comprehensive moral doctrine; as well as the moral worth of particular actions; 
Second, the idea of legitimate expectations (and its companion idea of 
entitlements), which is the other side of the principle of fairness; and Third, the 
idea of deservingness as specified by a scheme of public rules designed to achieve 
certain purposes. (p. 73) 
Of these three types of desert, Rawls is explicit that the first idea—of moral desert—
cannot be reconciled with his system of justice and, in particular, the fact of reasonable 
pluralism. Because he admits that persons will have conflicting conceptions of the good, 
they will not be able to “agree on a comprehensive doctrine to specify an idea of moral 
desert for political purposes” (Rawls, 2001, p. 73). Instead, the second idea (of legitimate 
expectations) is put forward as a replacement for moral desert in a theory of justice. 
Whereas moral desert is assessed according to a comprehensive moral doctrine, 
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legitimate expectations are determined by “the public rules that specify the scheme of 
cooperation” as laid out by justice as fairness (Rawls, 2001, p. 72). Additionally, Rawls 
(2001) admits the third kind of desert—deservingness specified by a scheme of public 
rules—so long as the scheme of public rules are “designed to achieve social purposes” (p. 
74). Ultimately, notions of legitimate expectation and individual deservingness are only 
justified with reference to the entire system while moral desert is expressly dismissed. 
Overall, Britz’s articulation of desert is far less explicit—he never connects his 
ideas on desert generally to his explicit discussions of the common norms and rules that 
justify expectations of desert in the first place. At times, however, his notion of desert 
seems squarely in line with a Rawlsian idea of legitimate expectations, as with his 
discussion of common norms and rules to accommodate differences based on merit and 
outcomes. In other places, he seems to rely on a heavily moralized (in the sense of “moral 
desert” specified above) view of desert, as when he argues, “everyone should get what 
they deserve—be it good or bad” (Britz, 2008, p. 1175). In the end, Britz’s effective and 
wide-ranging account of social justice issues in an information society would benefit 
from explicitly adopting the Rawlsian idea of legitimate expectations to avoid confusion 
with a comprehensively moral notion of desert. 
3.3.5 Duff. Alistair Duff develops a Rawls-based framework for addressing the 
problem of a just distribution of information in affluent Western democracies. He sets 
aside technological dimensions of the digital divide (such as the distribution of 
technological artifacts or the limits of current information infrastructures) to address “a 
far more intractable information divide” which he views as underwriting the broader 
phenomenon of the digital divide (Duff, 2011, p. 604). Duff cites an informational 
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dimension of digital divide debates often obscured by discussion of devices or the 
Internet alone. It is at this information divide that Duff’s (2011) framework is directed, 
and he seeks to “[postulate] a way of thinking about how to approximate a more 
‘inclusive’ information society” (p. 605). To address this divide, Duff (2011; 2012) 
appeals to Rawls (as well as the philosopher R.H. Tawney) to develop the “Rawls-
Tawney theorem”—a normative framework modeled directly on Rawls’ theory of justice 
(but limited in certain ways by the fraternal ethos of Tawney’s work).  
As with Drahos and van den Hoven earlier, Duff (2011) appeals to the Rawlsian 
notion of primary goods, insisting that “in the postindustrial era…information has 
graduated into a primary good in Rawls’s sense” (p. 607). While the case can be made 
that information was an important a primary good in the industrial context that frames 
Rawls’ work, Duff argues that it is even more important now, as “the distribution of 
informational goods must be a central issue in postindustrial societies” (Duff, 2011, p. 
607).31  Duff (2011) does not, however, appeal to Rawls’ theory alone. Rawls, Duff 
(2011) argues, ultimately permits “very considerable socioeconomic inequalities” that, 
over time, might undermine the achievement of social justice (p. 608). In particular, 
Rawls’ famous difference principle, Duff (2011) thinks, “leaves far too much room for 
                                                
31 Curiously, Duff’s (2011) characterization of primary goods does not appeal to any Rawlsian conception 
of the person. Instead, Duff pins his argument on the contingencies of a postindustrial society (p. 607). 
Overlooking this feature of Rawls’ theory leads Duff to consider the distribution of informational goods 
without attending to the ways in which the Rawls’ index of primary goods work as an expression of the 
interest persons have in exercising their two moral powers. Duff describes Rawls’ theory of justice as 
“predicated on the selection of a set of ‘primary goods,’ meaning social resources considered to be the 
proper object of social justice” (p. 607). Duff does not further elaborate on Rawls’ list of primary goods, 
but simply argues that information should be added to the list, since “the distribution of informational 
goods must be a central issue in postindustrial societies” (p. 607). One gets the sense, from Duff’s account, 
that primary goods (including information) are a set of important, historically contingent all-purpose means 
that can be marshaled to serve a wide range of human ends. That is, primary goods are simply resources 
that—at any given time—are vital to furthering human interests under all (or most) conditions without 
reference to the humans themselves. This is, however, a mischaracterization of the nature and role of 
primary goods within Rawls’ theory of justice. 
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interpretation” and potentially allows for excessive inequalities between the best and the 
least well-off in a given society (p. 608). To account for this problem, Duff (2011) adds 
the “Tawney proviso,” which stipulates that not only should justifiable inequalities work 
to the benefit of the least advantaged (as under Rawls’ difference principle), but they 
should also not be allowed to grow so large as to generate class divisions (p. 608).32  
 The “main referent” with which Duff’s (2011) Rawls-Tawney theorem is 
concerned “is information, not ICTs, nor new media, nor the information infrastructure” 
[emphasis original] (p. 608). Though technological artifacts and infrastructure are 
important, Duff (2011) thinks “they are politically significant only insofar as they 
impinge on the social distribution of information itself—information qua facts, data, the 
basic building-blocks of knowledge and participation” [emphasis original] (p. 608). As 
far as Duff (2011) is concerned, information is to be treated as “an identifiable and 
separable good” of the type that can properly be subject to a distributive scheme like the 
one articulated by Rawls (p. 609). He further asserts that, within the domain of 
information as a separable good, certain types of information are more important than 
others. He (2011) thinks that other information and technology theorists that have made 
use of Rawls have failed to “make clear whether [information] falls under [Rawls’] first 
or second principle of justice” and “when they do thus specify, they tend to lump all 
information under either the first or the second, rather than pause to ask whether different 
types of information belong under separate principles” (p. 609).33 He (2011) does not 
                                                
32 Duff (2011) does not, however, specify what range of inequality is large enough to generate class 
divisions. He only notes that in Tawney’s work “…it is fairly clear that [the] ideal of social democracy 
involved top earners taking home no more than three or four times the income of the lowest paid” (p. 608). 
33 This assertion, however, overlooks the ways in which both Drahos and van den Hoven have carefully 
and explicitly considered the place of information in both of Rawls’ principles of justice, as discussed 
earlier. 
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give any particular reason as to why we must delineate between different types of 
information, but he is convinced that not doing so generates “weaknesses…in most 
current neo-Rawlsian information society theory” (p. 609). 
 To address this supposed weakness, Duff manufactures a hierarchical 
classification scheme that divides information into three types: A, B, and C. Type A 
information includes information relevant to citizenship, such as electoral information 
and information pertaining to one’s political and legal rights. Type B information is 
classified as “within the orbit of social justice, [but] not so vital that it must be distributed 
exactly equally” (Duff, 2011, p 609). This type of information includes domestic and 
foreign news, as well as general scientific, technical, and medical information. Finally, 
type C information includes “all other information” (Duff, 2011, p. 609). Though he 
specifically cites soft news and entertainment as examples, type C would presumably 
include all literary, artistic, and other cultural information not captured by the political, 
legal, scientific, or medical interests of types A and B. Finally, Duff deems this last 
category of information as unimportant in terms of social justice. “In a world of scarce 
resources,” Duff (2011) writes, “the state cannot be burdened with the distribution of 
football scores, celebrity photo shots and the like” (p. 609). While he admits that “the 
precise location of the boundaries between” the different types of information is up for 
debate, he declares his rough classification scheme “sound” (Duff, 2011, p. 609).  
Ultimately, Duff’s system is designed to articulate a just distribution of 
information according to his hierarchical classification scheme. His Rawls-Tawney 
theorem is as follows: 
First Principle: Each person has an equal right to Type A information 
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Second Principle: Inequalities in the social distribution of Type B information are 
permissible if and only if such inequalities  
a) maximize the informational resources of the worst-off group 
b) are subject to equality of access 
c) are not extensive enough to cause class divisions (the Tawney proviso) 
(The distribution of Type C information, comprising all other information, can be 
safely left to market forces.) (p. 609) 
Formally speaking, the theorem emulates Rawls’ two principles of justice, as the first 
principle appears to take priority over the second. Further, Duff’s second principle 
follows the multi-part form of Rawls’ second principle as it accounts for both a version of 
the difference principle (a) and equality of opportunity (b).  The influence of Tawney can 
be seen in the second principle as well (the Tawney proviso). Finally, Type C information 
is altogether excluded from consideration under a scheme of social justice and left to 
“market forces” for its distribution.  
Duff’s theorem is dependent upon distinguishing between different types of 
information when considering its distribution. Within his framework, only two 
specifically delineated types of information—types A and B—are considered relevant to 
social justice and receive special consideration under the Rawls-Tawney principle. Type 
A information is assigned the highest priority, as it contains political and legal 
information integral to the exercise of one’s citizenship. Type B information lumps 
together domestic and foreign news, as well as general scientific, technical, and medical 
information as “within the orbit of social justice” but not vital (Duff, 2011, p. 609). Duff 
(2011) does not, however, specify why this information is relevant but not vital, only 
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noting that it is “of course important” (p. 609). Further, it is unclear what it might mean 
to arrange inequalities of this type B information to “maximize the informational 
resources of the worst-off group,” as called for by Duff’s (2011) second principle (p. 
609). 
Ambiguities in the first two principles aside, Duff’s taxonomy of information 
potentially conflicts Rawls’ theory of justice in its exclusion of type C information from 
consideration. In particular, the exclusion of type C information can easily serve as a 
justification for undermining the social bases self-respect—one of Rawls’ most important 
primary goods—for certain individuals or groups. While he only mentions “soft news” 
and “entertainment” specifically, the range and types of information that comprise “all 
other information” not accounted for by types A and B is, indeed, vast. It would feasibly 
contain all sorts of social and cultural information—literary, artistic, and beyond—that 
Duff asserts as irrelevant to social justice. However, various kinds of type C information 
can often prove integral to the development of self-respect for certain individuals or 
groups. For example, certain types of social and economic information (beyond that 
specified as type B information) are required for persons to build and maintain solidarity. 
Even information about sports teams (which Duff derides as unimportant) may 
underwrite the self-respect of certain communities or national associations. Similarly, 
certain types of cultural information are indispensable for people to associate with like-
minded others. Here, the activities of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer 
(LGBTQ) communities are instructive, as information regarding access, community and 
political histories, safe spaces, and even events are integral to participation.  
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Duff’s (2011) argument that the distribution of this type of information can be 
“safely left to market forces” (p. 609) does not extend adequate protection for 
information that might help provide the bases of self-respect for some. If social justice is, 
for Rawls, about securing for individuals the resources needed to exercise their two moral 
powers, securing all necessary information should be the aim of a Rawlsian approach to 
distributive justice in information. Duff’s lack of concern with self-respect helps expose 
at least one way in which the Rawls-Tawney theorem might actually undermine Rawlsian 
justice. 
3.4 Sketching the Standard Account of Rawls as Applied to Information and 
Technology 
The engagements with Rawls reviewed in this section converge upon similar 
themes. In one way or another, most uses are concerned with the just distribution of 
information as a resource at both domestic and global levels. In the process, they all 
appeal to Rawls’ two principles of justice, though in slightly different ways. The most 
robust accounts in this area focus on the status of information as a primary good of the 
sort Rawls’ theory is designed to distribute: information should count as a primary good 
because it is integral to rational life planning and for furthering human interests in an 
informational—or postindustrial—society. The instrumental value of information finds 
expression in the articulation of rights of access to information. At times, access rights 
are cast in negative terms (i.e., that one should not be hindered in the pursuit of certain 
kinds of information) or positive rights to information (i.e., that certain types of 
information should be made accessible by the state or other responsible agencies). The 
salient point here is that insofar as Rawls has been marshaled for use, it has largely been 
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to talk about the distribution of information as a primary good. Less thoroughly addressed 
are questions surrounding the distribution of technological artifacts or access to certain 
technologies. Duff mentions such access as important, but only insofar as it impacts the 
distribution of information in society. Similarly, Drahos distinguishes between 
information as an abstract object and information as expressed through physical objects 
like technological artifacts or systems, though he sets aside the latter and focuses on the 
former in order to better focus on the question of intellectual property rights.  
I will refer to this focus on the distribution of information as a primary good as 
the “standard account” of Rawls in discussions of justice, information, and technology. 
The standard account’s focus on distributions is in many ways unsurprising, given Rawls’ 
own emphasis on the distributive dimensions of social justice. Rawls (1971b) himself 
describes his work as “[providing] in the first instance a standard whereby the distributive 
aspects of the basic structure of society are to be assessed” (p. 8). In particular, major 
proponents of the standard account have tended to adhere to this description without 
interrogating its foundations. They accept Rawls’ normative prescriptions without 
offering particular consideration to the model-conceptions that underwrite justice as 
fairness and their relevance for the information or technological contexts within which 
they are applied. Put another way, the standard account tends to approach Rawls’ two 
principles of justice as formulated and justified apart from social or technological 
practices. Indeed, it is the assumed “practice-independence” of Rawls’ theory that seems, 
at times, to lend justice as fairness its real normative force: through his sophisticated use 
of original position reasoning, Rawls’ principles seem to emerge from, as Sangiovanni 
(2008) puts it, “a normative point of view unfettered by…existing institutions and 
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practices” that keeps us from “constraining the content of justice by whatever social and 
political arrangements we happen to share,” arrangements that may be, “at best, merely 
the product of arbitrary historical contingency or, at worst, the result of past injustice 
itself” (p. 137). Specific features of practices or contexts are secondary concerns—they 
only become relevant once we seek to implement an independent conception of justice 
already worked out. 
This is not to say that contextual considerations have been entirely absent. 
Proponents of the standard account have been careful to point out that Rawls’ ideas were 
not formulated with advanced networked or information societies in mind (notably: Duff, 
2011). Rather, Rawls’ theory was worked out to address problems of distribution against 
a backdrop of industrial social and economic practices typical of affluent Western 
democracies in the mid-twentieth century—hence its focus on the distribution of rights, 
opportunities, and material wealth in the form of income and property. However, the 
response to the limits of Rawls’ industrial perspective has not been to revisit the 
foundational assumptions of his theory in order to assess their continuing relevance for 
societies dominated by sophisticated networks and technologies designed to support 
flows of information. Instead, the opposite has happened: rather than reinterpreting Rawls 
in light of new contextual considerations, the standard account seeks to reinterpret 
contemporary informational or technological phenomena in terms congenial to Rawls’ 
system. This approach is particularly evident in Drahos’ interpretation of intellectual 
property rights as well as various interpretations of information as a Rawlsian primary 
good (as in the works of van den Hoven, Brey, Britz, and Duff). The assumption here is 
that Rawls’ powerful practice-independent conclusions are to be preserved and contextual 
  
 
119 
considerations reinterpreted accordingly. As a consequence, the standard account of 
Rawls implicitly endorses the idea that principles of justice are to be worked out first, and 
contextual considerations attended to second.  
I would suggest, however, that this approach fails to fully appreciate Rawls’ own 
motivations—in particular, his reasons for developing an index of primary goods. Rawls 
denies that primary goods account for things deemed generally necessary for advancing 
persons’ interests under particular historical circumstances. In light of this, simply 
noting—as Drahos, van den Hoven, Brey, Britz, and Duff all variously do—that 
information, because of its vital importance today, should be added to the index is 
misguided. Duff (2011) makes this mistake most explicit when he argues “that in the 
postindustrial era, where a much greater measure of informatization has occurred, 
information has graduated into a primary good in Rawls’s sense” (p. 607). However, 
Rawls did not arrive at his index of primary goods by simply thinking long and hard 
about what available goods might best advance persons’ interests generally. 
Consequently, we cannot simply add information to the index just because we have 
thought long and hard about its importance as an all-purpose resource in an information 
society. Rather, one must keep in mind that Rawls’ theory is designed to best promote the 
effective exercise of persons’ two moral powers—that is, their capacities for a sense of 
justice and to adopt and pursue a conception of the good. As Rawls (1980/1999d) puts it, 
the problem of primary goods cannot be discussed until “the conception of the person and 
its highest-order interests are fixed” (p. 314). At times, Drahos and van den Hoven are 
keen to Rawls’ justification for an index of primary goods in making explicit the ways in 
which information supports the exercise the second moral power. However, they still fall 
  
 
120 
short of reconsidering Rawls’ model-conceptions of persons and society in light of the 
informational and technological practices they seek to address. 
Beyond adopting an uncritical view of Rawls’ model-conceptions, the reviewed 
engagements have also tended to overstate the authority of the original position and its 
veil of ignorance for Rawls, ignoring the device’s justificatory foundations. Though it 
carries illustrative force, most of Rawls’ theoretical heavy lifting is done well before 
parties begin to deliberate inside the original position. Importantly, the model-
conceptions that he develops and advances (free and equal persons, a well-ordered 
society) and their expression (two moral powers, primary goods) are not constructed in 
the original position or behind the veil of ignorance. Instead, they are simply laid out, 
(recall that their justification is derived from Rawls’ constructivist method generally). No 
doubt, the original position and the veil of ignorance represent powerful tools for 
exploring issues of social justice in various domains, as evidenced by their widespread 
application to informational and technological issues. However, their seductiveness as 
illustrative tools draws attention away from other features of Rawls’ theory that might be 
similarly useful for thinking about issues of social justice, information, and technology. 
In clarifying the motivations behind Rawls’ theory, I do not mean to refute the 
idea that information should be considered a primary good, nor do I mean to suggest that 
attending to unjust distributions of information (or technology) is not important. As the 
various accounts reviewed in this chapter have effectively demonstrated, attending to the 
justice of informational and other distributions is indispensable to the pursuit of justice in 
contemporary liberal democracies broadly. However, I do suggest that the focus on 
distributions represents a particular limitation of the standard account: by reducing issues 
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of social justice, information, and technology to purely distributive terms, all we are left 
to talk about are problems of distribution. But, as both critics and proponents of Rawls 
have pointed out, the focus on distributions tends to obscure or make invisible other 
dimensions that are as—if not more—important to the realization of social justice. As Iris 
Marion Young (2006) puts it,  
while patterns of the distribution of resources, opportunities, and income are very 
important issues of justice, theoretical focus on them tends to deflect attention 
from important aspects of structural processes in at least two ways. First, focus on 
distribution pays too little attention to the processes that produce the distributions. 
Second, focus on distribution of benefits and burdens obscures important aspects 
of structural processes that do not fit well under a distributive paradigm. (p. 91) 
She cites as examples the problems of the social division of labor, structures of decision 
making power, and the elevation of certain judgments to normative standards—that is, 
processes in which “the attributes, comportments, or ways of life that are ‘normal,’ in the 
sense of exhibited by…dominant social segments, come to also have the connotation of 
being the ‘best’” (Young, 2006, p. 95). Currently, the standard account inherits these 
same blind spots: it reduces informational and technological goods to just (or mere) 
things to be distributed along a certain pattern or according to certain principles. It does 
not consider the structures or processes that pattern distributions as also evaluable 
according to principles of justice. Conceiving of information as a primary good cannot 
tell us much about the ways in which information is collected, framed, analyzed, 
presented, or packaged—only about the ways in which it is disseminated. Consequently, 
the structures and systems that allow people to access to information—or the ways these 
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systems may promote the distributions of some types of information while at the same 
time hindering others—go overlooked from the standpoint of Rawlsian justice. 
The importance of non-distributive dimensions of justice is well developed by 
critics of Rawls’ work. Many of these critiques, however, have gone overlooked by 
proponents of the standard account. For example, feminist critiques of Rawls have long 
been aware of the unfair social division of reproductive labor and the raising of children, 
a burden that—historically speaking—has disproportionately fallen on women. Leftist 
critics have pointed to problems of decision-making power with relation to productive 
technologies in society, arguing that Rawls permits control of such technologies to 
concentrate into relatively few hands, leading to unjust imbalances in power.34 Further, 
disabilities critics have shown how normative standards of ability shape social and 
physical environments in ways that are biased against certain groups of people. For 
example, public buildings that lack access for wheelchairs impose a normative standard 
of mobility that excludes many otherwise capable persons. These debates share an 
attention to the ways that the design of social, economic, and physical institutions assign 
roles and duties, structure decision making power, and impose normative standards in 
ways that are relevant to social justice but are not necessarily reducible to distributive 
terms. 
One might object to the above argument by pointing out that some proponents of 
the standard account do, in fact, account for problems of justice in non-distributive terms. 
Brey, in particular, is committed to systematically exposing the values and biases 
embedded within technological artifacts and systems—he is attuned to the ways in which 
                                                
34 Regarding the problem of control of productive technologies, Rawls himself even entertains the idea that 
perhaps subjecting productive technologies to democratic control (in a manner envisioned by John Stuart 
Mill) would better realize his system of justice (Rawls, 2001, p. 178). 
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not only the use but also the design of technology can create and sustain relations that 
empower some users and disempower others. Similarly, van den Hoven orients us 
towards the ways in which the design of things is relevant to justice by making explicit 
the fact that Rawls’ principles of justice are intended to regulate not individual human 
action but, rather, the design of the basic structure. Britz, too, is cognizant of non-
distributive dimensions of justice, like recognition and contribution. Indeed, it is not 
difficult to see how the design of technological systems recognizes some (while rendering 
others invisible) or more readily facilitates the contributions of certain people while 
making participation more difficult for others. Whereas the work of Drahos and Duff 
limits us to thinking about purely distributive concerns with regard to information, Britz, 
Brey, and van den Hoven suggest paths forward for considering justice in information 
and technology outside of distributions. I would suggest, however, that though these 
authors do pay attention to non-distributive issues, they do not propose Rawlsian 
strategies for attending to them. For example, in his discussions of privacy, van den 
Hoven appeals not to Rawls, but to the work of communitarian philosopher Michael 
Walzer (1984). Similarly, Britz and van den Hoven have, as of late, turned their attention 
to Sen’s capabilities approach, scaling back on their reliance on Rawlsian thought (Britz, 
Hoffmann, Ponelis, Zimmer, & Lor, 2013; Oosterlaken & van den Hoven, 2011). 
At first glance, this abandonment of Rawls when addressing non-distributive 
dimensions of justice seems to point to limitations of the Rawlsian framework itself. The 
overview of oppositional engagements with Rawls, for example, showed that many 
scholars are resisting Rawls in favor of the capabilities approach. This shift is in some 
ways unsurprising, as the capabilities approach is predicated (in part) on overcoming 
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perceived limitations of justice as fairness (Sen, 1979; Sen, 1990; Sen, 2009).35 
Famously, Sen (1979) argues that Rawls’ focus on primary goods might be appropriate if 
all people possessed roughly similar abilities to use such goods: "if people were basically 
very similar then an index of primary goods might be quite a good way of judging 
advantage" (p. 215). The problem, however, is that people are not very similar. In fact, 
“people seem to have very different needs varying with health, longevity, climatic 
conditions, location, work conditions, temperament, and even body size (affecting food 
and clothing requirements)” (Sen, 1979, p. 216). Against a primary goods metric, Sen 
advocates for a focus on the real capabilities people have to convert goods into 
functionings, that is, on what people are actually able to do and to be. The focus on 
human capacities emphasizes human development and the fulfillment of human needs not 
in terms of subjective well-being or resources, but on the capabilities of individuals to 
convert available goods—like information—into substantive freedoms (Britz, et al, 2013, 
p. 107-108; Robeyns & Brighouse, 2010). Certainly, problems of informational and 
technological literacy—that is, the ability of different individuals to make more or less 
effective use of available information and technology—seem better accounted for under a 
capabilities model than one rooted in Rawlsian primary goods.  
I would suggest, however, that the abandonment of Rawlsian ideas in favor of the 
capabilities approach for addressing issues of social justice, information, and technology 
has been somewhat uncritical. Certainly, the capabilities approach provides some 
valuable insight, but it is not without its own limitations. For example, Sen’s approach to 
justice ultimately hinges on a narrowly teleological conception of technology as 
                                                
35 For more on the debate between Rawls’ theory and the capabilities approach, see, generally: Brighouse 
and Robeyns, 2010. 
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instrumental to development and human flourishing. But, as previously noted, the use of 
technology is not simply instrumental to but intimately bound up with morality. Neither 
the standard account of Rawls nor the capabilities approach are able to account for the 
ways in which technology both mediates our perception of morally relevant aspects of 
particular situations and actively shapes our responses to them. Since the problem of 
social justice is both a moral and practical problem, technological mediation has 
implications for both conceiving of and achieving justice. Conceiving of technology as 
merely instrumental is ultimately unsatisfactory. Any viable theory of social justice today 
ought to consider the how values embedded in the design of technological artifacts and 
systems might actively promote—or hinder—social justice.  
Against the shortcomings of the standard account, I hope to show that there are 
resources yet available in Rawls’ work and attendant discussions that can help more fully 
inform discussions of social justice, information, and technology. In particular, 
recognizing that Rawls derives his index of primary goods by first articulating features of 
persons relevant to a theory of justice invites us to revisit the foundations of justice as 
fairness in order to more fully develop a comprehensively Rawlsian approach to social 
justice, information, and technology. In revisiting the foundations of his theory, we are 
reminded that Rawls’ model-conception of the person as capable of exercising the two 
moral powers arises out of a particular interpretation of the role of principles of justice 
for regulating the basic structure of society.  
Overall, Rawls (1993) is concerned with problems of “background justice,” 
namely a “tendency…for background justice to be eroded even when individuals act 
fairly: the overall result of separate and independent transactions is away from and not 
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toward background justice” (p. 267). Rawls’ model of the moral person, along with his 
model of a well-ordered society and the terms of the original position (including its veil 
of ignorance), are designed as a response to (not given independently of) the role of the 
basic structure in securing background justice. Further, his conception of justice is not 
worked out for just any basic structure, but the structure of relatively well-off Western 
democracies. The standard account, in its focus on primary goods and original position 
reasoning has, however, tended to neglect the importance of background justice and the 
argument from the basic structure for Rawls. In the next chapter, I put forward a 
different, but complimentary, account—the sociotechnical account—that foregrounds the 
role of the basic structure and demonstrates its relevance for discussions of information 
and technological practices. 
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Chapter 4.0: Towards a Sociotechnical Account of Rawlsian Justice, Information, 
and Technology 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that a dependence on the idea of distributions of 
primary goods and the original position limits the standard account of Rawls to 
distributive dimensions of social justice, information, and technology. In this chapter, I 
put forward an alternative account rooted in otherwise overlooked features of Rawls’ 
work, as well as the work of leftist, feminist, and disabilities critics. In particular, the 
alternative account developed here foregrounds the role of background justice and Rawls’ 
argument from the basic structure. By revisiting this foundational piece in the 
development and justification of justice as fairness, I hope to avoid the standard account’s 
reliance on primary goods and show how informational and technological issues can be 
addressed elsewhere in Rawls’ theory. Ultimately, I am concerned with the role of 
sociotechnical relations in promoting and preserving background justice, that is, I am 
interested in the ways in which technological artifacts and information systems secure 
and shape relations between institutions and individuals within the basic structure. 
Accordingly, I will refer to my approach as the sociotechnical account. 
In forwarding this alternative account, I do not mean to suggest that the standard 
account should be jettisoned in favor of a sociotechnical interpretation. As the previously 
reviewed proponents of Rawls make clear, Rawls’ primary goods are indispensable to 
development and pursuit of one’s conception of the good. Indeed, in a liberal society 
dedicated to a plurality of reasonable conceptions of the good, attending to distributions 
of primary goods is of great importance—even capabilities approaches predicated on the 
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rejection of primary goods as an appropriate metric of justice readily admit the 
importance of rights, opportunities, and all-purpose means like income and wealth to 
persons’ welfare. What I mean to suggest, however, is that the primacy of distributive 
concerns in analyses of social justice, information, and technology ultimately limits the 
range and types of social justice issues available for consideration. In the end, the 
sociotechnical account should not be viewed as in competition with the standard account 
but, rather, as complimentary or supplementary. Together, they can help produce a more 
complete Rawlsian picture of social justice, information, and technology. 
4.2 Situating the Sociotechnical Account I: Information, Technology and the Basic 
Structure 
Before discussing the relationship between technology and Rawls’ basic structure, 
I want to revisit Rawls’ picture of the basic structure of society. As previously noted, 
Rawls’ discussion of the family as a basic institution is instructive when trying to arrive 
at a complete picture of his conception of the basic structure. “The family,” Rawls 
(1997/1999f) argues, “is part of the basic structure, since one of its main roles is to be the 
basis of the orderly production and reproduction of society and its culture from one 
generation to the next” (p. 595). Here, Rawls (1997/1999f) has in mind the “socially 
necessary” labor of raising and caring for children, “ensuring their moral development 
and education into the wider culture” (p. 596). Setting aside concerns over his 
conceptions of human reproduction and family structures, the above passage makes 
explicit one of the qualifying features of a basic institution on a Rawlsian account: the 
production and reproduction of society and culture over time. Further, the task of 
reproducing society is ongoing, as Rawls (1997/1999f) views society—and the political 
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society he describes in Political Liberalism in particular—as “a scheme of social 
cooperation over time indefinitely” (p. 595). As a result, “the idea of a future time when 
its affairs are to be concluded and society disbanded is foreign to the conception of 
political society” (Rawls, 1997/1999f, p. 595). A Rawlsian conception of social justice, 
then, is concerned with the ongoing reproduction of society over time. 
Beyond the reproduction of society, Rawls’ discussion of the family also reminds 
us that he envisions different sorts of principles for governing different sorts of 
practices—an idea that has featured heavily throughout his writings.36 Rawls (1993) 
writes:  
it is the distinct purposes and roles of the parts of the social structure, and how 
they fit together, that explains there being different principles for distinct kinds of 
subjects. Indeed, it seems natural to suppose that the distinctive character and 
autonomy of the various elements of society requires that, within some sphere, 
they act from their own principles designed to fit their peculiar nature. (p. 262) 
This commitment to “different principles for distinct kinds of subjects” helps to explain, 
for example, the dramatic differences between the way Rawls implements his theory at 
the domestic and international levels, as accounted for by Drahos (1996) in his discussion 
of social justice and intellectual property rights. Rawls views domestic structures as 
different in kind from international relations and so he treats them according to different 
principles. At the international level, he zeroes in on relations between “peoples,” while 
in the domestic context, as cited above, he focuses his attention on “the basic structure of 
society,” that is “the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental 
                                                
36 For an early articulation of this idea, see: Rawls, 1955/1999b. 
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rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation” 
(Rawls, 1971b, p. 6). For Rawls (1958), “major social institutions” denote “any form of 
activity specified by a system of rules which defines offices, roles, moves, penalties, 
defenses, and so on, and which gives the activity its structure” (footnote 1, p. 164). In 
short: different principles for different types of things. 
But a focus on different principles for different things neglects the relations 
between things—that is, it does not account for the various connections between 
institutions and individuals. A focus on the articulation of discrete sets of principles for 
discrete types of things deflects attention from the practices and procedures that routinely 
connect and maintain relationships between different things, such as between individuals 
and institutions in the basic structure. While conceiving of these various spheres of 
activity as distinct is useful in some ways, in others it is atomistic in the worst sense: one 
ends up with different sets of principles for governing basic institutions, individual 
transactions, and voluntary associations respectively, but is left with little guidance for 
addressing the ways institutions, associations, and individuals relate to one another. In the 
following section, I argue that accounting for sociotechnical relations—that is, relations 
mediated by information and technology—offers one way to begin accounting for 
connections between institutions and individuals.  
In the following, I argue that sociotechnical relations are integral to the Rawlsian 
idea of the ongoing production and reproduction of society over time. For example, 
sociotechnical practices and infrastructures routinely organize and make useful resources 
necessary for the operation and upkeep of political, economic, and social practices—
practices that constitute the indefinite social cooperation with which Rawls is concerned. 
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Moreover, capacities for the collection and statistical analysis of information make 
possible the bureaucratic systems of liberal democrac societies that Rawls intends his 
principles to regulate in the first place. As Braman (2006) describes, bureaucratic welfare 
structures require the collection and processing of vast amounts of information in order to 
function (p. 33-34).  
While we do not generally perceive items such as file cabinets or genres such as 
statistical tables as technologies today, they were very much considered so when 
first introduced. Indeed, early in the twentieth century printed forms were 
considered ‘systems,’ and their use marked the height of sophistication in 
organizational practice. (Braman, 2006, p. 33) 
Braman’s description captures the relationship between information in the abstract, 
material artifacts (file cabinets, statistical tables), and sociotechnical practices 
(organizational systems) in ways that an Drahos’ earlier account, for example, does not 
(as it focuses exclusively on information in the abstract). Since sociotechnical practices 
are constitutive of the sorts of societies that Rawls intends his principles to govern, we 
ought to pay closer attention to their place in a theory of social justice. 
I begin this section by more fully developing the disconnection between Rawls’ 
basic institutions on the one hand and individual transactions on the other. To address this 
disconnect, I focus on the relationship between technology and society, paying particular 
attention to technology’s productive role within the basic structure, that is, its role in 
shaping and reproducing political, social, and economic practices over time. Though this 
discussion is primarily informed by traditions in the philosophy of technology and 
science and technology studies (STS), the connections to liberal theory—and, in 
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particular, liberal values of freedom, equality, and democracy—will be made clear. 
Finally, I move away from a discussion of technology and society broadly to focus on 
information infrastructures specifically. In turning to insights from the domain of 
infrastructure studies, I show how the idea of infrastructure both challenges and supports 
Rawls’ picture of the basic structure. Attending to practices organized by information 
infrastructures, for example, offers one way to account for connections between 
institutions and individuals missing from Rawls’ background conditions. At the same 
time, however, understanding the ubiquity of infrastructure lends empirical weight to 
Rawls’ assertions as to the “profound and pervasive” nature of the basic structure.  
4.2.1 Revisiting the basic structure argument. Recall that, for Rawls, the basic 
structure is the primary subject of justice: 
One main feature of justice as fairness is that it takes the basic structure as [its] 
primary subject.... It does so in part because the effects of the basic structure on 
citizens’ aims, aspirations and character, as well as on their opportunities and their 
ability to take advantage of them, are pervasive and present from the beginning of 
life. (Rawls, 2001, p. 10) 
Also recall that Rawls gives two kinds of reasons for taking the basic structure as his 
primary subject. Under the first kind of reason, principles of justice are said to be 
necessary for preserving background justice—that is, for the regulation and preservation 
of just background conditions over time. Rawls (1993) does not believe that injustice 
arises because individuals are necessarily deceitful or disingenuous in the pursuit of these 
ends, but because of a “tendency…for background justice to be eroded even when 
individuals act fairly: the overall result of separate and independent transactions is away 
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from and not toward background justice” (p. 267). Given the limited foresight of 
individuals and groups, he assumes that “if transactions between individuals are to be 
fair” then “certain background conditions are necessary” (Rawls, 1993, p. 269). Under 
the second kind of reason, Rawls (2001) cites the basic structure’s “profound and 
pervasive” influence in structuring the political, social, and economic possibilities 
available to citizens, both now and in the future (p. 55-56). “This it does,” Rawls (2001) 
notes, “by the expectations and ambitions it encourages in the present, and indeed over a 
complete life” (p. 56).  
Rawls’ focus on the basic structure has been the subject of various criticisms. 
G.A. Cohen, in particular, has resisted Rawls’ assertion that principles of justice properly 
apply to the basic structure of society alone. He argues that “principles of distributive 
justice, principles, that is, about the just distribution of benefits and burdens in society, 
apply, wherever else they do, to people’s legally unconstrained choices” (Cohen, 2008, p. 
116). His point is not that the basic structure is an inappropriate subject of justice, but that 
it cannot be the only appropriate subject—justice also bears on non-coercive structures, 
like social norms and other informal pressures. “My own fundamental concern,” Cohen 
(2008) writes,  
is neither the basic structure of society, in any sense, nor people’s individual 
choices, but the pattern of benefits and burdens in society: that is neither a 
structure in which choice occurs nor a set of choices, but the upshot of structure 
and choices alike. (p. 126) 
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However, Cohen’s distinction between the basic structure and the “legally unconstrained 
choices” of individuals betrays his conception of the basic structure as comprised 
exclusively of legally-coercive institutions. 
But, as Miriam Ronzoni (2007) has pointed out, Rawls is not necessarily 
committed to conceiving of the basic structure as comprised solely of legally coercive 
institutions, nor is he committed to the idea that the basic structure is the only thing 
capable of being just or unjust (p. 70). “In [Rawls’] account,” Ronzoni (2007) writes, 
“many things can be called just or unjust (for example, laws, attitudes, or persons), 
however, different criteria and considerations apply when we assess their justice” (p. 70). 
As previously discussed, Rawls deliberately establishes a division between principles 
designed to regulate just background conditions and those that should apply to local 
exchanges and transactions. “The justice of a society, on Rawls’s account, is determined 
by the justice of its basic structure, and the principles that apply to the basic structure are 
different from the principles that apply, say, to individual conduct” (Ronzoni, 2007, p 
70). The crux of the debate between Cohen and Rawls does not, then, rest on whether or 
not the basic structure is the only thing that can be assessed in terms of justice. Instead, it 
revolves around two distinct, but related concerns: the first regards whether social justice 
is determined by the basic structure of society while the second asks whether or not 
principles of justice for the basic structure differ from principles of justice for other 
entities (Ronzoni, 2007, p. 70-71).  
Ronzoni defends Rawls against Cohen’s criticisms, arguing that the latter’s 
concerns rest on a common misunderstanding of the notion of the basic structure. Even if 
one endorses a purely coercive and institutional understanding of the basic structure, on 
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Ronzoni’s account, the theoretical structure of Rawls’ theory is ambiguous and leaves 
room for discussing not only basic institutions, but non-coercive structures and individual 
decisions as well. Cohen seems to believe that once we have determined what (legally 
coercive) institutions comprise the Rawlsian basic structure, all that is left to do is to 
design those institutions in a way that is consistent with Rawls’ two principles of justice 
(Ronzoni, 2007, p. 72). There is no way, then, to extend an evaluation of the justness of 
the basic structure to things that fall outside of its institutional arrangement. This 
interpretation of Rawls, however, takes “the structure of an institutional framework [as] 
something fixed and given, that cannot be questioned” (Ronzoni, 2007, p. 72). 
Conceiving of Rawls’ basic structure in this way, Ronzoni (2007) argues, is  “not an 
intelligible enterprise” since 
institutions are created to realize certain standards of justice, and whether they 
succeed in doing so is the criterion according to which we should assess their 
justice. But whether institutions fail or succeed in realizing a standard of justice 
largely depends on the context in which they operate, and the specific obstacles 
that they are expected to encounter. If a society affirms fair equality of 
opportunity, but fails to address the main existing obstacles to fair equality of 
opportunity through its institutional setting, our legitimate concern is that such a 
society might not have the right institutions. (p. 72) 
 On this view, the basic structure is not conceived of as prior to or independent of any 
social context, but, rather, it represents a particular response to contextual considerations. 
Achieving social justice is not simply a matter of determining what institutions make up 
the basic structure, arranging those institutions according to some set of principles, and 
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washing our hands of the rest. Instead, we must first consider what conditions are 
necessary for principles of justice to be satisfied—that is, we must first inquire as to 
“which institutional structure needs to be set up in order to allow the principles of justice 
to be realised…in the specific context in which we are operating” (Ronzoni, 2007, p. 72). 
Contextual considerations (which include, among other things, non-coercive structures, 
social norms, and individual decisions) are not secondary to but, instead, inform our 
understanding of the basic structure. In this way, Ronzoni is able to account for factors 
relevant to justice that fall outside the basic structure, while still maintaining the division 
between different types of principles as established by Rawls. 
David Estlund (1998) advances a similar contextually-sensitive interpretation of 
the Rawlsian’ basic structure, though in a different way. As with Cohen, Estlund believes 
that considerations of social justice must go beyond legally-coercive structures, 
especially as it concerns the ways non-coercive structures and normative standards 
impact the well-being of the least well-off in a given society. As Estlund (1998) puts it, 
“the needs of the least well-off assert themselves well beyond the relatively rare contexts 
in which a citizen is deliberating about how to design or adjust the basic structure of 
society” (p. 112). What Cohen importantly brings to our attention, Estlund (1998) thinks, 
is an understanding that “we are often working on the basic structure of society just by 
working within it” (p. 112), but he disagrees with Cohen on the degree to which concerns 
of social justice should be a controlling factor in individuals’ lives. He grants that people 
might—at times—be motivated by a concern for social justice in their legally-
unconstrained choices, but that this motivation properly sits alongside other motivations, 
such as limited prerogatives of self-interest or affection towards friends and family. “A 
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good citizen’s motives,” he writes, “will be some mix of self-interest, affection, weak and 
strong moral factors, and the promotion of social justice” (Estlund, 1998, p. 112). In the 
face of these mixed motivations, Estlund (1998) reinforces the importance of background 
justice by arguing that institutions within the basic structure “ought to be set up to meet 
the principles of justice even when individuals permissibly exercise the prerogatives it is 
reasonable for them to recognize” (p. 112). As with Ronzoni, our conception of the basic 
structure should be informed by contextual considerations, as with the fact that 
individuals possess various motivations for action. Ultimately, Estlund thinks (as does 
Rawls) that it would be unreasonable to expect individuals to always act in a way that 
promotes the basic structure’s conformity to principles of justice. For Estlund, then, 
individuals work on the basic structure at the same time they work within it, though—
given a variety of motivations for action—they may not be working exclusively towards 
social justice. For Ronzoni, social context is to be taken into consideration when debating 
the types of institutions and how they are to be arranged—we must have the right 
institutions in view of our social context of we are to develop a viable picture of the basic 
structure to be regulated by principles of social justice. 
These discussions lay bare the tension between attending to localized and 
individual actions on the one hand and broader institutional arrangements on the other. It 
is clear that principles of justice are relevant at both levels—though there is disagreement 
as to the ways in which such principles are relevant and the degree to with which they 
apply. What is missing for both Estlund and Ronzoni, however, is some way to describe 
this relationship between local practices on the one hand and broader institutional 
processes on the other. We need, to use Estlund’s phrasing, to be able to account for the 
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ways in which individuals are working “on” the basic structure of society at the same 
time as they are working within it. Doing so, I argue, requires dropping the sharp 
distinction between the individual and the institutional. Instead, we must recognize that 
local processes inform the shape and nature of institutions while local practices and 
behaviors are simultaneously shaped by institutional practices and constraints. Below, I 
argue that this co-constitutive relationship can be accounted for by attending to ways in 
which sociotechnical practices support social, economic, and political structures and 
facilitate social cooperation over time. 
4.2.2 Technology and the basic structure. The ways in which technological 
artifacts and practices inform social, cultural, and economic structures have long been a 
point of contention for philosophers, scientists, and scholars. In some ways, human 
societies have always been informed by technological practices, as the tools and 
processes that gave rise to coordinated agricultural efforts some 10,000 years ago helped 
mark the transition from a largely nomadic existence to one centered around permanent 
settlement and organized production. In a different way, discussions of technology and its 
relationship to societal values like freedom, autonomy, democracy, and equality have 
been perpetually present in Western thought. Plato and Aristotle both distinguished 
(though in different ways) between epistēmē (knowledge or theory) and technē (craft or 
technical arts), and developed accounts of the relationship between the two concepts. 
Notably, Plato (trans., 1992/2003) explored the ways in which a technical art (technē) of 
ruling a city (the task of philosophers in Ancient Greece) could be informed by 
theoretical knowledge (epistēmē). Enlightenment thinkers, inspired by the Newtonian 
revolution in our understanding of the physical world, revered scientific progress and 
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technological development as a force for spreading ideals of liberty and rationality and 
radically altering structures of political rule and economic exchange. In contrast to his 
Enlightenment contemporaries, however, Rousseau argued that the spread of science and 
technology led to moral degradation, engendering vanity and penchants for luxury, and 
causing persons to “[lose] the taste for solid virtues” (Rousseau, 1992/2003, p. 60). 
 Discussions of technology and society came into particular focus during the 20th 
century. In the 1930’s, Lewis Mumford began discussing technology as culturally 
situated and “argued, in effect, that culture preceded technics in human evolution” 
(Smith, 1994). Echoing Rousseauian reservations, he expressed concerns over the 
“disadvantages and costs” associated with some forms of technological development, but 
remained cautiously optimistic that human intervention could stem technology’s more 
pernicious effects (see, generally: Mumford, 1964). Jacques Ellul articulated similar 
concerns, but without a sense of optimism. For Ellul, (1980/2003) a certain sort of 
technological rationality engendered by technological artifacts and systems had itself 
become an autonomous organism that defies ordinary moral judgment (p. 394). Instead of 
developing technological systems and artifacts in line with human values, Ellul saw 
humans as modifying their value systems in line with technological ideals. In turn, 
technology fatally becomes “the creative force of new values, of new ethics” (Ellul, 
1980/2003, p. 396). Langdon Winner (1986) presented a vision of technology as similarly 
autonomous, but less systematic and more volatile than Ellul’s view. According to 
Winner (1986), new technologies are developed and introduced by humans without a full 
appreciation of their consequences or side effects. Despite their differences, all three of 
these authors share a rejection of the idea that technology is a value-neutral instrument or 
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vessel for the pursuit of human ends. Instead, technological systems and artifacts exhibit 
value systems and ideals that inform the values and ideals of those societies within which 
they are embedded. 
The extent to which technology exerts its influence on society has been another 
point of contention. Economic historian Robert Heilbroner (1967/1994a), building on the 
observation by Marx that “the steam-mill [gives you] society with the industrial 
capitalist” (Marx as cited in Heilbroner, 1967/1994a, p. 54), argues that technological 
development unfolds along an independent and determinate pattern that ultimately 
determines the structure of socioeconomic activity in advanced industrial societies.37 In 
contrast to deterministic accounts, social constructivist approaches—as typified by the 
works of Bijker (1997), Pinch and Bijker (1987), and Woolgar (1991)—reject 
deterministic linkages between technology and society and instead argue that the 
meanings and values that we ascribe to technical artifacts are the result of complex social, 
political, and economic processes. In this sense, technology is socially determined, rather 
than technological development determining the shape of society. In a different manner, 
Latour (1999/2009; 2005) and actor-network theorists position the relationship between 
technology and society as one of both human and technological (i.e., non-human) actors 
enmeshed in webs of relations, neither of which overdetermine the structure or actions of 
others. 
                                                
37 Later, however, Heilbroner (1994b) makes room for certain social or political preconditions necessary for 
technology to unfold in the way he describes. This move can be best described as the difference between 
what has become known as “hard” versus “soft” technological determinism. In contrast, Bruce Bimber 
(1994)—influenced by G.A. Cohen’s (1978) account of Marx’s theory of history—rejects the idea that 
technological determinism can admit such variations. Instead, Bimber argues that only a strict sort of 
“hard” technological determinism counts as such. 
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Outside of broad social, economic, or political discussions, scholars have also 
explored the relationship between technology and democratic society specifically. 
Prominent among such efforts is Habermas’ (1970/2003) work on technology and the 
public sphere, wherein he explores the tenuous relationship between technology and 
democracy and asks, “how can the power of technical control be brought within the range 
of the consensus of acting and transacting citizens?” (p. 533). In addressing this question, 
Habermas argues that technological development has had “unplanned sociocultural 
consequences” and that future development must be brought under rational control in 
order to free public political discourse from the “irrationality of domination” of 
undirected technical progress (p. 535).38 Andrew Feenberg (1992/2003) has demonstrated 
the ways in which sociotechnical systems have overshadowed political democracy in 
their total impact on people’s daily lives. Decisions regarding technology, Feenberg 
(1992/2003) notes, “have far more to do with control over patterns of urban growth, the 
design of dwellings and transportation systems, the selection of innovations, our 
experience as employees, patients, and consumers, than all the governmental institutions 
of our society put together” (p. 652). Given the tremendous power wielded by those in a 
position to make decisions with regard to technology, he argues that technological 
development should be subordinated to democratic practices and processes. Richard 
Sclove (2000/2009) has made a similar argument for the democratization of technology, 
claiming that the subordination of technological development to democratic prerogatives 
is the only way “technologies begin actively to support, rather than to coerce or constrict, 
                                                
38 “This challenge of technology cannot be met by technology alone. It is rather a question of setting into 
motion a politically effective discussion that rationally brings the social potential constituted by technical 
knowledge and ability into a defined and controlled relation to our practical knowledge and will” 
(Habermas, 1970/2003, p. 535). 
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people’s chosen ways of life” (p. 279). Brey (2007) reaffirms an expanded version of this 
notion, arguing that “the democratization of technology is not just the democratization of 
physical designs, [but] is also the democratization of the social context of the technology 
and of the language that we use to talk about it” (p. 23). On each account, possibilities for 
democracy in society are structured in important ways by available technologies and 
sociotechnical practices. 
A unifying theme that emerges from these discussions is the recognition that 
technology is not morally neutral and, moreover, the moral relevance of technology goes 
beyond mere issues of use. Instead, technological artifacts and systems both mediate our 
perception of morally relevant aspects of particular situations and actively shape our 
responses to them (Verbeek, 2009). For Verbeek (2009) and other philosophers of 
technology, the use of technological systems and artifacts is not simply instrumental to 
human ends, but intimately bound up with our ideas about morality itself. Briggle and 
Mitcham (2009) have expressed a similar sentiment with regard to information: 
information should not be viewed as a neutral medium or empty package for encoding 
and transmitting culture—that is, information is not just the box but the contents as well 
(p. 171). In this way, information—like technology—actively shapes our moral, political, 
and cultural considerations. Moral analyses must attend to the ways in which the design 
and development of technological artifacts and information systems might promote or 
obscure different moral values or ethical norms (Brey, 2010, p. 41-42). 
4.2.3 Infrastructure and the basic structure. Some of the most well developed 
discussions of the complex interactions between technology and the institutions and 
practices that make up Rawls’ basic structure are found in the emerging domain of 
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infrastructure studies. Broadly speaking, infrastructure studies draws on discussions in 
computer science, information science, communication, organization theory, cognitive 
science, and STS in order to better understand the development and impact of 
infrastructure as “a persistent set of resources that can also support the ongoing daily 
activities of heterogeneous actors” (Ribes & Polk, 2012, p. 254). These resources include 
(but are not necessarily limited to) some combination of the technological (tools and 
technologies), the technical (classifications and standards), and the social (work and 
communication practices). As a descriptive project, infrastructure studies seeks to 
understand “the long now” of existing infrastructures and how they help make possible 
and organize certain practices or relationships (Bowker, Baker, Millerand, & Ribes, 
2010). As a normative project, it attends to the political and ethical dimensions of the 
categories and standards that infrastructures impose on the world. Moreover, given the 
tendency of infrastructure to disappear or fade into the background, careful attention to 
political and ethical questions is of particular importance. As Bowker and Star (1999) 
describe,  
good, usable systems disappear almost by definition. The easier they are to use, 
the harder they are to see. As well, most of the time, the bigger they are, the 
harder they are to see. Unless we are electricians or building inspectors, we rarely 
think about the myriad of databases, standards, and instruction manuals 
subtending our reading lamps, much less about the politics of the electric grid that 
they tap into. (p. 33) 
By balancing descriptive and normative considerations, infrastructure can be seen as both 
“an idea, a vision or an ideal” and  “a practice, a commitment and a long term endeavor” 
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(Ribes, 2006, p. 299). Through careful analyses of the development, dissemination and 
use of infrastructure, “we can achieve a deeper understanding of how it is that individuals 
and communities meet infrastructure” (Bowker & Star, 1999, p. 33). 
Importantly, understanding infrastructure means conceiving of it not merely as 
some thing or set of things (for example, a combination of tools and standards and 
patterns of work) that make coordinated activity possible. Rather, infrastructure can only 
be understood in practice—it is a “when,” not a “what,” occurring when “the tension 
between the local and global is resolved” (Star & Ruhleder, 1996, p. 4-6). An  
infrastructure occurs when local practices are afforded by a larger-scale 
technology, which can then be used in a natural, ready-to-hand fashion. It 
becomes transparent as local variations are folded into organizational changes, 
and becomes an unambiguous home—for somebody. This is not a physical 
location nor a permanent one, but a working one…. (Star & Ruhleder, 1996, p. 6)  
Elaborating on the above, Star and Ruhleder (1996) outline a series of dimensions, “the 
configuration of [which] forms ‘an infrastructure,’ which is without absolute boundary or 
a priori definition” (Star & Ruhleder, 1996, p. 6).39 
• Embeddedness. Infrastructure is “sunk” into, inside of, other structures, social 
arrangements and technologies; 
• Transparency. Infrastructure is transparent to use, in the sense that it does not 
have to be reinvented each time or assembled for each task, but invisibly 
supports those tasks; 
                                                
39 The following is quoted from Star and Ruhleder (1996, p. 5-6). 
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• Reach or scope. This may be either spatial or temporal—infrastructure has 
reach beyond a single event or one-site practice; 
• Learned as part of membership. The taken-for-grantedness of artifacts and 
organizational arrangements is a sine qua non of membership in a community of 
practice…. Strangers and outsiders encounter infrastructure as a target object to 
be learned about. New participants acquire a naturalized familiarity with its 
objects as they become members; 
• Links with conventions of practice. Infrastructure both shapes and is shaped by 
the conventions of a community of practice, e.g. the ways that cycles of day-
night work are affected by and affect electrical power rates and needs…. 
• Embodiment of standards. Modified by scope and often by conflicting 
conventions, infrastructure takes on transparency by plugging into other 
infrastructures and tools in a standardized fashion. 
• Built on an installed base. Infrastructure does not grow de novo; it wrestles with 
the “intertia of the installed base” and inherits strengths and limitations from 
that base…. 
• Becomes visible upon breakdown. The normally invisible quality of working 
infrastructure becomes visible when it breaks: the server is down, the bridge 
washes out, there is a power blackout. Even when there are back-up 
mechanisms or procedures, their existence further highlights the now-visible 
infrastructure. 
Following Star and Ruhleder’s description, we might also think of Rawls’ basic structure 
not as a what but as a when—“neither a structure in which choice occurs nor a set of 
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choices, but the upshot of structure and choices alike,” to repurpose Cohen’s (2008) 
original criticism (p. 126).  
4.2.4 Summary. The domain of infrastructure studies provides a comprehensive and 
concrete way to consider the relationships between institutions, associations, and 
individuals that make up Rawls’ basic structure. For example, infrastructure endures 
invisibly (except in moments of breakdown)—it fades into the woodwork of Rawls’ 
background conditions. Through conventions of practice and the deployment of standards 
it is able to connect a range of institutional and individual activities. The ubiquity and 
reach of infrastructure attends to Rawls’ notion of pervasiveness, while the constraints 
generated by the proliferation of standards and classification combined with the tangible 
disruptions caused by its breakdown captures his idea of profundity. Further, 
understanding that infrastructures are built on installed bases—inheriting the capacities 
and limitations of the bases they are built on—lends empirical weight to Rawls’ claim 
that, though any single transaction between individuals may be considered just, a great 
many transactions accumulating over time may ultimately lead away from (and not 
towards) justice. While a design decision for a single component of a technological 
system or artifact may not be an issue of justice in and of itself, the accumulation of such 
decisions over time and through different layers of infrastructural development may 
ultimately stand in the way of the realization of social justice. This struggle with inertia 
echoes Britz’s (2008) discussion of the struggle to achieve justice in the face of 
conditions that seem too far entrenched or social institutions that seem immovable. 
“These preset conditions make it difficult,” Britz (2008) writes, “to change or alter 
society according to the moral imperatives set by justice” (p. 1174).  
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While infrastructure defies any atomistic conception of institutions and individuals, it 
also reinforces the Rawlsian idea of a “profound and pervasive” basic structure. 
Recasting the relationship between institutions and individuals as one mediated by 
technology and infrastructure allows us a better picture of the basic structure to be 
regulated by principles of justice. Understanding the sociotechnical relations organized 
by infrastructure also helps us bridge the gap between transacting individuals and the 
background conditions of the basic structure. Rather than being disconnected from the 
basic structure as if it were a static backdrop, persons can be seen as inhabiting multiple 
roles, acting both “against” and “on” the basic structure simultaneously. Following 
Millerand and Baker (2010), persons are at once social actors, sociopolitical actors, and 
sociotechnical actors. As social actors, persons generate, exchange, and consume 
information and resources made available by institutions within the basic structure; as 
sociopolitical actors, persons’ positions and political capacities are set within “an 
organizational and political ‘web’ of interactions” mediated by the basic structure; as 
sociotechnical actors, persons are regarded “as engaging in definition and development 
with the system” (Millerand and Baker, 2010, p. 141).  
Admitting persons’ multiple roles and relationships reminds us that Rawls’ 
conception of persons as free never conceives of persons as wholly independent from 
natural or social forces—that is, they are not conceived of as having free will in any 
metaphysical sense, nor are they seen as being entirely determined by their 
circumstances. Instead, persons are able to revise and adjust their expectations according 
to their interactions with institutions and other persons in the basic structure. Though 
Rawls is here understood as describing the natural and social embeddedness of individual 
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lives, it can include sociotechnical embeddedness as well: we interact with information 
and technology in physical form; we receive information and encounter technology 
according to organizational and other social practices; data and information is processed 
through technological systems and “made sense of” to different degrees by institutions 
and other individuals before we ever encounter it. If information is a primary good on the 
standard account, then the sociotechnical account attends to the technologically mediated 
standards and practices that deliver information as a primary good to us. 
In response to critics of Rawls’ focus on the basic structure as opposed to 
individual transactions, the above lessons from the philosophy of technology and 
infrastructure studies tells us that Rawls’ focus is important and appropriate. It also, 
however, offers more concreteness and clarity as to the sorts of interactions that 
constitute the basic structure then does Rawls’ amorphous conception. For Rawls, the 
basic structure seems to be everywhere and nowhere—it has profound and pervasive 
effects and its institutions “hang together” (Rawls, 2001, p. 199), but we are not able to 
say why or how. Attending to sociotechnical relations (as represented, in particular, by 
infrastructure) allows us to see how the basic structure is made possible by social and 
technical practices, as well as through the the instruments and systems that permit their 
functioning and maintain them over time.  
This relationship between justice and infrastructure is forcefully illustrated by 
Jackson, Edwards, Bowker, & Knobel (2007): 
to begin, across virtually every type and class of emergent infrastructure we can 
identify provisional “winners” and “losers” — those whose positions, programs, 
work experiences, or general qualities of life are enhanced (or conversely, 
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challenged and undermined) by the developing infrastructure. Clear examples can 
be found in…the variable experiences of twentieth century factory automation 
(and later, computerization) strategies, through which managerial and technical 
groups gain new control over the production process, while certain classes of 
trade and unskilled workers see their workplace power and employment prospects 
shrink. These and other examples remind us that emergent infrastructures will 
often have important distributional consequences, reorganizing resource flows 
and opportunities for action across scales ranging from the local workplace to the 
global economy. Short–term experiences and long–term expectations of gain and 
loss will shape the incentive structures of individuals and institutions tasked with 
responding to infrastructural change. (para. 14) 
If, as Rawls has it, principles of justice are designed to address the basic structure’s 
profound and pervasive influence on people’s lives, then it is imperative that we consider 
the ways in which certain values are embedded in the sociotechnical processes through 
which people work “on” the basic structure (to revisit Estlund’s way of putting it). Just as 
Drahos explained that the abstract concept of information only makes itself known 
through physical expression, the abstract notion of the pervasiveness of the basic 
structure is made explicit in technology and infrastructure.  
By bringing sociotechnical relations to the fore, we can begin to see how basic 
institutions and individual transactions are not isolated from one another but, rather, they 
mutually constitute one another. In addition, it offers a Rawlsian discussion of social 
justice one way to move beyond a discussion of mere distributions to account for the 
practices, systems, and conventions that generate distributions. Paying attention to 
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sociotechnical relations gives us a way to more fully understand the dynamic relationship 
between persons and the basic structure, a relationship that is overlooked by debates 
between “individual transactions” and “background justice” as wholly distinct. 
4.3 Situating the Sociotechnical Account II: Sociotechnical Bases of Self-Respect 
In the previous section, I described some of the ways in which sociotechnical 
relations are integral to conceiving of the basic structure of society, as well as for its 
production and reproduction over time. I also resisted an atomistic picture of institutions 
and individuals as distinct and, instead, called upon insights from infrastructure studies to 
recast the basic structure not as a static set of institutions but as produced by the 
individuals, technologies, and practices it contains. In this section, I explore one way that 
the sociotechnical relations integral to the production of the basic structure are relevant to 
the realization of social justice. Namely, I am concerned with the relevance of 
sociotechnical systems for supporting the development of persons’ self-respect, an 
important feature of justice as fairness overlooked by scholars of information and 
technology.  
To be sure, there are other overlooked features of Rawls’ work that might be 
useful for discussing the role of sociotechnical relations for promoting (or hindering) 
social justice. For example, Eschenfelder, Howard, and Desai (2005) have focused on 
Rawls’ conception of civil disobedience in order to discuss practices of digital rights 
management (DRM) software circumvention. Palm (2009) has used the idea of just 
background conditions in order to normatively assess workplace surveillance practices. 
Powers (2003) has appealed to Rawls’ two concepts of rules to make sense of norm 
construction and transgression in virtual communities. These examples are important 
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exceptions to the standard account of Rawls in information and technology, though I am 
not interested in pursuing them here. Instead, I seek to articulate the relationship between 
Rawlsian social justice, self-respect, and sociotechnical practices. 
Earlier, I briefly addressed Rawls’ idea of the social bases of self-respect and its 
importance as “perhaps the most important primary good” (Rawls, 1971b, p. 386). 
Compared to other features of justice as fairness, there has been little sustained attention 
to the implications of self-respect for the application of Rawlsian theory to informational 
and technological issues—in fact, the idea of respect generally has not received a great 
deal of attention. Robin Dillon (2010), who has written extensively on the topics of 
dignity and self-respect, has voiced her concern over this “relative inattention” to respect 
in information and technology literature, as advanced ICTs 
have become a significant dimension of human life, and as such [have] moral 
implications. And central among the moral implications of human life are those 
that have to do with respect. This is because whether and how people respect or 
disrespect each other or themselves, are respected or disrespected by others, 
individually or collectively, and are worthy or unworthy of the respect of others or 
of themselves, significantly shape the moral quality of individuals’ lives, their 
interpersonal interactions, and their social and political organizations and 
engagements, determining to a significant extent whether individuals flourish or 
flounder, whether interpersonal relations are harmonious or hostile, whether 
social and political institutions and activities are just or unjust, and whether our 
characters and lives, individually and collectively, are morally commendable or 
condemnable. (p. 18) 
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 The importance of dignity and respect for social justice is well documented elsewhere. 
Dillon’s work is one example, as is the work of Elizabeth Telfer (1968), Stephen Darwall 
(1977; 2006), and—of course—Rawls (1971b). Other philosophical explorations have 
focused more precisely on the relationship between particular features of persons’ 
identities (such as race) and the development of self-respect, as with Boxill (1992) and 
Moody-Adams (1992). Work on both the capabilities approach—especially as 
represented by Nussbaum—and disabilities critics of Rawls have generated other 
valuable discussions of the ways in which accounting for primary goods is not sufficient 
for fully supporting human dignity. More recently, standalone pieces on Rawls’ 
conception of self-respect have further reinforced its importance for both Rawls and for 
theories of social justice generally (see: Zink, 2011; Doppelt, 2009).  
Drawing on these discussions, I want to more thoroughly consider the role of self-
respect for attending to issues of social justice, information, and technology. In particular, 
I want to move past Rawls’ narrowly distributive conception of self-respect as a primary 
good and consider the problem of self-respect more broadly. Following Doppelt (2009), 
the idea that self-respect can even qualify as a primary good is a questionable one, since 
it cannot be distributed in the ways that other primary goods (in particular, income and 
wealth) can (p. 128). Here, I argue in favor of an expanded notion of self-respect useful 
for articulating how a person’s sense of self-respect can be promoted or undermined by 
the design and use (i.e., non-distributive dimensions) of informational and technological 
systems. In doing so, I hope to show how sociotechnical relations can promote the 
development of self-respect for some persons and groups while at the same time 
hindering its development for others. 
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I begin by discussing the role of self-respect for Rawls’ and identifying some 
shortcomings in his discussion as demonstrated by leftist, feminist, and disabilities critics. 
From there, I advocate for an understanding of self-respect that goes beyond Rawls’ 
limited and largely individualistic conception to also account for socially contingent 
features of self-respect. Afterwards, I offer a discussion of privacy, administrative 
identities, and “values-conscious design” that demonstrates some ways in which self-
respect can be contingent on sociotechnical practices. Ultimately, my aim is to bring 
attention to the relevance of self-respect for discussions of social justice, information, and 
technology and help, in a small way, to alleviate the lack of attention paid to the subject 
lamented by Dillon. 
4.3.1 Rawls and the social bases of self-respect. Self-respect figures into the 
development of justice as fairness at various points. Most prominently, Rawls counts “the 
social bases of self-respect” as among the primary goods his theory is designed to 
distribute—even going so far as to call it “perhaps the most important primary good” 
(Rawls, 1971b, p. 386). As a primary good, the social bases of self-respect provide an 
individual with 1) “a sense of his own value” and 2) a “secure conviction that his 
conception of his good, his plan of life is worth carrying out” (Rawls, 1971b, p. 386). 
Zink (2011) further clarifies these two aspects of self-respect as follows: 
the first aspect of self-respect provides individuals the motivation to pursue their 
respective conceptions of the good. Without a secure sense of one’s own value 
and the value of one’s aims, individuals will lack the desire to execute their plan 
of life. The second aspect of self-respect relates to the first of course, for without 
the confidence in one’s abilities to fulfill a chosen plan, then the individual will 
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lack the persistence necessary to pursue her interests, no matter how much value 
they have for her. (p. 332)  
Zinks’ description makes clear that Rawls’ conception of self-respect contains a limited 
social dimension, as having a sense of one’s own value depends, in part, on how one is 
viewed by others (note that Rawls does not list “self-respect” as a primary good but, 
rather, “the social bases of self-respect”). “When we feel that our plans are of little 
value,” Rawls (1971b) writes, “we cannot pursue them with pleasure or take delight in 
their execution” (p. 386). In perhaps his most eloquent statement on the topic, Rawls 
(1968/1999c) says “our self-respect, which mirrors our sense of our own worth, depends 
in part upon the respect shown to us by others; no one can long possess an assurance of 
his own value in the face of enduring contempt or even the indifference of others" (p. 
171). Here and elsewhere in Rawls’ writings, self-respect, like other primary goods, is 
necessary for the effective exercise of his second moral power, that is, a capacity to set 
and pursue a conception of the good. 
Self-respect also serves to promote the exercise of Rawls’ first moral power, 
though his argument here is slightly more complicated, as it involves what is known as 
his argument from stability. A full account of the argument from stability is outside the 
scope of this section, but a brief discussion should suffice for showing the relevance of 
self-respect to the effective exercise of Rawls’ first moral power. Recall that Rawls holds 
his first principle of justice to be lexically prior to the second principle. In defending his 
two principles of justice, Rawls attempts to show that the priority he assigns to liberty 
through his first principle serves to better promote persons’ sense of their own worth (and 
discourages attitudes like envy and resentment) than principles from other traditions. In 
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particular, the priority and equal value of political liberties afforded by his first principle, 
as Cohen (2003) points out, helps promote the effective exercise of the first moral power 
(an effective sense of justice):  
we regard one another as equals in part because we regard one another as having 
the capacity to assess the justice of the society: to make reasonable judgments 
about the rights we should have and about a fair distribution of benefits and 
burdens. So my self-respect is founded in part on my sense of myself as an equal 
member who shares responsibility for making the fundamental judgements, with 
final authority, about social and political issues…. When others respect me as an 
equal, they confirm my sense of my own value. (p. 109) 
Further, second principle considerations (fair equality of opportunity and the difference 
principle) help provide a basis for individuals’ relative socioeconomic independence, 
ensuring that no one person must be necessarily subordinate or subservient to another. 
In the original, unrevised edition of Theory, self-respect appears to be critical to 
demonstrating that parties in the original position would select his principles over 
principles from other philosophical traditions (Zink, 2011, p. 338-339). In the revised 
edition, the justificatory role of self-respect is downplayed, though the implicit idea 
remains: Rawls believes that not only should a conception of justice be justifiable to 
parties in the original position, but it should also be stable, with stability being measured 
by its ability to cultivate in individuals a sense of justice and discourage countervailing 
inclinations or attitudes (Zink, 2011, p. 338). In particular, a conception of justice should 
promote values like self-respect and discourage tendencies towards envy or resentment 
that might, over time, undermine the development of Rawls’ first moral power (that is, a 
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capacity for a sense of justice). For parties selecting principles of justice in the original 
position, if one conception of justice better promotes a sense of justice than another—by, 
among other things, supporting the development of self-respect—, then that is to count as 
a reason for parties to choose that conception. Rawls holds that the priority of liberty 
along with the equal protection provided by the lexical ordering of his two principles 
creates an appropriate foundation for self-respect rooted in equal political and basic 
liberties (Rawls, 1971b, p. 477). Consequently, it helps to cultivate individuals’ sense of 
justice and discourage countervailing inclinations, which counts as a reason in favor of 
selecting justice as fairness over competing conceptions in the original position. 
Rawls’ argument from stability combined with the social bases of self-respect as a 
primary good helps show how self-respect is integral to the exercise of not just one, but 
both moral powers. It also, however, exposes two main limits of Rawls’ conception of 
self-respect. First, Rawls clearly views self-respect as “a matter of individual motivation” 
and that those who lack it “do not possess the psychological disposition necessary for 
acting from a sense of justice” (Zink, 2011, p. 338-339). Second, Rawls’ two principles 
of justice do not exhaust the social and cultural sources available for cultivating self-
respect in individuals. Though his conception of self-respect contains a limited social 
dimension, his view of self-respect ultimately lives and dies with the individual. 
The problems with this individualistic conception are well documented by leftist, 
disabilities, and feminist critics of Rawls. For leftist critics, a solely individualistic 
conception of self-respect does not appropriately attend to uneven distributions of 
decision-making power that structure socioeconomic relations in ways that favor the 
development of self-respect for certain classes of people over others. On this view, 
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“Rawls’ conception does not adequately comprehend…the deep ways in which equality 
and inequality in its social bases are decisively shaped by the distribution of economic 
power and position in advanced industrial society” (Doppelt, 1981, p. 260). As Rawls 
(2007c) himself points out in his lectures on Marx, leftist conceptions are suspicious of 
the assumption that the conditions under which individuals are able to exercise certain 
moral ideals can be improved independent of economic circumstances. On this leftist 
account, the realization of self-respect for certain individuals (workers) is unduly subject 
to the decisions of others (capitalists) that drive economic relations. These individuals are 
constantly subject, as Marx (1844/1975) puts it, to the “whims of the wealthy” (p. 283).40 
Rawls’ bracketing of issues related to disability obscures other ways in which 
self-respect is contingent on considerations external to the individual. Often, what counts 
as a disability in the first place is contextual, determined not by any particular ability or 
range of abilities exhibited by persons but, rather, by features of the social and physical 
environment. For example, blindness is only a disability with regard to reading in the 
absence of Braille; similarly, being wheelchair-bound is only a disability with regard to 
mobility in the absence of appropriate accommodations. Here, capabilities and disabilities 
critics of Rawls often converge, as in Sen’s argument against resource-based models that 
measure justice based on distributions of primary goods. Focusing on a specific bundle of 
primary goods would be appropriate, Sen (1979) thinks, if all people possessed roughly a 
similar ability to use such goods. The problem, however, is that people are not very 
                                                
40 It is worth pointing out that Rawls does attempt to confront this difficulty, though not fully. Later in his 
writings, he entertains the idea that a model of worker-managed firms as described by Mill might 
compatible with his theory. In the end, however, Rawls neither affirms nor rejects Mill’s vision. He simply 
points out that, in the time since Mill’s writing, worker-managed firms have not become common, and he 
does not believe they show any sign of winning out over privately-owned capitalist firms (See: Rawls, 
2001, p. 176-178). 
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similar, but “have very different needs varying with health, longevity, climatic 
conditions, location, work conditions, temperament, and even body size” (Sen, 1979, p. 
215-216). So, even though an individual might have plentiful access to primary goods, 
other considerations might negatively impact their well-being in ways relevant to social 
justice. For example, it is possible that an individual confined to a wheelchair could be 
relatively well-off economically, but issues of mobility raised by a lack of wheelchair-
appropriate access to various spaces might impinge on his or her dignity and sense of 
self-respect (Nussbaum, 2004, footnote 22, p. 129).  
Even if a primary goods account could accommodate some considerations related 
to disability (for example, through the allocation of funds for addressing them), problems 
related to cultural and social norms are likely to remain. As Terzi (2010) describes, 
persons with disabilities also face difficulties “in dealing with the reactions by other 
people to the way they look, act, or simply to the way they are” (p. 163). Social 
circumstances, then, “question disabled people’s equal social bases of self-respect” 
(Terzi, 2010, p. 163). In the case of disability, a person’s self-respect clearly depends, in 
part, on external features of the social and physical environment that are not wholly 
reducible to individual considerations. 
The social contingency of self-respect is also relevant to Rawls’ characterization 
of the family. Recall that Rawls views the family as a part of the basic structure, but does 
not conceive of the family’s inner-workings as regulable by his principles of justice. 
Instead, families are to be treated like non-basic institutions such as churches or 
universities: they are to be constrained—but not immediately regulated—by the two 
principles of justice as fairness. The intuition behind this move is a recognition that the 
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sphere of the family is integral to the exercise of Rawls’ second moral power and a liberal 
theory of justice must not unduly or unjustifiably interfere with an individual’s ability to 
pursue and promote their conception of the good. But this characterization of the family 
abstracts away from the often oppressive realities of many family structures and 
situations. As Nussbaum (2004) forcefully describes: “the family is one of the most non-
voluntary and pervasively influential of social institutions, and one of the most notorious 
homes of sex hierarchy, denial of equal opportunity, and sex-based violence and 
humiliation” (p. 115). Rawls’ position appears to recognize the equal standing of all 
family members as citizens but fails to offer an appropriate response to injustice that may 
occur within the family structure. However, if a theory of social justice is serious about 
providing the social bases of self-respect equally for all, issues of sex-based 
subordination and oppression in the family cannot be ignored. Further, problems of sex-
based and other forms of oppression are not solely limited to the family—they must also 
be addressed within broader social and cultural structures. As Susan Moller Okin (2004) 
has shown in her potent criticisms of both Rawls and liberalism generally, the 
development of self-respect is intimately tied to one’s place within a larger culture and 
whether or not that culture forces particular social roles upon certain categories of people 
(p. 202).  
What these discussions make clear is that self-respect is not only a matter of 
individual motivation but also contingent on external cultural factors such as the 
economy, the built environment, and other social and cultural structures. As Doppelt 
(2009) neatly summarizes, individuals “participate in multiple contexts of evaluation 
including networks of friends, family, neighborhood, church, workplaces, political 
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citizenship, national identity” (Doppelt, 2009, p. 132), all of which have some bearing on 
one’s self-respect. I further argue that the development and maintenance of self-respect is 
contingent on sociotechnical factors. In the following, I develop more robust picture of 
self-respect than that offered by Rawls, one that more clearly demonstrates the social and 
cultural contingency of self-respect before turning to a discussion of self-respect, 
information, and technology. 
4.3.2 Social dimensions of self-respect. Broadly speaking, respect can be 
described as the appropriate response to dignity, just as esteem is to the estimable (see: 
Darwall, 2006, p. 119-121). Unlike attitudes such as esteem, however, respect is 
something that can be mandated—and not simply called for—by dignity. As Darwall 
(2006) puts it, “someone who fails to esteem your estimable qualities may not give you 
the response you deserve, but esteem is nothing you or anyone else can expect or 
demand. Not so with respect of your dignity” (p. 120). However, this understanding of 
respect as something that is required by dignity conflicts with other common uses and 
understandings of respect. Depending on the context, respect is variously a thing, a state, 
or an emotion. Sometimes, it to refers to something that is deserved categorically (as with 
respect for persons); other times, it seems to admit degrees and can be gained or lost 
based on merit.  
In response to these different uses, it is helpful to understand the now-classic 
distinction made by Darwall (1977) between appraisal respect and recognition respect. 
Appraisal respect, as the name implies, “is an assessment of someone’s conduct or 
character or of something that somehow involves these” (Darwall, 2006, p. 122; see also: 
Darwall, 1977, p. 41). One might, for example, have respect for another’s specific skills 
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or abilities—for example, a volleyball player might respect the skills of a particular 
setter. However, when we say that all persons are owed respect by virtue of being 
persons, we are not making an appraisal but, instead, we are making a claim that informs 
or constrains our relations with one another (Darwall, 2006, p. 123). Darwall (1977) calls 
this form of respect recognition respect, as it refers to “appropriate consideration or 
recognition to some feature of an object in deliberating about what to do” (p. 38).  In 
short: by respecting persons we are not appraising them but, rather, we are recognizing 
that persons are (by virtue of being persons) necessarily due certain considerations and 
constraints on our behavior towards them. Certainly, an untalented volleyball player is 
not due the same appraisal respect as a talented one, insofar as volleyball abilities are 
concerned. However, that same untalented volleyball player is nonetheless due 
recognition respect as a person, since “to have recognition respect for a person as such is 
not necessarily to give [someone] credit for anything in particular” but, rather, it is to 
recognize “that the fact that he or she is a person places moral constraints on our 
behavior” (Darwall, 1977, p. 46).  
One main difference between appraisal and recognition respect, then, is the 
admission of degrees—appraisal respect can admit degrees whereas recognition respect 
cannot. However, as a particular brand of respect, self-respect blurs the distinction 
between appraisal and recognition respect. For example, one can fail to express 
recognition respect for oneself through certain behaviors, such as by submitting to 
indignities or not caring whether one is taken seriously; at the same time, one can fail to 
express appraisal respect for oneself by holding a low opinion of oneself as a person  
(Darwall, 1977, p. 47-48). 
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One’s self-esteem may suffer from a low opinion of, for example, one’s 
appearance, temperament, wit, physical capacities, and so forth. One cannot 
always be what one would wish to be, and one's opinion of oneself may suffer. 
Such a failing by itself does not give rise to lack of appraisal self-respect, 
although it might suffer if one attributed the failing to a lack of will, an inability 
to bring oneself to do what one wanted most to do. So far forth the failing would 
be regarded as arising from a defect in one's character and not solely from, for 
example, a lack of physical ability. (Darwall, 1977, p. 48) 
Darwall’s description is reminiscent of Rawls’ conception of self-respect—both 
characterize self-respect as fundamentally reducible to considerations internal to an 
individual. Like Rawls, Darwall (1977) also admits that self-respect contains a social 
dimension, noting that what constitutes self-respect may “vary with society, convention, 
and context” (p. 48). But Darwall (1977) goes beyond Rawls insofar as he makes the 
nature of this social contingency more explicit: self-respect can depend “both on the 
appropriate conception of persons and on what behaviors are taken to express this 
conception or the lack of it” (p. 48). In other words, whether or not an individual realizes 
self-respect depends, in part, on socially-defined ideas of what it means to be a self-
respecting individual. Consequently, accounting for the social dimension of self-respect 
means accounting for the social and cultural conceptions of respect available to 
individuals. 
Dillon (1997) argues that if we are committed to viewing self-respect as a largely 
personal problem—a personal inadequacy or psychological defect, the relief of which is a 
matter of personal responsibility—we cannot ignore the frameworks that influence the 
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development of  “basal self-understandings.” These basal frameworks help underwrite 
our self-respect long before we begin to exercise agency—they  
are constructed in the complex, emotionally charged interplay of self, others, and 
institutions which begins before we are capable of conceptualizing self, worth, 
persons, institutions, and the relations among them, and it shapes and delimits our 
conceptual scheme…and our agentic capacities. (Dillon, 1997, p. 244) 
Moreoever, 
it is essential to recognize that basal interpretive frameworks are also constructed 
in and by social, cultural, and political contexts, which for many categories of 
persons are contexts of oppression…. Where subordination and devaluation of a 
category of persons pervades social, cultural, and political reality, we should 
expect, other things equal, the respect such persons can have for themselves to be 
shaped in particular ways. (Dillon, 1997, p. 245-246) 
In other words, though my sense of self-respect may be my own, it is not wholly 
reducible to my sense of self. It is, rather, constructed through the complex interplay of 
social, cultural, and political forces. 
The ways in which self-respect is socially constructed are made explicit in 
discussions of institutionalized injustice and the development of self-respect for racial or 
ethnic groups. Both Thomas (1983/1995) and Boxill (1976; 1992), for example, have 
shown how the aim of political protest and American civil rights movements can be 
viewed not exclusively in terms of the expansion of freedom and the winning of rights for 
African-Americans, but also as a process of liberating self-respect. In this way, they 
follow Rawls in admitting the profound influence of social institutions on the 
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development of self-respect, but they are more explicit in attending to the role of protest 
for transforming unjust institutional structures and asserting the self-respect of 
marginalized groups. Moody-Adams (1992) also accounts for self-respect in the face of 
entrenched social discrimination, making clear that the possibilities for individuals to 
develop and hold such a conviction are constrained by normative standards embedded in 
social, political and economic structures. In addition to institutionalized racism, 
embedded heteronormative standards of sexuality shape the possibilities for self-respect 
held by bisexual and homosexual individuals (Mohr, 1988) while cisnormative standards 
of binary gender frame the ways in which transgender or gender non-conforming 
individuals might exercise self-respect. 
Jonathan Wolff’s (1998) notion of “respect-standing” presents a concrete way to 
consider the degradation of self-respect in the face of institutionalized discrimination. A 
person’s respect-standing, at least as Wolff (1998) has it, is defined as the degree of 
respect others have for that person (p. 107). If a person is treated with contempt, she will 
likely be led to believe that she has low respect-standing; conversely, if a person is 
treated decently, she will likely believe her respect-standing is high (Wolff, 1998, p. 107). 
Moreover, it is particularly insulting for a person to be treated with less respect than is 
due, and it is demeaning to require someone to do anything that might reasonably be 
expected to lower her respect-standing (Wolff, 1998, p. 107).  
Wolff goes on to describe three ways in which one’s respect-standing might be 
(reasonably or unreasonably) diminished. The first two ways account for failures of 
common courtesy and issues of mistrust. If one is frequently ignored, patronized, or 
lectured, one might be led to believe that she has low-respect standing (Wolff, 1998, p. 
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108). Similarly, being regularly or systematically mistrusted can also undermine one’s 
sense of her own respect-standing:  
to be asked to justify oneself or one’s claims can often be insulting. It is 
undignified; as if others suspect one has something to hide. Although it is 
important not to exaggerate, being called to account for one’s actions or claims—
or at least being called too often, or in circumstances when others are not, or when 
the depth of investigation seems out of proportion—gives the impression that one 
is not trusted, that one is an object of suspicion and hence is not being respected. 
(Wolff, 1998, p. 108) 
This is not to say that people should never have to stand up and account for their actions, 
nor is it an invitation for some to exploit the trust of others. Rather, it is simply to say that 
a person’ respect-standing can be undermined by uneven patterns of trust in society—as 
when some are subject to disproportionate and invasive investigations or are made to 
account for their day-to-day actions or beliefs more often than others. 
In addition to failures of common courtesy and mistrust, Wolff  (1998) outlines a 
third source of diminished respect-standing which he refers to as “shameful revelation” 
(p. 109-110). In instances of shameful revelation, one is forced to behave in a certain way 
or reveal things about themselves that reduce her respect standing (Wolff, 1998, p. 109). 
Specifically, Wolff thinks this can mean people are forced to reveal details about 
themselves or their lives that they find shameful, though he is also quick to recognize that 
what might be considered shameful is also often socially-relative or contingent. But the 
contingent nature of shame, Wolff (1998) rightly argues, does not make it irrelevant, 
since it does not follow from this contingency 
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that shame is somehow ‘unreal’ or even unjustified. For example, it is quite 
common for teachers, doctors, or social workers to claim that some particular trait 
is ‘nothing to be ashamed of.’ However, unless people typically were ashamed of 
such a trait there would be no need for such reassurance. Even if there is no good 
reason why a particular trait should lower your respect-standing, the fact is that it 
can, or, at least, may lead one to believe that it will. So even if a source of shame 
is contingent and even irrational it can still be experienced as a source of shame. 
(p. 114-115) 
For present purposes, I set aside the complexities of shame as both an experience and a 
term. Instead, I only mean to emphasize Wolff’s point that being pressed to act in certain 
ways or to reveal information about oneself that might not be valued by a broader 
culture—or, worse, that might lead to active discrimination—can be a source of 
diminished respect-standing. That is, being so pressed can undermine one’s self-respect. 
These various understandings of self-respect fit with and expand on the limited 
view of self-respect as a matter of personal responsibility for living up to standards or 
views we set for ourselves found in Rawls’ (1971b) work (p. 440-46; see also: Dillon, 
1997, footnote 18, p. 232). In going beyond Rawls, they permit a more robust picture of 
how the “profound and pervasive” social, cultural, and political institutions that make up 
the basic structure of society come to structure the possibilities for self-respect that are 
available to certain categories or groups of people. If we include sociotechnical 
institutions in our picture of the basic structure—as I argued we should in the previous 
section—then we ought to also pay close attention the ways in which sociotechnical 
factors can support or undermine social justice by structuring possibilities for self-
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respect. Below, I draw on discussions of privacy, administrative identities, and design to 
show how self-respect can be influenced—at least in part—by available informational 
and technological systems 
4.3.3 Sociotechnical bases of self-respect: privacy, identity, and design. 
Discussions of respect and privacy have long been bound up with innovations in 
technology. For example, the paradigmatic notion of privacy as "the right to be let 
alone"—detailed by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in their classic 1890 article on 
the right to privacy—was a direct response to the increased presence and popularity of 
Eastman Kodak Company's small and inexpensive snap cameras, which allowed almost 
anyone to become a photographer and further propagated the salacious gossip news (or 
"yellow journalism") of the day (Solove, 2008, p. 15). "Recent inventions and business 
methods," the authors wrote at the time, "call attention to the next step which must be 
taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual...the right 'to be 
let alone'" (Warren and Brandeis, 1984/1890, p. 76). While Warren and Brandeis' did not 
use the language of self-respect, they sought to affirm the fundamental role of privacy in 
preventing indignities and securing "the protection of the person.” The contemporary 
landscape of privacy is, of course, much more complicated—from sophisticated 
surveillance practices to advanced data mining and database matching techniques enabled 
by networked computer systems, technological advances over the last 150 years have 
forced constant reconsiderations of the role of privacy, autonomy, and respect in modern 
liberal societies (Regan, 1995; Solove, 2008; Nissenbaum, 2010). 
Privacy rights claimed against informational or technological invasions are often 
justified by appealing to ideals of individual autonomy, self-determination, and dignity. 
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According to Regan (1995), “privacy inheres in the individual as an individual and is 
important to the individual primarily for self-development or for the establishment of 
intimate or human relationships” (p. 24). Bloustein (1964/1984) describes privacy as 
preserving an “individual’s independence, dignity, and integrity; it defines man’s essence 
as a unique and self-determining being” (p. 163). Similarly, Westin (1967) defines 
privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves 
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others" 
(Westin, 1967, p. 7).  As Benn (1971) puts it, “any man who desires that he himself 
should not be an object of scrutiny" has "a prima facie ground for limiting the freedom of 
others to observe and report at will" (p. 12-13). One’s dignity can be undermined unless 
safeguards are put in place to “[insulate] individual objectives from social scrutiny...and 
thereby [protect] the realm of the personal” (Schoeman, 1984, p. 415). On these accounts, 
privacy is one way to express respect for individual dignity and autonomy. 
Other conceptions of privacy go beyond individual considerations to also account 
for its role in social life. As Reiman (1976) points out in his discussion of the relationship 
between privacy and intimacy, "what constitutes intimacy is not merely the sharing of 
otherwise withheld information, but the context of caring which makes the sharing of 
personal information significant" (p. 33). In other words, our privacy expectations are 
determined, in part, by normative standards of information sharing that are not fully 
accounted for by discussions of individual control. Nissenbaum (2010) argues that our 
social lives are framed by activities and practices that take place within specific contexts, 
and these contexts are characterized, in part, by the norms that govern the flow of 
information within them. These "context-relative informational norms," as she describes 
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them, "prescribe, for a given context, the types of information, the parties who are the 
subjects of the information as well as those who are sending and receiving it, and the 
principles under which this information is transmitted" (Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 141). 
Privacy violations occur when the norms that govern the flow of personal information in 
a given context are upset in certain ways. In a healthcare context, for example, 
information shared with a doctor by a patient is generally considered unidirectional (that 
is, the doctor is not expected to share the same types of personal information in return) 
and confidential. If the unidirectionality and confidentiality of this flow are disrupted (for 
instance, if the doctor were to share intimate details of a patient's condition with someone 
irrelevant to the patient's treatment) then a patient's privacy has been violated. 
It is important to point out, however, that protecting privacy does not always 
promote or protect self-respect for all individuals or groups. As feminist critics have 
argued, defenses of privacy often institutionalize power imbalances in the home—
imbalances that traditionally disfavor and disempower women.  Consequently, privacy 
protections developed to promote liberal ideals of autonomy or dignity can actually serve 
to reinforce conditions of domestic confinement, traditional social roles, and violence 
against women (Allen, 2004, p. 35). Similarly, Iris Marion Young (2004) argues that 
privacy protections can undermine human dignity when they are applied unevenly or 
conceived of inappropriately, as evidenced by the uneven privacy protections afforded to 
senior citizens residing in many nursing care facilities. 
The foregoing discussions of privacy implicate Wolff’s sources of reduced 
respect-standing in various ways. Failures of courtesy occur when contextually-bound 
information norms are misunderstood or violated, as when changes to online social 
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networking platforms upend previously established information flows.41 The widespread 
deployment of pervasive surveillance technologies can promote an environment of 
mistrust, as exemplified by recent revelations of domestic spying carried out by the 
National Security Administration. Finally, the ubiquitous and invasive data-gathering 
techniques employed online can produce (to use Wolff’s term) “revelations” of 
information, that is, they can unwittingly reveal information about an individual that 
invites undue scrutiny or has negative social and financial consequences. Depending on 
how these technological practices are employed, they can have the effect of reducing a 
person’s respect-standing—from an undue subjection to surveillance to the forced 
disclosure of otherwise personal or sensitive information. 
Beyond privacy, the standards and categories imposed by informational and 
technological systems can also influence one’s sense of self-respect. All informational 
and technological systems require some more or less complete set of standards, 
classifications, or protocols in order to function—without recognizable and shared 
standards, advanced communication networks like the Internet would be impossible. In 
some cases, the standards imposed by these systems are of immediate relevance to a 
person’s sense of self, imposing what Manders-Huits (2010) describes as an 
“administrative conception” of identity and identification.  
Presently, we find ourselves regularly defined in relation to others in IT-mediated 
environments. This happens for example when we are seeking information on the 
Internet and using Google as a search engine: The search behavior of all users is 
                                                
41 For example, Facebook’s introduction of its NewsFeed feature shifted the flow of information within the 
service from the manual navigation of static profile pages to an automated stream of user updates visible 
upon logging into the site. This shift “threatened the privacy of users who previously assumed that only 
those friends who happened to visit their page would notice the changes; instead, any change made was 
automatically fed to all followers” (Zimmer and Hoffmann, 2011, p. 177). 
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recorded and analyzed in order to present the searcher with the most relevant 
search results. And when we buy a book at Amazon.com, we receive information 
on the preferences of other customers: ‘someone who bought this book also 
bought X….’ For processing technologies…we appear as statistical objects of 
study, abstracted from our personal preferences and life plans, and from our 
individual capacities and freedom to choose. (Manders-Huits, 2010, p. 45) 
Manders-Huits argues that administrative conceptions of personal identity can come into 
conflict with our self-informative identities—that is, with self-conceptions that are more 
comprehensive, reflexive, and moral in nature. Administrative conceptions are nominal 
and entail a third-person, attributed perspective, whereas self-informative identities have 
a reflexive relationship to the subject to which the identity refers (Manders-Huits, 2010, 
p. 47).  
She discusses three ways in which these identities can come into tension. The 
first, and perhaps most obvious, is the problem of computational reductionism, that is, an 
“endorsement of the ideal that anything can be expressed in terms of data (and the 
probabilities and profiles based on them)” (Manders-Huits, 2010, p. 51). Though 
necessary for the operation of computational systems, practices of computational 
reductionism cannot take into account “soft information or data, such as contextual and 
motivational features, background knowledge, and (personal) explanation regarding 
actions or decisions” (Manders-Huits, 2010, p. 51). In addition, the persistence of 
information (particularly digital information online) regarding one’s nominal identity can 
obstruct the development of a self-informative identity. Because information captured in 
files and databases endures, is easily spread, and is often difficult to change or remove, 
  
 
172 
the ability of individuals “to wrest themselves from (former) characterizations and 
change in light of (new) moral considerations” is stunted (Manders-Huits, 2010, p. 52). 
Lastly, Manders-Huits (2010) draws on Ian Hacking’s notion of “dynamic nominalism” 
to show how moral or self-informative identities often take up or are shaped by available 
categories, labels, or attributed identifications (p. 52-53). The increasing “ubiquity and 
possibilities of profiling by means of information technology evidently enhances the 
aptness of dynamic nominalism,” as individuals incorporate attributed, third-personal 
descriptions into their self-informative identities (p. 53). She cites Lawrence Lessig’s 
concept of “nominalization” to further describe this phenomenon: “The system watches 
what you do; it fits you into a pattern; the pattern is then fed back to you in the form of 
options set by the pattern; the options reinforce the patterns; the cycle begins again” 
(Lessig, 1999, p. 154; Lessig as cited in Manders-Huits, 2010, p. 53).  
The relevance of computational reductionism, the persistence of information, and 
dynamic nominalism to social justice is reflected in Iris Marion Young’s call to attend to 
processes in which certain attributes, comportments, or ways of life are normalized by the 
basic structure of society. Information or standards that are imposed on an individual 
from without—and that endure in ways that are difficult to change—can impact one’s 
ability to exercise their second moral power on Rawls’ account, as it becomes difficult to 
freely revise one’s values and commitments throughout the course of one’s life. In 
addition to the tensions identified by Manders-Huits, there is also a problem of persons 
being forced to engage with informational or technological systems (or where avoiding 
such an engagement would be impractical or have severe consequences) that impose 
nominal or administrative identities that fundamentally contradict one’s self-informative 
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identity. For example, the filling out of forms is often a prerequisite for receiving services 
of varying levels of importance—from joining online social networks to receiving access 
to medical care. However, a form that asks for one’s gender identity and only provides 
options for “male” or “female” imposes a binary conception of gender that may come 
into conflict with non-binary identities. Here, the imposition of a nominal identity goes 
beyond mere semantics—through the filling out of a form, an individual has little choice 
but to endorse a worldview that fundamentally conflicts with one’s own. In order to 
receive the benefits of certain services or to gain access to certain spaces (online and off), 
individuals in these instances must engage in what might be referred to as “informational 
contortionism,” modifying and twisting information about themselves to fit pre-
determined, often inflexible categories.42 Building on this metaphor, we might also say 
that—once this information is compiled and used to generate a profile of the person 
providing the contorted information—the imposition of certain categories represents an 
act of informational disfigurement, a form of informational violence reminiscent of 
Spade’s (2011) discussion of the administrative violences enacted upon transgender 
identities by legal systems. 
The problem of self-respect also poses practical issues for the design and 
development of ethical technology. Scholars and researchers involved in the emerging 
area of values-conscious design, in particular, focus on the ways in which human values 
may come to reside in technological artifacts and systems, and—inversely—how the 
design of technology may come to shape human values (Boehner, David, Kaye, & 
Sengers, 2005; Friedman, Kahn, & Borning, 2006; Flanagan et al, 2008; Camp, n.d.). 
Work in this area is driven by a “concern over the moral and ethical consequences of our 
                                                
42 I am indebted to David Phillips for the contortionist metaphor. 
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modern technological era” and focuses on ways to “ensure that particular attention to 
moral and technical values becomes an integral part of the conception, design, and 
development of [information and communication technology]” (Manders-Huits & 
Zimmer, 2009). The problems of values-conscious and ethical design take on new 
urgency as sophisticated ICTs pervade increasingly large portions of daily life.   
Perhaps the paradigmatic example of a values-conscious design effort is 
RAPUNSEL, a National Science Foundation-funded research project developed to help 
teach computer programming skills to young girls (RAPUNSEL, 2014). The design and 
development of RAPUNSEL was motived by a desire to address the absence of women 
in areas of technological development, especially computer programming (Flanagan et al, 
2005). Working from the assumption that the disinterest in math, science, and computing 
exhibited by adolescent girls is partly a result of the ways in which these subjects are 
taught, researchers set out—based on evidence that girls are receptive to networked 
software environments and social learning—to produce a computer game in which 
programming is an integral part of play (Flanagan et al, 2005, p. 752). 
To build the game, developers and researchers deployed a value-conscious design 
methodology called Values at Play (VAP), “a theoretically grounded approach that 
[allows research teams] to consider human values in a rigorous and iterative manner 
throughout the design cycle” (Flanagan et al, 2005, p. 754). VAP unfolds heuristically, 
accounting for human values at various stages of the design process. First, researchers 
and designers engage in a process of “values discovery,” wherein values relevant to a 
given project are identified, clarified, and indexed for reference. At this stage, sources of 
values include “individuals, institutions, societies, and cultures that suggest relevant 
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values or place values-oriented demands on creators” (Flanagan et al, 2005, p. 754). 
Second, researchers and designers identify and articulate the tensions between relevant 
values. Examples of such conflicts may be (but are not limited to) those between 
transparency and privacy, openness and security, or safety and cost. Once conflicts are 
identified, researchers and designers can choose from a variety of resolution strategies. 
Third, researchers and designers continually develop small, targeted prototypes to allow 
for quick response to issues or conflicts that invoke relevant values as articulated and 
clarified in the discovery and conflict-identification phases. Constantly developing and 
deploying small prototypes helps to ensure that issues are recognized and resolved at key 
points along the design path, rather than having to address them in later (and often costly) 
stages of development. In the fourth and final step, VAP calls for a phase of values 
verification, where initial and emergent values (as identified in the discovery phase) are 
compared against a final version to verify that the desired values are ultimately embedded 
in the product (Flanagan et al, 2005, p. 758). 
In the case of RAPUNSEL, researchers engaged in a process of values discovery 
through ongoing consideration of documents and discussions regarding: the project goals 
and hypotheses; prior work conducted in related disciplines; beliefs and values held by 
the game’s designers and relevant stakeholders (such as players, parents, educators, and 
funders) (Flanagan et al, 2005). Further, the process of values discovery was iterative; 
researchers and designers remained constantly aware that “[values] not only appear 
throughout the process but can also change in importance and even type” (Flanagan et al, 
2005, p. 756). In addition, researchers and designers were careful to identify and 
articulate any values-based conflicts, allowing them to discuss and revise the game in 
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development to make sure it hewed close to the values as articulated in the project goals 
and hypotheses: 
For example, when the question arose, early on, about how to devise a reward 
structure for the game environment, designers first reasoned that a care-giving or 
nurturing structure would work best due to the popularity of such games with the 
target audience. However, further research and prototyping showed that this initial 
conception was incorrect. Rather than promote the values of cooperation and 
collaboration, this original game design fostered quite a competitive style of care- 
giving.... The initial design thus led to a values conflict. Later design iterations 
established a cooperative reward structure that encouraged sharing of elements 
and ideas between players—goals better matched to empirical findings on girls’ 
science and mathematics learning preferences. (Flanagan et al, 2005, p. 756) 
Overall, the RAPUNSEL project demonstrates how problems of human values can 
emerge at various stages in the design process. Ultimately, designs that promote certain 
values over others can also provide for (or hinder) the development of self-respect in 
certain types of individuals. In the case of RAPNUSEL, researchers were able to show 
that certain values of competitiveness did not support the identities and particular skill 
sets of young girls in ways that, over time, could lead to a lack of confidence in one’s 
abilities and—with regard to certain subjects—come to undermine one’s self-respect. 
4.3.4 Summary. The preceding discussion aimed to show the various ways in 
which sociotechnical relations can influence the development of self-respect. Discussions 
of privacy highlight the ways in which technological advancements can threaten 
individual autonomy and dignity. Issues of computational reductionism, the persistence 
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of information, and dynamic nominalism highlight conflicts between the administrative 
conception of persons imposed by technology and our own moral, self-informative 
identities. Questions regarding the values embedded in the design of technology show 
how the promotion of certain values over others can similarly promote the development 
of self-respect for some people and hinder it for others. Moreover, such a pattern of 
promotion and demotion of certain values can perpetuate already entrenched injustice by 
informally deterring certain types of people from pursuing particular career paths or 
intellectual endeavors. 
Of all the major proponents of Rawls discussed, only van den Hoven devotes 
some time to discussing the social bases of self-respect (van den Hoven, 1995). He is not, 
however, interested in the relevance of information and technology to self-respect but, 
rather, he relies on Rawls’ discussion of this particular primary good in order to reinforce 
his argument for information as a primary good.43 Also, I identified earlier a gap between 
van den Hoven’s work on values embedded in design and Rawlsian justice. Here, the 
social bases of self-respect offer one way to connect these discussions: distribution of the 
social bases of self-respect is vital (“perhaps the most important primary good”) within 
Rawls’ distributive scheme, but assessing whether or not a given system or artifact 
provides a basis for self-respect for a diverse group of people allows us to evaluate 
relevant non-distributive dimensions of information and technology. Once we have 
assessed the ways in which it may either support or undermine the development of self-
respect, we can then consider it within Rawls’ distributive scheme. In this way, we can 
                                                
43 Just as institutions may be responsible for providing the bases of self-respect in persons but they cannot 
be held responsible for whether any given individual’s self-respect is actually realized, van den Hoven 
argues that institutions that provide access to information should not be held responsible as to whether or 
not people actually gain knowledge from information (van den Hoven, 1995, p. 13). 
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also connect non-distributive concerns of the sociotechnical account with issues of 
distributive justice that mark the standard account. 
Just as buildings without wheelchair access promote a certain normative standard 
of ability for individuals who are otherwise capable of exercising Rawls’ two moral 
powers, the design of information technology endorses certain abilities and strategies as 
normatively appropriate. The routine promotion of certain normative standards over 
others offers some and deprives others of the social bases of self-respect. Buildings that 
exclude wheelchairs can contribute to a negative self-conception for someone who is 
wheelchair-bound, while computer applications designed to teach certain skills, like math 
or computer programming, that routinely evoke certain values over others (as in the case 
of competition versus cooperation in the RAPUNSEL example) may undermine one’s 
confidence by leading one to believe that she is not good at certain subjects. These are, of 
course, generalizations, but the point is not to show that such conditions will always, 
without regard to other factors, contribute to the diminishment of self-respect. Rather, I 
only mean to show how it might be that the design of technological artifacts and systems 
can come to promote the self-respect of some while undermining that of others. 
4.4 Against the “Enduring Contempt” of Information and Technology: Towards a 
Sociotechnical Account of Rawlsian Justice 
For our self-respect, which mirrors our sense of our own worth, depends in 
part upon the respect shown to us by others; no one can long possess an 
assurance of his own value in the face of enduring contempt or even the 
indifference of others.  
 
–Rawls, Distributive Justice: Some Addenda 
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 As demonstrated by various scholars and philosophers, our self-respect is 
informed, in part, by considerations external to the self. Our sense of our own value, as 
Dillon (1997) argues, is developed in the “interplay of self, others, and institutions which 
begins before we are capable of conceptualizing self, worth, persons, institutions, and the 
relations among them” (p. 244). Particularly pernicious are the relations and practices 
institutionalized in Rawls’ basic structure that constitute the background conditions 
against which individuals conceive of their selves, formulate conceptions of the good, 
and set and pursue valued ends. But, recalling one of Rawls’ (1968/1999c) earliest and 
most eloquent statements on the subject of self-respect, it is unreasonable to expect that 
individuals will remain assured of their own value “in the face of enduring contempt or 
even the indifference of others” (p. 171). While others have shown how institutionalized 
discrimination within social, economic, or political structures can serve to disempower 
individuals along racial, gender, sexual, or other lines, I have tried to demonstrate that the 
development and design of information and technological systems can also carry 
discriminatory biases. Further, given the inertia of existing sociotechnical infrastructures, 
biases embedded in the sociotechnical systems and practices that help reproduce social, 
economic, and political structures over time can have long-lasting and far-reaching 
effects. Consequently, the “enduring contempt and indifference” of biased and value-
laden technologies can have a profound and pervasive impact on the development of self-
respect for some well into the future. 
As a normative project, then, the sociotechnical account seeks to identify ways in 
which considerations of the design and implementation of information technology 
variously empowers some and disempowers others. It is in a notion of empowerment that, 
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I believe, the standard and sociotechnical accounts of Rawls can come together. For 
example, Brey (2007) defines empowerment as “(1) having the power to use one’s 
primary goods to one’s own ends (freedom from restraint by others and from other 
restraints) and (2) the successful acquisition of a relevant share of primary social goods to 
more effectively further one’s ends” (p. 16). As noted previously in the section Brey’s 
work, he clearly views access to productive information and communication technologies 
as a relevant contemporary addition to Rawls’ scheme of primary goods. In this way, 
empowerment can be seen as a normative aim of the standard account insofar as it is 
concerned with supplying individuals with the goods needed to pursue valued ends. But, 
Brey also recognizes that the ethical or political impact of technology may vary in its 
context of use. “The same technological artifact may,” Brey (2007) writes, “empower one 
user more than it does another [since] artifacts will necessarily serve certain goals or 
interests better than others [and] may be more or less compatible with the attributes of 
users” (p. 17). Additionally, Brey (2007) shows us how technology can differentially 
foster the self-respect of its users (though he does not connect this discussion to a 
Rawlsian conception): 
Technological artifacts make assumptions about the attributes and needs of their 
users, and when these assumptions are not met, users are not fully empowered by 
these artifacts. Users may even be disempowered by such artifacts, because 
empowerment is often a relative notion, defined relative to the empowerment of 
others. (p. 18) 
Though Brey is talking specifically about technological artifacts, it is not difficult to see 
how representation through categories or ontologies that are embedded in technological 
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artifacts, systems, or infrastructures can also fail to meet the expectation of users from 
marginalized backgrounds. For example, being presented with only two gender options 
on a form reinforces a binary gender system which undermines the value of a trans or 
non-binary persons’ identity.  
Not seeing one’s self reflected in the systems and structures one must navigate to 
acquire information or other goods (like medical services, for example) denies one an 
important basis for developing self-respect. But, where proponents of the standard 
account have to abandon Rawls in order to talk about ideas of empowerment and self-
respect, the sociotechnical account stays with Rawls (and his critics) by appealing to the 
productive role of sociotechnical relations within the basic structure and their 
consequences for self-respect in order to account for non-distributive dimensions of 
social justice, information, and technology. 
4.5 Summary: Comparing the Standard and Sociotechnical Accounts 
 As complimentary lenses, the standard and sociotechnical accounts are concerned 
with different dimensions of social justice, information, and technology. The standard 
account’s focus is distributive and centered on the instrumental importance of 
informational and technological resources for the pursuit of valued ends. Its primary 
mechanism for securing access to resources is the articulation of various informational 
rights and liberties to stand alongside other Rawlsian basic liberties, like freedom of 
expression or association. Implicit in the focus on informational resources and liberties is 
a conception of individuals as idealized rational agents, able to effectively exercise 
liberties and make use of informational and technological goods. The sociotechnical 
account, on the other hand, is concerned with non-distributive dimensions of social 
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justice, information, and technology. It strays from Rawls in following Young’s (2006) 
call to attend to the normative standards embedded in various structures—standards that 
support positive self-valuations and the development of self-respect for some but deny 
others similar opportunities. It also follows O’Neill (2000), as well as the patient-oriented 
spirit of Rawls’ veil of ignorance (as emphasized by Floridi, 2006), to conceive of 
individual agents and their self-respect as vulnerable and in need of support. Though it 
appeals to critics of Rawls, however, the sociotechnical account is still—I would argue—
still broadly Rawlsian in spirit, as it focuses on the ways in which sociotechnical 
practices that produce the background conditions of the basic structure can come to 
support or undermine the development of self-respect. The ideas of the basic structure 
and self-respect, as I have shown, are indispensible features of Rawls’ work.  
 To summarize, the various focal points of both the standard and sociotechnical 
accounts of Rawls as applied to information and technology are laid out below.  
 
 Standard Account Sociotechnical Account 
Technology and Society resource; instrumental embedded; co-constitutive 
Social Justice distributive; atomistic Relational; holistic 
Agents idealized; agent-oriented vulnerable; patient-oriented 
Rawlsian Focus primary goods; basic liberties basic structure; self-respect 
Provisions informational goods and 
liberties 
dignity and self-respect 
Table 1: Comparing the Standard and Sociotechnical Accounts 
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Chapter 5.0: Disclosing Google Books 
5.1 Introduction 
Following the method of disclosive ethics, the previous chapters were engaged at 
the theoretical level. Chapter 2 presented Rawls’ theory while Chapter 3 articulated the 
standard account of Rawls as applied to information and technology. The previous 
chapter drew on under-appreciated arguments and resources in Rawls’ theory to put 
forward an alternative framework—the sociotechnical account—for considering, in 
particular, non-distributive issues of sociotechnical relations and self-respect. In this 
chapter, I move from the theoretical level to the disclosive and application levels of 
analysis. After further introducing Google Books, I surface and discuss three morally 
opaque features of the project (disclosure): 1) quality of scans and metadata; 2) visibility 
(and invisibility) of information work patterned by the service’s snippet and preview 
mechanisms; and 3) the value of information as informed by library history and practice 
versus the algorithmic search environment engineered by Google. After discussing these 
features, I assess their relevance to social justice according to both the standard and 
sociotechnical accounts of Rawls sketched earlier (application). In the end, I use Google 
Books as illustrative of the idea that social justice issues with regard to information and 
technology go beyond matters of distribution and also extend to issues of development 
and design. In doing so, I also show how the sociotechnical account is able to foreground 
certain features of sociotechnical systems that the standard account is otherwise ill-
equipped to address.44  
                                                
44 It should be noted that the shift here from sustained discussion of Rawlsian political philosophy to a 
focus on Google Books risks confusing the use of certain terms. For example, “primary goods” has distinct 
meanings in an economic context (relevant to a discussion of Google Books as for-profit company) versus 
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5.2 Google Books: Background 
5.2.1 Relevance. The Google Books project is germane for demonstrating the 
applicability of both the standard and sociotechnical accounts of Rawls outlined earlier. 
As a project, Google Books is unprecedented and, in many ways, wildly successful—it 
stands to remain the dominant online digital library well into the future. As a large-scale 
information infrastructure, is also a rich example of complex sociotechnical relations 
organized between technologies, institutions, and individuals today. It invokes a wide 
range of stakeholders—from individual authors to multinational corporations to a 
potentially global public. 
Recalling Star and Ruhleder’s (1996) definition of infrastructure, it is possible to 
understand the complex relations organized by Google Books along a number of 
dimensions. For example, Google Books is embedded in (or “sunk into”) existing 
technological structures, as it is dependent upon larger networks like the Internet for 
facilitating access to its collection. In this sense, it is “built on an installed base” and, as a 
consequence, inherits certain limitations and a dependence on standards set by the World 
Wide Web and the Internet. The Google Books project is also embedded within existing 
economic structures, as it is designed to be sensitive to existing copyright interests (e.g., 
only showing “snippets” of certain copyrighted works). Google Books also shapes and is 
shaped by communities of practice, as its scanning initiative is informed by the practices 
of its partner institutions—namely, libraries—and, in turn, informs and overcomes 
localized practices of libraries to make their collections of books more universally 
accessible. In particular, this process of overcoming localized practices includes 
                                                                                                                                            
its meaning within Rawls’ theory. For present purposes, potentially confusing terms should be viewed 
within their Rawlsian context (i.e., “primary goods” refer to Rawlsian primary goods). 
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removing collections of books from contexts traditionally informed by women’s work 
(Harris, 1992) and subjecting them to the technical rationality of a male-dominated 
technology industry. Further, the service becomes visible upon breakdown. For Google 
Books, this goes beyond simple interruptions in service (not uncommon for Google 
services), as it is also evident in the dubious quality of many scans. Poor, indecipherable, 
or otherwise badly scanned copies of books expose the infrastructure of the Books 
project, making an otherwise transparent system visible to users.  
Attention to Google Books also takes on additional importance in light of its 
position within the overall landscape of digital scanning initiatives. Given its massive 
scope and size, it has become difficult for other institutions to justify allocating funds and 
other resources to developing alternative projects. As Paul Duguid (2007) puts it,  
with each scanned page, Google Books’ Library Project, by its quantity if not 
necessarily by its quality, makes the possibility of a better alternative unlikely. 
The Project may then become the library of the future, whatever its quality, by 
default (para. 6).  
One notable competitor is the Open Content Alliance (OCA)— an open academic 
consortium based around a partnership of libraries and corporate sponsors under the 
administration of the Internet Archive (Leetaru, 2008). Launched in 2005 as a counter to 
the commercial and proprietary practices of Google, OCA partner libraries make their 
collections available for scanning, while corporate sponsors provide funding for 
digitization (Leetaru, 2008). But while the OCA may represent a different, perhaps more 
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transparent approach to the digitization of library collections, it cannot keep up with 
Google Books in terms of sheer volume.45  
The inertia of the Books project is further evident within the HathiTrust Digital 
Library, which consolidates collections from Google, OCA, Microsoft, and other 
initiatives for preservation and institutional access purposes (HathiTrust, 2014). Despite 
drawing on various sources, scans from the Google Books project dominate HathiTrust’s 
collection. As Paul Conway (2013) describes it, behind HathiTrust’s “commitment to a 
longstanding mandate of research libraries is a simple reality: HathiTrust is now and is 
likely to be for the foreseeable future primarily a repository for digitized library volumes 
from Google’s foray into large-scale digitization” (p. 17). In fact, over 90 percent of the 
more than 10 million book scans in HathiTrust’s collection were originally produced by 
Google (York, 2010; Conway, 2013). As a practical reality, Google Books has become 
the dominant digital library in the world—not only as a standalone collection, but by 
serving as the backbone for other digital library efforts as well. Furthermore, it is likely to 
retain its dominance well into the future. 
In addition to its overall dominance, both proponents and critics of Google Books 
have highlighted its relevance to the pursuit of liberal values like liberty and equality. 
Proponents of the project have touted its potential for an increased “egalitarianism of 
information” (Schmidt, 2005, para. 9) through the creation of an educational and 
commercial platform to expand access. Others have argued that the Books project will 
generate an equalization of higher education institutions by opening up the collections of 
                                                
45 It should be noted, however, that the overall transparency and openness of the OCA as an alternative to 
Google Books can be called into question. See: Leetaru, 2008. 
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large research libraries to smaller institutions.46 Critics, on the other hand, have expressed 
concerns over issues of user privacy (Grimmelmann, 2010, p. 44-47), intellectual 
freedom and censorship (Zimmer, 2012), and the granting of an exclusive (though 
ultimately unsuccessful) deal to Google that seemingly circumvents—via the proposed 
settlement—established copyright law (Newman, 2011, p. 12). The possibilities touted by 
proponents speak to the ways in which sociotechnical infrastructures can enable 
widespread information access vital to the furthering of equality and individual liberty, 
especially if one conceives of information as a primary good. At the same time, the 
challenges of critics expose the ways in which Google Books might ultimately subvert 
the ideals of equality and individual liberty it claims to further. It is my aim to extend 
discussion of the relationship of Google Books and liberal values by surfacing morally 
opaque features and assessing them according to both the standard and sociotechnical 
account outlined earlier.  
In examining Google Books according to a liberal conception of social justice, 
however, I do not mean to imply that Google has the sorts of responsibilities for 
achieving or furthering social justice commonly associated with state or governmental 
agencies. To claim as much would be to misrepresent the motivations and interests of 
Google, as it is, foremost, a private companies providing a particular set of online 
services. Nonetheless, it is possible to distinguish between the motivations of a particular 
agent or agency and its capacities for promoting social justice. Whether or not a 
particular private project is motivated by a concern for justice does not preclude scholars 
or critics from examining the specific ways it might be capable of promoting justice (or, 
                                                
46 See discussion in Samuelson, 2009, p. 1320-1321. 
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inversely, perpetuating injustice). O’Neill (2001) has explicitly recognized this 
distinction in the context of nonstate agencies (such as NGOs) and transnational 
corporations, and argued that it is worth attending to their capacities as potential “agents 
of justice” rather than focusing on their supposed or assumed motivations (p. 189).  
From the point of view of achieving justice—however we conceptualise it—
agents and agencies must dispose not only of capacities which they could deploy 
if circumstances were favourable, but of capabilities, that is to say, of specific, 
effectively resourced capacities which they can deploy in actual circumstances. 
(O’Neill, 2001, p. 189)  
Danielle Citron and Helen Norton (2011), for example, have explored the role of online 
intermediaries like Google for fostering responsible digital citizenship. As made explicit 
in Rawls’ principles of justice, notions of equal respect and basic liberties (among them 
freedom of expression) are an integral to an account of social justice. Citron and Norton’s 
work points us towards at least one way Google’s services have been discussed as 
relevant to the furthering (or undermining) liberal and democratic values.  
5.2.2 A brief history. Google first launched its book scanning initiative in 2002, 
furthering the company’s stated mission to “organize the world’s information and make it 
universally accessible and useful,” (Google, Inc., n.d.). The project aims to do to the 
world’s collection of printed books what the company has already done for webpages: 
index their contents, analyze their connections, and make them searchable. In the first 
few years of its development, Google sought support from publishers willing to 
contribute in-print books to the collection—an effort now known as the Partner Program 
(Newman, 2011; Grimmelman, 2009). In 2004, Google also announced its “Google 
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Print” Library Project (Google, Inc., 2004), initially driven by partnerships with libraries 
at the University of Michigan, Harvard, Oxford, Stanford, and the New York Public 
Library. The goal of the Library Project was—and remains—to scan entire library 
collections for inclusion in the company’s books database. For Google, the Library 
Project held more promise than the Partner Program for the rapid growth of their 
collection, since it afforded them access to more than 15 million titles with only a handful 
of partnerships, compared to just hundreds of titles made available by thousands of 
publishers (Newman, 2011, p. 5). In 2005, Google Print was renamed Google Books in 
order to better communicate the initiative’s mission to the public (Google, Inc., 2005). 
While the Library Project helped rapidly expand Google’s collection, it was 
perceived as a potential threat to the copyright interests of authors and publishers. 
Though Google has always maintained that its use of scanned books from library 
collections was protected under fair use provisions, various interest groups and publishers 
objected that Google’s development and maintenance of a vast archive of library 
collections for commercial benefit represented a violation of copyright (Newman, 2011; 
Samuelson, 2009). In 2005, The Authors Guild of America and several individual authors 
brought a lawsuit against Google, maintaining that the Books project was a violation of 
copyright law. Shortly after, five publishers filed a similar complaint, which was 
eventually consolidated with the authors’ lawsuit (Grimmelmann, 2009, p. 3).  
In 2008, a settlement was proposed which would have released Google from 
liability for both past and future scanning efforts in exchange for $125 million in 
compensation (Grimmelmann, 2009, p. 4). In addition, the Google Books Settlement also 
1) proposed a non-profit Books Rights Registry to act as a mediator between Google and 
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copyright holders; 2) authorized Google to begin selling both individual books (in ebook 
form) and subscriptions to the company’s books database to libraries, universities, and 
other interested institutions; and 3) proposed the creation of a research database to open 
up Google’s collection for large-scale computational analysis and scholarly study 
(Grimmelmann, 2009, p 4-5). The initial settlement was met with much criticism. 
Objections to the agreement ranged from concerns over issues of privacy, copyright 
policy, and the collection’s inclusion of foreign books (i.e., books published outside of 
the United States) to accusations that Google was being granted an unfair monopoly over 
the digital books market (Grimmelmann, 2010; Zimmer, 2012). Still others objected to 
the settlement entirely, hoping for (and eventually receiving) a broad fair use ruling that 
would have benefits beyond Google Books. In response to these concerns, parties to the 
lawsuit proposed an amended settlement in 2009. The court rejected the amended 
settlement in March, 2011. 
In the years since its inception, Google Books failed to have the wholly 
transformative impact on the publishing industry anticipated by proponents and critics 
alike. As none of the lawsuits forced Google Books offline or prevented Google from 
continuing its scanning efforts, the project was able to move forward despite litigation. 
Eventually, Google Books settled into the broader information ecosystem of the Web and 
its preview mechanisms have effectively prevented it from sparking widespread 
copyright violation. The everyday utility of Google Books proved central to Judge Chin’s 
November 2013 ruling that Google’s book scanning efforts are protected by fair use. As 
Grimmelmann (2013) summarizes, the current position of Google Books 
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might have seemed unlikely in the early days of the lawsuit, when Google’s book 
scanning was new and scary. But [the] ruling demonstrates just how much the 
world has changed. Since Google began its program nine years ago, book 
scanning has become domesticated, and its benefits are easy to see. What was 
once viewed almost as science fiction has become part of our daily reality—
everyone, it seems, has used Google Books…. (para. 2) 
Judge Chin listed as primary benefits increased and efficient access to books, new 
possibilities for quantitative research of texts, improved access for disabled persons (as 
with text-to-speech capabilities for digitized text), and the granting of new life to 
otherwise neglected and out-of-print works (Author’s Guild v. Google, 2013, p. 9-12). 
Judge Chin also held that the service ultimately benefits authors and publishers, since 
Google provides links to retailers where a reader or researcher can purchase 
commercially available titles (Author’s Guild v. Google, 2013, p. 12). Finally, Judge Chin 
affirmed the optimism of the project’s biggest proponents in his assertion that “indeed, all 
society benefits” (Author’s Guild v. Google, 2013, p. 26). 
Beyond its application to Google Books, Judge Chin’s fair use ruling also has 
implications for the copying of digital information generally. As Jonathan Band (2014) 
describes, the reliance on fair use in Chin’s decision is “a function of the conflicts 
resulting from the interaction of a changing copyright system and evolving digital 
technology” (para. 11). The continual lengthening of copyright terms means that, today, 
more works are protected than ever before; at the same time, however, digital technology 
allows users to make dramatically more copies, often simply by “turning on their 
computer[s], viewing websites with browsers, responding to and forwarding emails” 
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(Band, 2014, para 11). Chin’s decision further solidifies the role of fair use in enabling 
and protecting not only large-scale initiatives like Google Books, but routine online 
activities as well. 
5.2.3 Surfacing morally opaque features. To use language employed by Star 
(1999), the above details reveal different narratives surrounding Google Books. One such 
narrative is a descriptive, roughly chronological, and largely legal “story” of Google 
Books and its relationship to other information institutions, like libraries and publishers—
as in the history sketched above. Another narrative might foreground what Google 
Books’ “does” from an aspirational standpoint: it works to achieve a heightened 
“egalitarianism of information;” it helps equalize institutions of higher learning; it 
improves commercial access to lesser-known or otherwise unavailable works; and it 
provides dramatically expanded access to relatively closed-off library collections. This 
type of story is typical of Google Books’ proponents and further reinforced by Judge 
Chin’s fair use ruling. This narrative, however, tends to consolidate the perspectives of 
the Books project’s many and varied collaborators as if they were part of a unified voice 
“with a presumably monolithic agenda” (Star, 1999, p. 385). In this case, Google’s 
“monolithic agenda” is presented as one dedicated to the organization and universal 
accessibility of the world’s information, as per the company’s broad mission statement. 
When surfacing moral dimensions of particular technology or platform, it is 
important to pay attention to the kinds of stories being told. In particular, we should pay 
attention to those stories that might be obscured or even forestalled by dominant 
narratives. For example, focusing on Google’s choice to first partner with publishers 
foregrounds issues of information control and intellectual property interests, while the 
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eventual decision to partner with libraries highlights the project’s struggle to balance 
values of efficiency (libraries had more to offer Google than publishers in terms of 
volume) with legal concerns (potential copyright infringement). From the perspective of 
some critics, the story of Google Books is one about a company largely unconstrained in 
its pursuit of a digital library at the expense of important library values like privacy and 
intellectual freedom. For still other critics, the project tells a story of a corporate entity re-
writing copyright law without legislation, outside of established legal channels. In light of 
Judge Chin’s fair use ruling, yet another story emerges regarding the role of fair use in 
enabling innovative digital information initiatives for both private and public benefit. 
From a broader historical and cultural standpoint, Google Books concerns the imposition 
of ideals of technological rationality and efficiency (typical of search engine technology) 
onto entire swaths of recorded human knowledge. All of these stories are large, sweeping, 
and complex; many of them have been told elsewhere. Save for the brief background 
sketched above, it is not my intention to retell them here. 
Instead want to tell three different stories, each of which aim to surface otherwise 
obscured moral dimensions of the Google Books project. In particular, each story 
foregrounds a different feature of the project in order to better understand the ways in 
which Google constructs particular kinds of relationships. The first story concerns the 
relationship between original texts and Google’s book scans. In this story, I draw on 
existing research as to the quality of scans and metadata within the collection and discuss 
its broader moral implications, particularly for those who lack access to other types of 
information institutions. In the second story, I attend to the relationship Google Books’ 
preview mode establishes between different types of information work, showing how the 
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project’s previews and snippets mechanism prioritizes the process of automatic indexing 
and obscures the information work of human indexers through its obscuring of back-of-
book indexes. Finally, I venture a story about the relationship between users and 
information relative to both libraries and Google. In particular, I show how this 
relationship—conceived of differently in each setting—constructs a particular conception 
of the value of information. Understanding these different conceptions is important for 
assessing the changing relevance of users’ moral and political claims when information 
once situated in a library context is submitted to the “black-box” of Google search.  
While not exhaustive of the range of features of Google Books that might have 
moral import, explication of these particular features allows us to begin attending to the 
relationships Google Books organizes between institutions, individuals, and information 
and their potential consequences for the development of self-respect for different 
individuals or groups. Many of these relationships would, however, go overlooked by 
discussions of social justice concerned primarily with distributions of goods. The 
standard account sketched earlier, for example, only allows us to consider these issues 
from the standpoint of primary goods and access to information; it only permits us a view 
of information as an indispensable good for the development and pursuit of individual 
ends. By contrast, the sociotechnical account centers on technologically-mediated 
relations between institutions and individuals and how these relations might support the 
development of self-respect for some while hindering it for others. Where the standard 
account focuses on the importance of information for pursuing life plans, the 
sociotechnical account examines the ways systems are implemented and access is 
structured to better understand their potential impact on the development of self-respect. 
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5.3 Google Books: Issues 
5.3.1 Quality of scans and metadata. Anecdotal evidence of poor or distorted 
pages and unreadable documents within Google Books has been available for a number 
of years. “The Art of Google Books”—a blog dedicated to capturing errors or other blips 
in the Google Books archive and presenting them as aesthetic objects out of context—has 
documented hundreds of errors, ranging from skewed or distorted images to margin notes 
and graffiti to scans partially obscured by human fingers (Goldsmith, 2013). Medieval 
historian Ronald Musto (2009) vividly describes such distortions or disruptions of texts 
as a type of “mutilation;” he has described being appalled by the “mutilated, good-
enough version of our already vicarious understanding of the past” encoded in historical 
texts “rushed through the scanning process so that Google could lay claim to as many 
artifacts of our cultural past in as short a time and with as small a budget as possible” 
(Musto, 2009, para. 15). For Musto (2009), there is a clear disconnect between Google’s 
promotion of the Books project and its reality: 
Google Books has represented to us that its massive digitization project will offer 
a valuable, reliable, open-access research tool that would make the digital at least 
the equivalent and—through its ubiquity and ease—the clear superior of print. It 
is, after all, the ‘public good’…that lies behind all of Google Books’ claims for 
fair-use rights to its digitization schemes. (para. 9) 
These aesthetic and anecdotal accounts raise important questions regarding digital 
preservation, research, and epistemology. From a practical perspective, however, the 
existence of hundreds—indeed, even many thousands—of such errors are to be 
unexpected from a digital scanning initiative as ambitious as Google Books. 
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Systematic attempts have been made to address the issue of quality in Google 
Books, though most efforts are limited in scope as the massive size of Google Books’ 
collection makes it difficult to assess the overall quality of Google’s scans or metadata 
records. In one study, Duguid (2007) zeroed in on a single text—The Life and Opinions 
of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman—in order to “probe what kind of quality [Google Books] 
might present to an ordinary user that Google envisages wanting to find a book” (para. 6). 
His analysis revealed a number of issues immediately relevant to a casual reader: scans of 
the book were frequently accompanied by inconsistent or missing metadata regarding 
volume information; text on the page was lopped off at the margins in some versions; 
most egregiously, Google’s automated scanning process outright removed the book’s 
iconic solid black page, originally inserted by the author in response to the death of one 
of the story’s characters (Duguid, 2007, para. 13). Though this particular scan does not 
necessarily reflect the quality of scans across the entire archive, it does call into question 
the quality of access Google Books affords an ordinary, everyday user. 
Other studies have attempted to document errors across a range of pages and 
texts, but results vary greatly depending on the parameters of a given analysis. For 
example, one study found a 1% error rate out of a random 2,500 page sample of the entire 
collection (James, 2010) while another study that limited its sample to fully available 
public domain texts published before 1923 identified a full 32% of texts to be of poor or 
insufficient quality (Gevinson, 2010). Based on a study of 93,858 pages from 1,000 pre-
1923 volumes, Conway (2013) found that a minority of fully viewable public domain 
texts could be considered error-free, but that the majority of errors are low-level and have 
a negligible effect on readability (p. 26). Outside of general readability, however, 
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Conway (2013) reports concerns that the pervasiveness of low-level errors as well as the 
widespread visibility of evidence of the scanning process (such as fingers or equipment 
visible in the scan) undermines the digitization standards set by other information 
institutions (such as libraries, archives and museums), replacing them with lower 
standards that become normalized as simply the cost of building such a massive 
collection (p. 27). Beyond low-level errors, the random distribution of fatal errors (that is, 
errors that render a text entirely unfit for use) throughout the collection also undermines 
its authority and trustworthiness, making it an ultimately unreliable source of information 
for users.  
Other examinations have shown how errors or inconsistencies in the scanning 
process produce poor or inconsistent metadata for individual texts (Nunberg, 2009; Chen, 
2012). In a study comparing the metadata entries for texts available in both Google 
Books and WorldCat, roughly one-quarter of the compared entries in Google Books did 
not actually contain a scanned copy of the corresponding text (Chen, 2012). As with 
random distributions of fatal errors, random distribution of absent or missing scans for 
particular records further undermines the authority and reliability of Google Books. 
5.3.2 Indexes and preview mode. The proliferation of information in digital 
form—as well as the increasing sophistication of the tools and methods available for 
managing information—has presented new challenges for indexers. The rise of 
automated indexing processes have allowed for the near-instant granting of access to the 
contents of digitized books via keyword access—computers are able to quickly and 
efficiently identify occurrences of words and direct readers to their location. Compared to 
human-generated back-of-book indexes, however, automated indexes are little more than 
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concordances—that is, simple lists showing where words or phrases appear in a text 
(Society of Indexers, 2013). Google Books full-text search is one example of automated 
indexing: for a given keyword or set of keywords, Google displays a list of pages in a text 
where the words appear. But mere concordances cannot account for contextual or 
intertextual dimensions of a text. For example, automated indexing processes have great 
difficulty handling homographs, synonyms, and significant versus trivial occurrences of a 
term.  
Wright’s (2012) comparative analysis of the different navigational tools available 
for the print version versus the Amazon Kindle e-book edition of historical novel The 
Devil in the White City by Erik Larson is illustrative of the limitations of automated 
indexing. The original print version of Larson’s novel included a human-generated index 
of 1,032 lines that was omitted from the Kindle e-book, leaving readers at the mercy of 
Amazon’s “X-Ray”—the service’s built-in automated indexing functionality (Wright, 
2012). While Amazon’s X-Ray allows for some interesting visual representations of 
textual data (tallies of word occurrences visualized on charts, for example), it failed to 
grasp many important details that were accounted for in the human-created index. For 
example, X-Ray linked readers to outside information (such as Wikipedia pages) for 
featured historical figures like William “Buffalo Bill” Cody, but it failed to recognize that 
“Buffalo Bill” and William Cody were, in fact, the same person.  
A great number of indexes have been scanned and included in Google Books’ 
collection. For public domain books, indexes are open and available along with the rest of 
a work—indexes are treated, along with the body of a text, in a uniformly accessible way. 
For in-copyright texts, however, Google does not treat back-of-book indexes the same as 
  
 
199 
the rest of a text. Instead, indexes are excluded from preview-mode altogether. That is, 
the Google Books preview mechanism does not show full-page previews of any part of 
an index, though it shows up to twenty percent of the rest of the text. In fact, for in-
copyright works, a user is only able to access “snippets” of index pages by conducting 
full-text keyword searches of the entire text and serendipitously happening on an instance 
of a term found in the back-of-book index. Deprived of any ability to peruse indexes, 
users are left to develop their own keyword searches with only the additional guidance of 
the Google-generated “common terms and phrases” tag cloud added to the metadata for 
each book. While these tags may help some readers formulate effective keyword-
searches, they still cannot account for the implicit knowledge and contextual 
considerations afforded by human indexes. 
Following Star (1999), information systems encode work in different ways. For 
example, a system may do certain things for you, it may require workaround or 
modifications in order for work to proceed, or it might leave gaps in the work that need to 
be bridged by other actors (Star, 1999, p. 385). In the case of human-generated indexes, a 
great deal of information work is done for the reader—key terms and concepts are 
codified, contextualized, and made easily accessible at the back of a book. In this sense, 
the work of indexers is encoded in a ready and visible way. Moreover, this type of 
information work is highly useful and highly valued—back-of-book indexes are 
indispensable to the work of scholars, researchers, journalists, novelists, and beyond.47 At 
the same time, however, authors of indexes are rarely listed or given explicit credit for 
their intellectual work. Mulvany (1995) notes a fear that the profession’s largely 
                                                
47 In the 19th century, authors such as Thomas Carlyle and Lord Campbell even went so far as to suggest 
that any author who published a book without an index should be denied the benefits of copyright (Beare, 
2007, p. 261). 
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anonymous nature “cloaks a lack of accountability and respect” for indexers generally (p. 
241). So, while the work of indexers is highly visible and highly useful, the workers 
themselves are largely invisible and often go unrecognized. In this way, indexing 
represents a type of information work with a tenuous relationship to visibility: indexes 
are clearly demarcated in the backs of many books and considered indispensable to many 
other types of work, while indexers themselves remain largely invisible. 
It is unclear, however, why Google should choose to exclude indexes from 
preview mode. The benefits to readers seem clear: as with other types of bibliographic 
information or metadata, the value added to a text by human indexers can help a reader 
quickly and effectively assess the relevance of a text to their needs. Further, there appear 
to be no immediate legal constraints placed on making previews of indexes available, nor 
does there seem to be any additional concern from publishers that indexes should be 
excluded. Though the Google Books Settlement is now void, its treatment of indexes is 
instructive in this regard. In it, indexes are classified as “Front Matter Display,” as 
defined in section 1.61 of the amended settlement agreement:  
‘Front Matter Display’ means the display to users of Google Products and 
Services of one or more of the title page, copyright page, table of contents, other 
pages that appear prior to the table of contents at the front of the Book, and 
indexes of a Book. (Author’s Guild v Google, 2011, p. 9)  
Importantly, there are no preview constraints placed on Google in the agreement with 
regard to Front Matter Display, as specified by “Preview Uses” in section 1.108 
(Author’s Guild v. Google, 2011, p. 16). Further explication of preview uses in section 
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4.3 also grant Google the right to display indexes along with other bibliographic 
information (Author’s Guild v. Google, 2011, p. 62).  
If Google treated back-of-book indexes the same way they treated the bodies of 
texts, then the Books service would—on the surface, at least—appear to simply extend 
the complicated visibility of human indexing into the digital realm. That is, if Google 
allowed blanket preview access to in-copyright books and their indexes, then it would be 
difficult to say that Google is doing anything more than inheriting from libraries the 
practice of encoding the information work of indexers in a particular way. But, this is not 
the case. Instead, Google excludes back-of-book indexes from preview mode altogether. 
If there are no external legal or practical constraints on the ability to show previews of 
index pages, then the decision to exclude indexes appears to lie with Google. Intentional 
or not, this obscuring of indexes means the further obscuring of the information work 
performed by human indexers: where the work of human indexers was once clearly 
visible, it is now obscured. 
5.3.3 The value of information. Google’s library partner program—starting with 
the University of Michigan in 2005 and expanding outward to today include the 
collections of more than 40 university, public, and national libraries—has been 
indispensable to the development and growth of Google Books. In return for opening up 
collections for scanning, Google provides libraries with digital archives of individual 
collections—an invaluable resource, the development of which would be otherwise out of 
reach for many institutions. Partnerships with libraries have made Google Books possible 
(at least as we know it today) while Google has helped libraries quickly and efficiently 
digitize large swaths of their collections. In this sense, it seems that the relationship 
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between Google and the mission of libraries is mutually beneficial: Google wants to 
index all of the world’s information and make it useful while libraries, as the American 
Library Association (2004) puts it, aim to make information “readily, equally, and 
equitably accessible to all library users” (n.p.). But, however mutually beneficial the 
arrangement initially appears, institutions like libraries and companies like Google are 
ultimately informed by different values that—as Waller (2009) has argued—reveal 
radically different conceptions of the value of information.  
It is the “grand tradition” of libraries that ready and equitable access to 
information is integral to a functioning democracy (McColvin, 1956; Waller, 2009). As 
Buschman (2004; 2005) describes it, libraries support the existence of a robust public 
sphere in the Habermasian sense—that is, they enact “the principle of critique and 
rational argumentation through the commitment to balanced collections, preserving them 
over time, and furthering inclusion through active attempts to make collections and 
resources reflect historical and current intellectual diversity” (Buschman, 2005, p. 2). In 
addition, the tradition of progressive librarianship has helped infuse library rhetoric and 
practice with a commitment to intellectual freedom (Samek, 2005).  As Morgan (2006) 
characterizes it:  
the public library exists primarily to provide access to information on all subjects, 
from all points of view, to all people…served by the library, regardless of race, 
nationality, ethnic origin, religion, income, age, or any other arbitrary 
classification. The individual library user exercises free choice about whether she 
seeks information or library materials for educational, recreational, informational, 
cultural, political, job-related, or other reasons. (p. 8)  
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 A commitment to intellectual freedom readily acknowledges the role of diverse types of 
information for supporting liberal freedoms like liberty of conscience and freedom of 
association. Further, by rejecting morally arbitrary distinctions between the types of 
information made available and the types of patrons served, libraries support an ideal of 
equal democratic citizens. The relevance of any given piece of information is subjective 
and contextual, determined by its usefulness to a user conceived of as a free and equal 
citizen—the moral and political claims of citizens directly inform the value and relevance 
of information. Ultimately, information in a library context derives its value from 
libraries’ role in promoting and preserving a democratic ideal. 
Despite being built on the backs of library collections, the Books project is framed 
by Google’s stated mission to “organize the world’s information and make it universally 
accessible and useful,” (Google, Inc., n.d.). While Google makes a broad and ambiguous 
moral commitment in its “don’t be evil” motto, the company is not immediately 
concerned with furthering democratic values or conceiving of its users as free and equal. 
For Google, the value and relevance of information is not determined by its subjective 
usefulness for democratic citizens; instead, Google indexes and organizes its information 
in a way that is useful for marketing and advertising purposes. In order to sell custom 
advertisements that appear alongside search results, Google must demonstrate that it can 
effectively match information resources to particular queries in ways that are consistent 
and relevant for advertisers. The value of information is determined by its relevance to 
queries and keywords that can then be sold for marketing purposes. By contrast to the 
subjective value of information for libraries, information in the context of Google is 
conceived of as “objectively” valuable insofar as it demonstrates relevance to a search 
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query (Waller, 2009, para. 11).48 The moral and political claims of users, then, are not 
directly implicated by Google’s conception of the value of information. 
The contrast between the subjective value of information for libraries and its 
objective value for Google exposes a fundamental tension between the two entities—put 
simply, libraries and Google “want different things” (Waller, 2009, para. 5). From the 
perspective of social justice, this tension raises questions as to the relevance of moral and 
political claims within different types of information institutions and infrastructures. For 
libraries, the moral and political claims of users directly inform the value of information, 
since information is valuable only insofar as it is subjectively useful for free and equal 
democratic citizens. For Google, on the other hand, information is only valuable insofar 
as it is objectively relevant to a given search query, regardless of the person inquiring. 
The relevance of users’ moral and political claims is not immediately implicated, since—
from the perspective of search engine algorithms—the question of information 
organization and retrieval is fundamentally a technical problem of connecting some set of 
resources to a query within the system.  
The distinction between the subjective value of information for libraries and its 
objective value for Google is made explicit in their different responses to problems of 
representational bias. Historically, libraries have served as sites for protest against biases 
embedded in information systems, such as library subject headings and classification 
schemes. Today, cultural and representational biases in information organization systems 
                                                
48 I borrow the term “objective” from Waller’s (2009) discussion of libraries and Google Books. By 
employing it, I do not mean to imply an additional value judgment—that is, I do not meant to suggest that 
the “objective” value of information is somehow morally or actually superior to the subjective value 
bestowed on information by libraries. In fact, both conceptions of the value information are subjective—
both libraries and Google rely on conceptions of information relevant from their subjective perspectives. 
Here, I only mean to use the term “objective” to distinguish between the value assigned to information by 
reference to search queries for Google and the subjective value assigned to information in a library context 
by reference to equal democratic citizens. 
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are well documented.49 With regard to the Library of Congress’s subject headings 
(LCSH) in particular, Sanford Berman’s 1971 book Prejudices and Antipathies: A Tract 
on the LC Subject Heads Concerning People is arguably the most visible and effective 
example of a critique of representational biases in library classification schemes. In the 
text, Berman (1971) addressed widespread problems of Western, white, and religious bias 
reflected the LCSH and proposed a series of 225 changes to remedy them.  
Though the library community initially met the work with mixed reviews, it is 
estimated that in the time between 1971 and 2005 at least 60% of Berman’s suggestions 
have been implemented either faithfully or in spirit (Knowlton, 2005).50 To be sure, the 
information and knowledge organization systems employed by libraries are not perfect—
any effort to organize the whole of human knowledge and experience to a set of discrete 
categories is inevitably reductionist and incomplete. Nonetheless, effective moral and 
political intervention for redress of cultural and representational wrongs is possible. More 
importantly, the moral and political claims of citizens against representational wrongs are 
immediately relevant to the value of information in a library context. 
Comparatively, the politics and biases of search engines are less accessible. In 
their seminal article “Shaping the Web: Why the Politics of Search Engines Matters,” 
Introna and Nissenbaum (2000) brought to light various political and moral dimensions 
of search algorithms like those employed by Google.  They endeavored to show how the 
                                                
49 Many scholars have forcefully and eloquently articulated the nature and effects of representational biases 
in classification systems. Notable examples include: the continuing subjugation of women to men and the 
mishandling of feminist subjects (i.e., Olson, 2001); the foreclosure of opportunities for certain types of 
queer representation (i.e., Keilty, 2009); and the long-term social and economic impact of policy and 
funding decisions based on controversial classifications (i.e., Bowker & Star, 1999). 
50 Many of these changes are documented and readily accessible in online copies of back issues of the now 
discontinued Cataloguing Service Bulletin, a quarterly publication of the Library of Congress that ran from 
1978 to 2010. Today, updates and changes to LCSH are made available in news items posted to the 
webpage of the Acquisitions and Bibliographic Access Directorate of the Library of Congress. 
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technical limitations of algorithmic search leads to “systematic inclusions and ex- 
clusions...that dictate systematic prominence for some sites, dictating systematic 
invisibility for others” (Introna and Nissenbaum, 2000, p. 171). It is well understood, for 
example, that Google’s PageRank algorithm examines not only the content of a given 
webpage but also the type and quality of the pages that link to it—as a consequence, 
pages with higher PageRanks tend to be more prominent in lists of search results. For 
Google, then, relevance is in large part continuous with popularity and visibility (Diaz, 
2008). Since the publication of Introna and Nissenbaum’s article, scholars have continued 
to critically address issues of information bias, censorship, online diversity, and 
democratic deliberation as they relate to search engine technology (Hargittai, 2007; 
Zimmer, 2008a; Diaz, 2008).51 Ultimately, work in this area is driven by “a desire to 
prevent online information from merely mimicking the power structure of the 
conglomerates that dominate the media landscape” (Granka, 2010, p. 365).  
The biases of search engine technology serve to exacerbate what Diaz (2008) calls 
“link inequality”—the disparity between underrepresented pages and thoroughly linked-
to and visible pages. To be sure, PageRank is not the only feature of Google’s search 
technology that generates a list of results for a given query—commercial interests, 
linguistic cues, Web metadata, and personalized results also contribute. However, insofar 
as Google relies on PageRank to deliver results, Google search does not mitigate against 
arbitrary inequality, but, rather, tends to mirror or exacerbate the uneven distribution of 
links on the Web (Diaz, 2008, p. 16). Recognizing the hidden or obscured politics of 
search engine technology challenges utopian visions of the World Wide Web as a 
                                                
51 For a dedicated review of literature on the politics of search engines, see Granka, 2010. 
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revolutionary, inherently democratic, and seemingly limitless platform for the exchange 
of diverse types of information. 
The moral and political consequences of automated search algorithms are clear in 
Google’s management of sensitive or controversial search terms. In a now infamous 
example, the top Google hit for the keyword “jew” was—for a time during the mid-
2000s—an anti-Semitic hate site. Upset with this particular site’s prominence in Google’s 
results, people organized and used a technique referred to as “Googlebombing” in an 
effort to replace the top Google result with the Wikipedia page for “Jews.” 52 This 
touched off a counter-“Googlebomb,” as neo-Nazi sites tried to reclaim the top spot for 
the original hate site (Grimmelmann, 2008/2009, p. 943). Google’s formal response was 
not to censor or edit the list of results, but to add an “Offensive Search Results” 
disclaimer that linked to a page explaining how the results list was generated. Conducting 
the same search today, the offending page persists on the first page of results (though it is 
no longer the first hit) and the “Offensive Search Results” disclaimer remains in place. 
Overall, Google’s official stance on the matter appears to be “don’t blame us, the 
computers did it” (Grimmelmann, 2008/2009, p. 944). In view of Google’s conception of 
information as directly concerned with connecting resources to particular queries, the 
response makes sense. For those affected by the prominence of hate sites in the results of 
the world’s dominant search environment, however, “the computer did it” offers little 
comfort. 
                                                
52 Googlebombing is a practice that takes advantage of the PageRank algorithm by generating a great 
number of links to a page, making sure that each link uses the same term or phrase. Over time, Google’s 
system starts to associate the chosen term or phrase with the linked-to page—but that also means that 
Google can be tricked, since “all you would have to do is get a lot of friends to create links using particular 
words” (Grimmelmann, 2008/2009, p. 942). 
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The claim here is not that people cannot or have not asserted particular moral or 
political claims against Google and search engines as points of protest—that is, as the 
foregoing discussion shows, not the case. Rather, it is to say that the different ways in 
which libraries and Google conceive of the value of information also generates a 
fundamental difference in how users’ moral and political claims are implicated. In a 
library context, the value of information derives from its value for free and equal citizens; 
for Google, the value of information derives from its relevance to search queries that can 
be sold for marketing and advertising purposes. In the case of Google Books, submitting 
library collections to the organization and algorithmic logic of Google search means 
displacing the moral and political claims of citizens—though proponents claim that 
Google Books helps open up libraries to broader, more “universal” access, it 
simultaneously sacrifices the immediacy of user’s moral and political claims on the value 
of information. 
5.4 Google Books: Applying the Standard and Sociotechnical Accounts 
5.4.1 Quality of scans and metadata.  
5.4.1.1 The standard account. The standard account emphasizes the role of 
information as a primary good and access to information as a basic liberty. Errors and 
poor quality scans within Google Books’ collection become relevant in terms of the 
effective exercise of informational liberties—in this case, an unreliable or untrustworthy 
archive potentially undermines the ability of individuals to effectively exercise rights to 
access information, especially for those without ready access to information institutions 
like large public or university research libraries. This complaint, however, might be 
resisted as unfair. Google Books, as previously discussed, is concerned with access 
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digitization as opposed to preservation and is not necessarily concerned with achieving 
the quality demanded by preservationists, information professionals, or researchers 
(Leetaru, 2008). Rather, Google is simply trying to create conditions for mass access to 
print materials online. In terms of generating conditions for widespread access, the 
existence of low-level error is largely irrelevant since, as Conway (2013) notes, such 
errors do not actively hinder reading. In order to make the massive amounts of 
information otherwise exclusively confined to libraries available online, pragmatic 
matters of cost, time, and space must be taken into consideration. On the standard 
account, poor quality scans and metadata can be dismissed as simply the cost of making 
valuable library collections widely and easily accessible online. 
5.4.1.2 The sociotechnical account. Where the standard account foregrounds 
access to resources, the sociotechnical account attends to relationships produced and 
maintained through sociotechnical systems. Google Books does indeed make collections 
previously confined to libraries readily available to a broader public, but—for many 
individuals—the possibilities for access to these texts are mediated entirely by the 
standards and values set by Google. Consequently, the unreliable access afforded through 
Google Books can be viewed as reinforcing (rather than overcoming) the gap between 
those with and those without ready access to alternative information institutions. Further, 
issues of institutional access and privilege are intimately bound up with an individual’s 
sense of self-respect. The sub-par access described by Duguid (2007) does not 
communicate to an ordinary user that their reading experience is valued more highly than 
Google’s desire to quickly and efficiently index massive collections of books. Instead, it 
reinforces and reminds us of unequal access and institutional privilege. This is not to say 
  
 
210 
that Google Books should not make available its resources; nor is it to say that there are 
no benefits to the massive collection the company has developed. What the 
sociotechnical account suggests, however, is a resistance to the idea that Google Books 
goes very far in bridging the divide between contemporary information haves and have-
nots in any broad, institutional sense. Instead, the sociotechnical account asks us to pay 
attention to the ways the collection might be indicative of further injustices in access to 
information, privilege, and power. 
5.4.2 Indexes and preview mode.  
5.4.2.1 The standard account. The standard account’s focus on rights and 
resources interprets Google’s preview mechanism as a pragmatic compromise between 
control and access—it is representative of a balancing act between the control sought 
intellectual property interests and widespread access to books for public benefit. The 
obscuring of human indexes in preview mode does not immediately appear to violate any 
particular information liberties, as main bodies of texts can still be previewed. Moreover, 
individuals are not wholly deprived access to indexes since they remain accessible 
through keyword searches. The differential treatment of back-of-book indexes may be a 
curiosity, but given that previews of the rest of the book are available, it is unlikely that 
the standard account would view their exclusion from previews as a problem for social 
justice. 
5.4.2.2 The sociotechnical account. The sociotechnical account’s holistic and 
contextual focus views the exclusion of back-of-book indexes from preview mode a 
relevant from a social justice perspective. This exclusion exposes the relationship Google 
Books establishes between the reader and the text as one mediated by a technical 
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rationality that priortizes efficiency and automation over expertise and contextual 
sensitivity. In this way, Google systematically promotes one sort of information work 
(automated indexing) over another (human indexing): users cannot effectively use a 
back-of-book index to assess a text and, instead, must rely on generating their own 
keywords for in-text searching. In short, Google Books promotes of the rationality and 
efficiency of algorithmic search over the expertise and contextual considerations of 
human indexing.  
If both human-generated and automated methods delivered similar or comparable 
results, this might not be cause for concern. However, human indexes and the sort of 
automatic indexes available in Google Books vary considerably. The differential 
treatment of different types of information work potentially undermines self-respect in 
two different ways. First, however unintentionally, it further obscures and devalues the 
work of one type of information worker, depriving them of an important basis for self-
respect. Second, individuals lacking the skills to formulate effective keywords apart from 
Google’s “common terms and phrases” tags are systematically disadvantaged in their use 
of Google Books. Without access to substantive alternatives for navigating the contents 
of a book, users attempting to assess the relevance of a particular text in preview mode 
are offered the rationality and efficiency of search engines but are deprived of the value 
of the implicit knowledge and contextual considerations added to a text by human 
indexers. 
5.4.3 The value of information.  
5.4.3.1 The standard account. The standard account and its focus on distributive 
justice makes no reference the value of goods being distributed outside of their 
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instrumental value for setting and pursuing particular ends. With regard to Google Books, 
the standard account is only concerned with attending to the expanded distribution of 
information goods—it is not concerned with the value bestowed on that information by 
the context within which it is embedded. Whether a book resides in a library or is 
captured by a scan in Google’s collection is only important insofar as it impacts its 
overall distribution. In line with the claims of the project’s proponents and Judge Chin’s 
2013 fair use decision, the standard account would accept that Google Books, by 
expanding access to a massive number of books, furthers information justice broadly. 
5.4.3.2 The sociotechnical account. The sociotechnical account is concerned with 
the ways information and technological systems exhibit their own value systems and 
provide (or elide) opportunities for the development of self-respect. On this account, 
libraries can be viewed as having served an important role in underwriting the self-
respect of persons especially in the senses described by Rawls—that is, they support self-
respect founded in part on an individual’s being accounted for as an equal citizen with 
shared responsibilities for making fundamental judgments about social and political 
issues. In short: they promote self-respect founded on equal citizenship. Libraries have 
also served as sites for protest and political intervention into information and knowledge 
systems. Challenges over banned books, critiques of classification systems, and debates 
over the role of libraries in local communities all offer individuals and groups 
opportunities to assert their self-respect. Boxill (1976), in particular, has demonstrated the 
importance of meaningful protest as important for the assertion and maintenance of self-
respect.53  
                                                
53 “People do not take the powerless seriously. Because he wants to know himself as self-respecting, the 
powerless but self-respecting person is driven to make others take him seriously. He is driven to make his 
  
 
213 
Search engines, on the other hand, organize different relationships between an 
individual and a text—and it is this difference that has implications for self-respect and 
social justice. Effective, concrete protest against an explicit taxonomy presents a more 
robust foundation for the exercise of self-respect by marginalized groups and individuals 
than protest against an opaque and constantly shifting target like complex and proprietary 
search engine algorithms. The comparative opacity of Google search is problematic in 
light of the power they wield online—they are able to direct and shape the flow of 
information on the World Wide Web, relying on automated algorithms for determining 
what content to display and what content to ignore in response to a given query. The 
complexity and proprietary nature of Google’s search technology makes assessing its 
moral and political dimensions incredibly difficult (Diaz, 2008, p. 17). Ultimately, the 
“black box” (Introna, 2007) of search algorithms and the “objective” value of information 
for Google present an unreliable foundation upon which to further develop a robust sense 
of self-respect. 
5.5 Summary 
 Taken individually, the dimensions of Google Books disclosed in this chapter 
might be considered curious and marginally relevant from a moral perspective. 
Collectively, however, they tell a story of the particular sorts of relationships established 
between institutions, individuals, and information through the design and development of 
an information infrastructure. The moral relevance of these relationships, however, is 
                                                                                                                                            
claim to self-respect unmistakable. Therefore, since nothing as unequivocally expresses what a person 
thinks he believes as his own emphatic statement, the powerless but self-respecting person will declare his 
self-respect. He will protest. His protest affirms that he has rights. More important, it tells everyone that he 
believes he has rights and that he therefore claims self-respect. When he has to endure wrongs he cannot 
repel and feels his self-respect threatened, he will publicly claim it in order to reassure himself that he has 
it. His reassurance does not come from persuading others that he has self-respect. It comes from using his 
claim to self-respect as a challenge” (Boxill, 1976, p. 69).  
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insufficiently captured by concerns over distributions and rights to access information. 
Consequently, the standard account has a difficult time assessing the overall relevance of 
the quality of scans and metadata, treatment of back-of-book indexes, and competing 
conceptions of the value of information for social justice. Indeed, from a purely 
distributive standpoint, Google Books appears to further the cause of social justice with 
regard to information. Without reference to quality, Google’s massive digital library 
improves access to information by making available books that would otherwise be 
inaccessible to the wider public. In this sense, the collection opens up new possibilities 
for a heightened “egalitarianism of information.” That Google prioritizes automated 
indexing and obscures human indexing does not immediately impact the overall increase 
in the distribution of books. In addition, the standard account’s focus on distributions 
forestalls an evaluation of the value assigned to information in different contexts—it is 
only equipped to address distributions of resources without reference to the value 
bestowed on them in a given context.. 
By contrast, the sociotechnical account’s focus on the different relationships 
mediated by Google Books suggests that the project does not—and perhaps cannot—
address issues of self-respect tied variously to institutional position and opportunity, 
information work, and the immediacy of users’ moral and political claims with regard to 
the value of information. On this account, the proliferation of Google Books and its 
“good enough” access is viewed as reinforcing a division between those with high-quality 
access to information institutions like prestigious research libraries and those largely at 
the mercy of Google. The sociotechnical account also attends to the moral relevance of 
the ways information work is encoded within Google Books by identifying its potential 
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impact on the ability of users to effectively navigate information as well as its further 
obscuring of the work done by human indexers. Finally, the sociotechnical account 
inquires as to how the value of information is constructed within different contexts. It 
finds a robust foundation for supporting individuals’ self-respect within a library context, 
where the value of information is directly informed by the moral and political claims of 
democratic citizens. In the context of Google, by contrast, the objective value of 
information derived from its relevance for particular search queries combined with the 
complex, propriety, and “black boxed” nature of search algorithms provides too uncertain 
a foundation for the assertion and maintenance of self-respect for many. 
It is not my intention to condemn Google Books as wholly unjust. Rather, I have 
tried to show how the different frames employed to assess the justness of a particular 
information or technological system can expose different dimensions relevant to 
furthering social justice. From a distributive perspective, Google Books offers expanded 
opportunities for access to books in ways that promote social justice. In particular, its 
digitization efforts have enabled—as noted by Judge Chin in his 2013 fair use decision—
widespread access to books for people with difficulties receiving text in book format. In 
this sense, Google Books promotes social justice by helping to reduce arbitrary or 
socially-constructed inequalities that stem from certain disabilities. At the same time, 
however, a non-distributive frame helps recognize that the expanded access afforded by 
Google’s massive digitization efforts also present new challenges. Attention to 
widespread rates of error and random distribution of fatal error within Google’s 
collection, for example, shows how the compromises to quality made in order to quickly 
and efficiently scan millions of library books have further consequences that are relevant 
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to social justice. Widespread but low-quality and unreliable access may attend to a 
quantitative divide between information haves and have-nots, but it also exposes further 
injustices with regard to quality of access. 
  
  
 
217 
Chapter 6.0: Concluding Remarks 
Imagine sitting at your computer and, in less than a second, searching the full text 
of every book ever written. Imagine an historian being able to instantly find every 
book that mentions the Battle of Algiers. Imagine a high school student in 
Bangladesh discovering an out-of-print author held only in a library in Ann 
Arbor. Imagine one giant electronic card catalog that makes all the world's books 
discoverable with just a few keystrokes by anyone, anywhere, anytime.”  
 
–Eric Schmidt, “Books of Revelation,” The Wall Street Journal 
 
Google is so strange. It promises everything, but everything isn’t there. You type 
in the words for what you need, and what you need becomes superfluous in an 
instant, shadowed instantaneously by the things you really need, and none of them 
answerable by Google.  
 
–Ali Smith, There But For The 
 
“...but everything isn’t there.” 
In Ali Smith’s novel, There But For The, Mark—a late middle-aged, gay 
Londoner—finds himself trapped in the middle of an awkward dinner party. When 
conversation suddenly turns to the topic of his sexuality, Mark begins to suspect that his 
invitation was less than genuine—it appears the waspy, Greenwich-based hosts have 
included Mark as a curiosity, a token sexual minority to shake up their otherwise 
heteronormative guest list. As the party carries on, Mark (a touch drunk on wine) drifts 
inward, quietly reflecting on his own private struggles with shame and longing as a result 
of sexual difference. He recalls attempts to combat feelings of marginalization and 
degradation using Google. He describes typing the words something beautiful into a 
Google image search only to be met with random pictures of sunsets, babies, and Mother 
Teresa. “Google is so strange,” he thinks to himself, “it promises everything, but 
everything isn’t there.” He sees value in the access to information Google provides, but 
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his perspective is jaded. “Sure, there’s a certain charm to being able to look up and watch 
Eartha Kitt singing Old Fashioned Millionaire in 1957,” he thinks, “but the charm is a 
kind of deception about a whole new way of feeling lonely, a semblance of plenitude but 
really a new level of Dante’s inferno....” 54 As another guest nods in agreement, Mark 
suddenly realizes he has been reflecting out loud for some time. He panics and stops 
talking. 
“Bit of a Luddite approach, though,” the hostess says. 
Mark, feeling sick, excuses himself from the table. 
Google Books as Infrastructure of In/Justice 
As with Mark’s cynicism in the face of Google’s techno-utopian plenitude, the 
treatment of Google Books in the foregoing dissertation runs the risk of appearing, at 
times, anti-Google. To blunt the force of such an accusation, I have tried—where 
relevant—to embrace the promise of the Books project as touted by its proponents. In 
many ways, it seems that all of society stands to benefit from Google Books, to use Judge 
Chin’s words (The Author’s Guild v. Google, 2013, p. 26). It would be unfair to assert 
that there could be no benefits derived from “putting tens of millions of previously 
inaccessible volumes into one vast index, every word of which is searchable by anyone, 
rich and poor, urban and rural, First World and Third, en toute langue” (Schmidt 2005, 
para. 9). In particular, vastly expanded resources for individuals with reading disabilities 
and the protection afforded to other routine online activities by extension of the fair use 
ruling in the Google Books lawsuit (as described by Band, 2014) are positive outcomes 
that help further the cause of social justice with regard to information and technology. 
                                                
54 Direct quotations are from pages 105 and 106 of the paperback edition of Ali Smith’s 2011 novel There 
But For The, published by Anchor Books. 
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But blind adoration of Google and the ways in which it might further distributive 
justice uncritically accepts features of the Books project that might undermine social 
justice in other ways. Evgeny Morozov (2011) has referred to an uncritical faith in the 
proliferation of ICTs as an unqualified force for good as “the Google Doctrine.” He 
describes as “irrational exuberance” the “intense Western longing for a world where 
information technology is the liberator rather than the oppressor, a world where 
technology could be harvested to spread democracy around the globe” (Morozov, 2011, 
p. 5). Certainly, the comments made by ex-Google CEO and current Google Executive 
Chairman Eric Schmidt fit squarely within the Google Doctrine. Though Schmidt does 
not make explicit reference to social justice or democracy in his discussion of the 
company’s Books project, Schmidt’s rhetoric carries with it an air of unlimited 
possibility—as if lives will be improved through sheer force of connection to resources. 
In the case of the Books project, an increased access to information around the 
globe is made possible by the different relationships organized and mediated by Google. 
But as Hume (1777/1975) reminds us, “the boundaries of justice...grow larger, in 
proportion to the largeness of men's views, and the force of their mutual connexions” (p. 
192). Understanding social justice in the face of advanced ICTs means not only attending 
to the number of “mutual connexions,” but to their nature and scope as well. Though 
Google may allow for more connections to be made between institutions, individuals, and 
information, those connections are structured in particular ways. The design and 
implementation of a project like Google Books opens up certain possibilities while 
simultaneously obscuring others. The quality of Google’s scans and metadata, its 
prioritization of certain kinds of information work over others, and its conception of the 
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value of information carry unintended consequences for users—consequences that cannot 
necessarily be reduced to distributive terms. Attending to the justness of a project like 
Google Books, then, means not only attending to distributive outcomes, but these non-
distributive dimensions as well. 
Unfortunately, many available frameworks for attending to issues of systematic 
injustice, discrimination, and inequality with regard to access to information and 
technology also struggle to account for justice outside of distributions. Deployments of 
Rawlsian theory in this area, as I have shown, regularly focus on information and 
technology as discrete sorts of goods, characterizing information injustice as little more 
than a relative lack of access to these goods. But, as the Young (2006) argued earlier, 
while distributions of resources, opportunities, and income are no doubt important, their 
dominance in discussion has tended to deflect attention from processes that do not fit into 
a distributive paradigm. Discussions of Rawlsian social justice, information, and 
technology inherit similar problems, as a focus on the distributions of goods and 
opportunities obscures questions of power and privilege in the design and development of 
the technological systems and information infrastructures that pervade our daily lives. 
In order to expand the scope of analysis beyond distributive issues, this 
dissertation has put forward an alternative to the standard account of Rawls in discussions 
of information and technology. This alternative account—the sociotechnical account—
aims to recover important non-distributive features of Rawls’ work, such as his basic 
structure argument and the social bases of self-respect. Where applicable, it also draws on 
insights from feminist, leftist, disabilities, and other critics of Rawls in order to arrive a 
more robust and inclusive picture of social justice than one concerned simply with 
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information or technological goods. By foregrounding these foundational pieces and 
critical discussions, the sociotechnical account avoids a narrowly distributive focus to 
show how social justice concerns with regard to information and technology might be 
otherwise accounted for in a broadly Rawlsian manner. It shows how sociotechnical 
relations are integral to the production and upkeep of Rawls’ basic structure and that 
technological artifacts and information systems are not merely instrumental to, but 
actively shape relations between institutions and individuals. In this way, sociotechnical 
relations can be viewed as integral to the promotion and preservation of what Rawls’ 
refers to as “background justice.” Finally, the sociotechnical account seeks to identify the 
ways in which these sociotechnical relations variously empower some and disempower 
others.  
Though addressing social justice issues within Google Books was the impetus for 
developing a sociotechnical account of Rawls’ work its relevance extends beyond the 
Books project. Theoretically speaking, it opens up new avenues for connecting potent 
ideas from discussions of philosophy, technology, and society to Rawlsian social justice. 
It pulls together and synthesizes the work of Rawlsian proponents like Drahos, van den 
Hoven, Brey, Britz and Duff and shows the strengths and limits of a focus on distributive 
justice. It recovers the importance of attending to issues of background justice and self-
respect for scholars working on issues of social justice, information, and technology; in 
doing so, it heeds Young’s call for “taking the basic structure seriously” and it attends to 
Dillon’s concerns over the relative lack of attention to issues of respect and ICTs. In 
doing so, however, it may be argued that this dissertation’s focus on the role of self-
respect is, in some ways, too narrow. The narrowness of the present discussion, however, 
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should be viewed as indicative of a particular focus on the role of self-respect within a 
broadly Rawlsian system of justice. No doubt, the value of self-respect merits sustained 
attention itself, in particular as it relates to broader discussion of respect, dignity and 
autonomy that—as Dillon noted—have received relatively little attention. It is my hope 
that thie discussion presented here may contribute to the further development of a more 
far-reaching account of the relationship between self-respect, information, and 
technology. 
On a practical level, it provides a theoretical foundation for further examination of 
the relationship between self-respect and information infrastructures. Understanding how 
different sorts of information infrastructures variously empower some individuals and 
groups by providing a secure foundation upon which to build a sense of their own value 
and disempower others by providing too slender a basis for a similar sense of self-respect 
is indispensible to assessing the justness of informational and technological systems. 
Though some ideas of the sociotechnical account remain underdeveloped—in particular, 
the notions of “informational disfigurement” and its connection to existing research on 
administrative violence—I have nonetheless tried to articulate a starting point for their 
further exploration.  
Ultimately, whether one adopts a distributive focus typical of the standard account 
or a relational lens as emphasized by the sociotechnical account has an impact on the 
sorts of issues that emerge from an analysis of a platform like Google Books. On the 
standard account, Google Books appears to generally further the cause of social justice 
with regard to information by vastly expanding access to books that would be otherwise 
inaccessible to a wider public. In this sense, Google Books works to achieve a heightened 
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“egalitarianism of information.” By contrast, the sociotechnical account’s focus on the 
relationships mediated by Google through the development and design Books shows how 
the project fails to address issues of self-respect rooted in institutional position and 
opportunity, information work, and the immediacy of users’ moral and political claims 
with regard to the value of information. Combined, these two accounts present a more 
complete—if mixed—moral exploration of Google Books as an infrastructure of 
in/justice. They paint a complicated picture of an information infrastructure that advances 
the cause of social justice, information, and technology in some ways, but might 
undermine it in others.   
Or, recalling Mark’s reflection, they reveal the how Google promises everything, 
but everything isn’t there.   
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